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1. Introduction 
Earmarking means dedicating specific public revenue streams to a specific purpose. These 
revenues then accumulate in earmarked funds. Politicians utilize earmarks to serve their clientele 
while voters are pleased to trace the taxes they pay (Wilkinson 1994). In an exemplary case, a recent 
ballot on the federal level in Switzerland cemented a road fund which joined its previously installed 
counterpart for the railroads. 1 Both funds benefit from various earmarked revenues, such as the 
motor vehicle tax, the petroleum tax, or the fees for the motorway sticker. Revenues from these 
sources are either totally or partly appropriated to the funds without going through the ordinary 
budgeting progress. With respect to the road fund, the Swiss Federal Council (2015, p. 2085) argues 
that “earmarked funds ensure that most of the money accumulated from road traffic fees are 
allocated to the road infrastructure”, which should warrant the user-pays-principle.2 Counting the 
motorist as their clientele, the Swiss People’s Party (2014) supporting the bill complained about the 
intended alienation of appropriated funds. They feared that the earmarked revenues could be used 
for a broader target group beyond their electoral base. On the other side of the political spectrum, 
the Social Democratic Party (2014), likewise in favor of the bill, wanted to extend the scope of the 
earmark to fund projects that were useful to the pedestrians and cyclists who are their clientele. 
Despite the enthusiasm, politicians also acknowledge the drawbacks that earmarking might 
entail. When contemplating the railroad fund, the Swiss Federal Council (2012, p. 1610) admits 
that “from a fiscal policy point of view, fund solutions entail disadvantages as they potentially limit 
the budget controllability and transparency and they can undermine economic solutions.” 2 From 
this point of view, earmarking prevents an optimal budget allocation. Accordingly, the expenditures 
for and, consequently, the amount of a public good, do not correspond to the public demand 
(Deran 1965). For this argument to hold, exponents of public administration literature assume the 
bureaucrat’s nature to be benevolent (Schönenberger 2013). On the contrary, earmarking can also 
be seen as a mechanism that enforces the government to spend a certain share of the total budget 
for the intended purpose. In the words of public choice scholars, earmarking is a remedy to tame 
the Leviathan. As a result, earmarking enhances the budget allocation according to the taxpayers 
preferences (Buchanan 1963). The two opinions have provoked a rich discussion in the literature, 
which has not yet come to a conclusion. 
The two opposing views show the general disagreement as to whether earmarking forces or 
impedes the budget allocation to correspond to the taxpayers’ preferences. To consider the 
predicted impacts of earmarking in more detail, some clarification of terminology is vital. Budget 
allocation means the allotment of public resources to the different public services in response to 
taxpayer preferences. Moreover, a government is considered technically efficient compared to its 
peers if it provides the maximum number of public services (i.e. outputs) given its bundle of 
expenditures (i.e. inputs). In contrast, a government provides its services inefficiently if there is 
overspending for excessively large offices, unproductive programs, et cetera. Furthermore, 
allocative efficiency denotes the optimal combination of inputs in consideration of their prices. 
                                                 
1 The vote about the fund for national roads and agglomeration traffic (Fonds für die Nationalstrassen und den 
Agglomerationsverkehr) took place on February 12th 2017 and obtained an approval rate of 61.9 percent. Its rail related 
pendant, the fund for railroad infrastructure (Bahninfratrukturfonds), was accepted by 62.0 percent of voters on February 
9th 2014. 
2 Translated from German by the author.  
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The definition of these terms underline that the technical and allocative efficiency on the one hand 
differ sharply from the concept of budget allocation on the other hand. While the former two are 
at the heart of the analysis, the latter is outside its scope. The methods to assess an optimal budget 
allocation are fundamentally different from an efficiency analysis and a corresponding assessment 
would therefore focus on a different research area. Accordingly, turning back to the empirical 
discussion of earmarking and efficiency, the further analysis focusses on the technical efficiency. 
Interestingly enough, when the question of whether to earmark transfers turns up, the politics 
and the scientific literature concur. They agree that earmarked grants negatively affect technical 
efficiency. Particularly, in 2008, the inefficient use of financial resources led to the reform of the 
fiscal equalization between the federal state and the cantons. One fundamental aim of the reform 
was to drastically shrink the share of earmarked transfers.3 The Swiss Federal Council (2001, p. 
2365) considers the cantonal use of earmarked transfers as less efficient than their non-earmarked 
counterpart. Following this logic, one might wonder why earmarking only unfolds its negative 
effect on efficiency with grants while other earmarked revenues are unsuspicious. So far, very few 
scientific papers have discussed the effect that earmarking has on efficiency, and in the practical 
debate the subject is basically absent. 
The neglected connection between earmarking and technical inefficiency in the political 
debates is surprising. Not only do earmarked revenues amount to significant fractions of the total 
budget (e.g. the cultural domain benefits on average from 35 percent of earmarked revenues), but 
also the politicians constantly seek for tools to induce an efficient administration. During the debate 
on the 2018 federal budget for instance, the terms efficiency and efficient were mentioned more 
than 40 times covering different parties, departments, and government bodies. While the 
parliament usually demands a more efficient provision of the public services, the executive claims 
to act accordingly. A right-wing parliament member expresses his concern about the newly 
reformed federal management system (Neues Führungsmodell des Bundes) that links financial resources 
with outputs and should then give the parliament more possibilities to control the administration. 
He doubts the benefits of the new system and he still considers the executive responsible as it “has 
the necessary expertise to set priorities and to stand up to the administration”.4 The statement 
exposes the fundamental intricacy involved when the aim is to make an administration more 
efficient. The external standpoint not only prevents identifying the part of the administration with 
potential for improvement, but it also challenges any overall determination of efficiency. 
A broad literature already works to approach and explain the efficiency of the public sector. 
All these studies share a common empirical structure. They relate some inputs to some outputs to 
attain an efficiency measure and they link them with certain environmental variables which 
potentially affect efficiency. Narbón-Perpiñá & De Witte (2017) provide a systematic overview of 
the efficiency studies focusing on the local public sector. They demonstrate the immense scope of 
the studies in terms of geographical coverage, methodological approaches, or the considered inputs 
and outputs. Moreover, while some authors concentrate on the public sector altogether, others 
assess the efficiency of some specific domains such as education, health, transportation, et cetera. 
                                                 
3 While the regime change of 2008 seemingly provides a promising setting to study the effect of earmarking, at least 
two counterarguments speak against such an identification strategy. First, the reform can be viewed neither as 
exogenous nor as an unexpected intervention. It responded to critiques of the old inefficiency-promoting system and 
its implementation had a long lead time. Second, the regime change concerned only the transfers but not all the 
remaining earmarked revenues. If anything, the reform would only enable testing the effect of earmarked transfers on 
efficiency. 
4 Hösli, W., November 2017-11-28, winter session of Council of States, Berne; translated from German by the author. 
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As explaining factors, Narbón-Perpiñà & De Witte (2007) list several categories like social, 
economic, political, institutional, or financial determinants of efficiency. Among the financial 
determinants, they mention transfers, debt, or the tax system. However, no study has so far 
considered earmarked revenues as revenue characteristic, which likewise might affect efficiency. 
Therefore, this study aims to determine whether earmarking has a positive or negative effect on 
the efficiency of public service provision and what factors condition this relationship. 
While the other financial related efficiency determinants generally arise from the fiscal illusion 
theory, no comparable line of argument exists for earmarked revenues yet. Arguing with a public 
choice logic, taxpayers are subject to a fiscal illusion if they fail to correctly perceive the cost of the 
public service (Buchanan 1967). Underestimated costs seduce bureaucrats to exploit voter 
generosity and to appropriate personal rents which eventually leads to inefficiency (Wyckoff 1990). 
The misperception might arise, among others, from the revenue characteristics mentioned above 
(i.e. debt, transfers etc.)(Oates 1985). Likewise based on the public choice framework, this study 
develops a formal argument, claiming that ministers prevent the debate during the budgeting 
process by hiding behind revenues that are earmarked for their department. They are thereby less 
monitored by their colleagues and thus able to appropriate personal rents. As a result, the 
government provides its service again less efficiently. This chain of reasoning, henceforth called 
debate prevention, hypothesizes that higher shares of earmarked revenues lead to a less efficient 
public service provision. 
As an empirical foundation to test the hypothesis, the 26 Swiss cantons provide an appropriate 
data source. Given their shared legal context paired with ample fiscal autonomy, the Swiss second 
state layer has already led to various empirical applications in economics, public administration, 
and political science literature. Particularly in public finance, the data prove valuable as the Federal 
Finance Administration (2016) harmonizes the figures of the annual accounts, which improves 
comparability. In addition, a common functional classification splits the revenues and expenditures 
into different domains of public activities (Conference of cantonal finance directors 2008). This 
enables testing the hypotheses for specific domains. Since it turns out that earmarked revenues are 
most dominant in the two domains culture and transportation, the study mainly focuses on these 
two government functions. In order to account for canton-specific effects and to increase the 
number of observations, the study rests on panel data from 2000 to 2014. 
While the official statistics provide a tremendous amount of quantitative information about 
the cantons, a statistic regarding earmarking is still lacking. One reason for this gap is the 
proliferation of different applications of earmarking among cantons. Despite the common chart of 
accounts, which also outlines the application of earmarking, the actual practice is still rather 
heterogeneous. This study sets a milestone by defining earmarking in detail and by giving an 
overview of its relevance in the Swiss cantonal context. 
Following numerous previous publications (e.g. Kalb, 2010a; Widmer & Zweifel, 2012; Afonso 
& Fernandes, 2008; Seifert & Nieswand, 2014), two methods assess the theory and challenge the 
hypotheses. The non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), on one side, first estimates 
cantonal efficiency and, in a second step, regresses the revenue characteristics on these efficiency 
scores. While largely avoiding specification problems of the production frontier, DEA struggles 
with integrating a stochastic error. The parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), on the other 
side, incorporates both steps in one estimator and roughly turns the drawbacks of the DEA to 
advantages and vice versa. 
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The main results show that earmarked revenues affect efficiency differently depending on which 
government function is considered. Using data from the culture domain, earmarking indeed 
impedes an efficient public service provision, which supports the debate prevention hypothesis. 
On the contrary, earmarking in the transportation domain has a positive effect on efficiency. The 
principal explanation for this difference comes from the existing literature, which sees three 
conditions for an earmark to work: first, a strong link between the taxed and the benefitting good; 
second, the possibility of differentiating the benefitting good from other public goods or services; 
third, a close match of people utilizing the taxed good and the beneficiary good and an excludability 
of those who do not contribute (Brazer 1984; Lee & Wagner 1991; McCleary 1991). 
However, the empirical evidence found is insufficient to exclude alternative explanations. A 
second possible reason for the opposing results of the two domains is the inherently differing 
intentions of the earmarks. While the transportation domain indeed seeks to mimic the user-pays 
principle of a private good, the earmarks in the cultural domain might instead be driven by a 
redistribution idea, where efficiency is not a priority. Yet another cause for the unexpected positive 
effect in the transportation domain even challenges the debate prevention fundamentally. 
Preventing the debate also means that the administration can focus on effective service provision 
instead of putting effort into political discussions; in consequence the departments benefitting from 
earmarked revenue could provide their services more efficiently. A further explanation is a 
methodological one, since both approaches applied here cannot handle possible endogeneity 
problems. Briefly speaking, the results show that earmarking is not good or bad per se, but the 
insights cannot make a final assessment on the true mechanisms leading to a positive or a negative 
effect on efficiency. 
In sum, the study involves three major contributions. First, it formalizes a theory to link 
earmarked revenues and the efficiency of public service provision. Second, it proposes a measure 
to quantify the practice of earmarking in the Swiss cantons and provides the respective statistical 
information for 2000 to 2014. Third, it demonstrates how to apply the two-stage Data 
Envelopment Analysis in a panel context without contradictory ad-hoc assumptions. In addition, 
several minor but novel approaches provide alternative practices for old questions. For instance, 
instead of treating plain transfers, they are split into three tiers according to their intensity of 
appropriation. Likewise, a single measure to approximate the progressivity of the tax system is 
developed in order to estimate the effect of the tax illusion in the Swiss cantons. Lastly, a widening 
of the data sources (to the association of Swiss museums, the federal office of sport, or to the 
federal office of police) makes it possible to more accurately estimate the cantonal efficiencies. 
The study is structured as follows: After the introduction, the literature review presents the 
previous discussion in the relevant research areas. Hereupon, the theoretical models develop the 
hypotheses before the subsequent fourth chapter demarcates the empirical context. Next, the 
revenue characteristics are operationalized in Chapter five and the sixth chapter proposes measures 
of efficiency. The seventh chapter combines the efficiency estimates with the revenue 
characteristics and tests the hypotheses. To introduce a further methodological perspective, chapter 
eight examines the theory qualitatively and, finally, the last chapter concludes. To provide a non-
technical summary, an introduction and a conclusion enclose each chapter.  
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2. Literature review 
The current theoretical literature mainly treats two related questions with respect to earmarking: 
What motivation do governments have to earmark revenues? What influence does earmarking have 
on public support for new taxes? Regarding the first question, several authors argue that the 
government utilizes earmarks to bind future administrations to their policies (Brett & Keen 2000; 
Jackson 2013). At the same time, the incumbent administration might use earmarking to commit 
to its policy program and thereby to increase its reelection probability (Anesi 2006; Stratmann 
2013). Alternatively, some departments might use earmarking as a signal for their competence. 
According to Glazer and Proost (2007), competent departments bundle a less transparent public 
service with a more observable one if they provide the latter of high quality. Earmarking thus serves 
as a credible bundling mechanism. Addressing the second question, Baranzini and Carattini (2017) 
find in their survey-based study that the acceptance of additional taxes is higher if they are 
earmarked. They explain the willingness and higher trust the taxpayer puts into the government if 
she can trace the financial resources. In contrast to these two prominent questions, the aspect 
treated in this paper has not been developed for a long time, although the research community did 
not come to a conclusion yet. The further literature review therefore rests largely on older studies 
that assess the impact of earmarked revenues on efficiency. 
The theoretical literature on earmarking in relation to efficiency mainly separates into two 
camps. On one side, there are the public finance scholars who reject earmarking due to its 
inflexibility in terms of budget allocation (Lee & Wagner 1991). On the other side, public choice 
scholars see earmarking as a solution to tame the Leviathan (Buchanan 1963). Ultimately, it is the 
fundamentally different image of humanity that sunder the two camps, which possibly impedes a 
final agreement. And yet, critique of the public administration scholars is indicated as most of them 
insufficiently substantiate their argument, why earmarking should have a negative impact on 
technical efficiency. Only a few papers unify earmarking and technical efficiency in a formalized 
theory but they either disregard the supposed underlying mechanism of the causal effect, or the 
theory covers only a specific field (Martínez 2014; Brennan & Buchanan 1978; Bös 2000). Just as 
in the theoretical literature, the empirical papers assessing the effect of earmarking on efficiency 
are very rare. 
When it comes to further revenue features that potentially affect efficiency, the theoretical 
literature is much more developed. Since the seminal paper by Oates (1985), the idea of fiscal 
illusion disseminated into different directions and encouraged researchers to advance the theory. 
Today, five sources of fiscal illusion are broadly accepted and three of them have also been tested 
empirically with technical efficiency as a dependent variable. However, neither grants nor 
indebtedness furnishes unambiguous evidence for a negative or positive effect on efficiency. Only 
one study exists with respect to tax complexity, and this hardly suffices for a substantial statement. 
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2.1. Two views on earmarking 
Unlike the still meager literature would suggest, the earmarking of revenue is a widespread 
practice. Roberts (2002) lists several examples for the US in various policy areas such as security, 
infrastructure, health, telecommunication, education, environment, and social security. McCleary 
(1991) provides a similar enumeration for other countries. Particularly in Switzerland, a report of 
the Swiss Federal Council (2013) names a large scope where public revenues are earmarked: 
agriculture, air traffic, infrastructure, environment, et cetera. Additionally, the inventive vocabulary 
used to frame earmarking indicates the popularity of this kind of funding mechanisms. The 
creativity ranges from ring-fenced fund over recycle revenues, segregated funding, autonomous 
revenue streams, pork-barrel spending, tax hypothecation, or hypothecation to lockboxing 
(Roberts 2002; Jackson 2013). 
From a political point of view, politicians and citizens may simultaneously relish earmarking 
revenues. Frequently mentioned among practitioners is the ease to sell new taxes to the citizen in 
return for a new program, that is earmarking taxes lowers the resistance for increasing them. The 
argument works on both sides of the political spectrum. Leftwing voters appreciate earmarked 
revenue as they feel they are paying directly for more or better services. To the libertarian right, 
earmarking seemingly demonstrates the cost of state services in a more transparent fashion 
(Wilkinson 1994). In addition, earmarking stabilizes the revenue for a certain service or at least 
guarantees a minimal financial foundation desired by specific interest groups from either political 
camp (Brazer 1984). For further and more profound political arguments see Bird & Jun (2005). 
Despite the political acceptance of earmarked taxes among citizens, one possibility why policy-
makers keep on looking for new terms to describe the same practice is that they feel urged to 
exculpate themselves when introducing a new fund. Given the mainstream view of classic public 
administration literature, this feeling is comprehensible. In the Weberian tradition, where the 
administration is omniscient and follows a logic of a benevolent despotism, earmarking revenues 
does not compute (Ostrom 2008). A predefined budget allocation unnecessarily limits the 
administration’s scope to maximize social welfare (Lee & Wagner 1991). In general, the argument 
of misallocation due to predefined appropriation is the most prominent reasoning of opposing 
earmarks (Deran 1965; Oakland 1984; Jankowski 1984). Schönenberger (2013) underlines the 
confining aspect towards the administration and he dismisses earmarked revenues as being 
politically motivated. Jankowski (1984) sees in earmarked funds even an encouragement for special 
program advocates who seek to prevent a debate about limited financial resources. In sum, theorists 
following the logic of public administration conclude that earmarking revenue cuts the efficiency 
of public service provision. 
With the advent of public choice literature, the practice of earmarking revenues increasingly 
attracted attention among researchers. It became seen as a disciplinary tool hindering politicians 
from abusing their influential position in the budgetary process. To put it more positively, 
earmarking makes it possible to redress tie-in sales offered by the government under general fund 
financing (Buchanan 1963; Goetz 1968). The necessity to curb the administration reveals the 
underlying skepticism against its benevolent nature, which is typical for supporters of the public 
choice stream (Tullock 2008; Niskanen 1975; Migué et al. 1974; Wyckoff 1990; Persson & Tabellini 
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2002) and which is writ large in the view of the state as a Leviathan (Brennan & Buchanan 1978). 
From this perspective, earmarking can even help to fight against rigid budgeting procedures under 
certain circumstances (Bird 1982). Moreover, linking a levy with a certain public service seems to 
be a fairer tax system because the beneficiary pays for his own utility (McCleary 1991). Also, it 
provides the administration with information about the true demand for a public good (Bird & Jun 
2005). In this sense, earmarking per se is not the first best solution but it substitutes a direct user 
charge if the latter is not feasible (Lee & Wagner 1991). Besides the fairness argument, user charges 
induce no or less distortions in contrast to income taxes for instance and they are therefore more 
efficient (Brazer 1984). Briefly speaking, in the view of – prior – public choice scholars, earmarked 
revenues force the administration to provide their services more efficiently (Buchanan 1963). 
The positive attitude towards earmarking among adherents of the public choice school has again 
provoked critique. Two arguments challenge the charge-characteristic of earmarks. On one hand, 
the buyer of a good whose tax is earmarked for a specific service cannot decide individually upon 
the amount of the service financed by the earmarked tax; only the median voter has this privilege 
(Bös 2000). On the other hand, according to Musgrave & Musgrave (1973), earmarking fails to 
meet the intended benefit (i.e. user-pays) principle because the link between the taxed complement 
and the benefitting public good is usually rather weak; Lee & Wagner (1991) acknowledge this 
weakness. In fact, the unavailability of a complement to guarantee a user charging mechanism is 
often the reason why the state, instead of a private supplier, performs a certain task in the first 
place (Oakland 1984). McMahon & Sprenkle (1970) detail the argument in pointing towards the 
different price elasticities of the taxed good and the public service financed by earmarked taxes. 
Assuming nevertheless that the good to be taxed and the benefitting public service are perfect 
complements and have the same elasticities, the tax rate still remains arbitrary. Besides many others, 
Goel & Nelson (1999) and Lee & Tollison (2013) show both theoretically and empirically that the 
tax rate imposed on a good in order to fund a particular public service depends on political 
considerations. Moreover, from a distributional point of view a beneficiary financing is doubtful 
after all because the service might be publicly provided in order to make it available for poorer 
classes of the population; according to Oakland (1984) beneficiary financing is just as little desirable 
if the public good in question has important merits. In case of a pure public good, the free riding 
problem incentivizes the beneficiaries to hide their true preferences anyway (Teja 1988). In sum, 
the dispute seems to bear three recurrent conditions under which earmarking might lead to more 
efficient public service provision: First, a high correlation between the taxed good and the 
benefitting public service or good; second, a significant differentiation from other public goods or 
services in order to prevent hidden cross-financing; third, a strong homogeneity among payers of 
the taxed good and the beneficiaries of the good financed by the earmarked revenue and an 
excludability of those who do not pay (Brazer 1984; Lee & Wagner 1991; McCleary 1991). 
Drawing premature conclusions from the theoretical literature bears some risks though. First, it 
is often unclear what the scholars mean by efficiency. For instance, Buchanan (1963) mostly puts 
the word efficiency in quotation marks and his examples of tie-in sales indicate that he means a 
budget allocation that corresponds to the preferences of the taxpayer; this understanding of 
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‘efficiency’ is far from how efficiency is defined in our analysis.5 At the same time, Roberts (2002), 
among others, refers to technical efficiency citing the expression of ‘getting more for less’. Second, 
the rationale behind the opposition against earmarked revenue is poorly substantiated. The 
opponents simply criticize the rigidity that earmarking imposes and they defeat theories that 
emphasize any positive aspects of earmarking. However, they mostly fail to explain how the 
inefficiency effectively comes about. 
Nonetheless, a few critical authors autonomously develop and formalize a line of argument that 
links earmarking with low technical efficiency. Possibly the first authors who married the two 
concepts were Brennan & Buchanan (1978). The authors emanate from the Leviathan, in other 
words from the state as a monopolist that enables the bureaucrat to maximize his utility. Assuming 
that bureaucrat’s goal is to maximize the surplus he can use as slack, earmarking can prevent some 
inefficiencies. If the public good and the taxed private good are complementary, the bureaucrat has 
an incentive to provide some of the public good in order to be able to raise taxes in the first place. 
Perfect complementary goods even lay the ground to create a tax law that ensures a fully efficient 
public good provision, i.e. there is no surplus left the bureaucrat can pinch as slack. Martínez (2014) 
chooses a different approach. He relies on the assumption that a voter is better informed about 
general tax revenue than about earmarked revenue and in consequence, the bureaucrat puts more 
effort toward an efficient public good provision. This assumption is plausible in his case, because 
he only considers royalties from the extraction of oil as earmarked revenue, which limits the scope 
of his model. Bös (2000) makes the decision about earmarking endogenous and concludes that 
even a welfare-maximizing parliament must collect too much tax in order to make sure they meet 
the earmarking constraint, i.e. guaranteeing that the earmarked tax covers the cost of the benefiting 
public service. Because of the distortionary effect of taxes, earmarking indirectly engenders 
inefficiency. 
Albeit all three authors theoretically explain why earmarking decreases the technical efficiency, 
they stay at the macro level without penetrating the underlying functional chain. Put differently, 
the earmarking literature did not succeed in exploring the conceptual underpinnings with enough 
care and rigor. The lack of a substantiated theory is probably the reason why authors of public 
choice literature usually refer to some vague classic literature on public budgeting, public 
administration, et cetera when designating their opponents rather than explicitly citing specific 
articles (see for instance Dye & McGuire, 1992; Gwilliam & Shalizi, 1999; Bös, 2000; Bird & Jun, 
2005). Section 3.1 yields an attack surface for the defenders of earmarking. Instead of simply 
criticizing existing ideas that promote earmarking, the debate prevention theory is a formalized 
model that explains why earmarking generally impairs the technical efficiency of public service 
provision when a collegial government is in charge. 
The empirical evidence is mixed. First and foremost, no more than one article actually 
empirically studies the efficiency of the public service provision as the dependent variable, whereas 
all the others examine the effect of earmarked revenues on public expenditure, which is another 
question. The exception is Martínez (2014) who examines the influence of earmarked revenue on 
local public good provision in Colombian municipalities. The Colombian law appropriates the 
                                                 
5 Remember the definition above: A government is considered technically efficient compared to its peers if it provides 
the maximum number of public services (i.e. outputs) given its bundle of expenditures (i.e. inputs). 
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revenue stemming from oil royalties to basic public services. Martínez operationalizes efficiency 
with specific outcome variables depending on the service in question. With the net school 
enrolment rate of six- to fourteen-year-olds he approximates the efficiency in education. In the 
health domain, he rests on the infant mortality rate and the percentage of the poor population with 
access to subsidized health insurance. Finally, the water quality should approximate the quality of 
the infrastructure. His results show that increases of the general budget boost the public goods 
indicators at least ten times more than an equivalent increase in earmarked revenues. 
Empirical studies explaining the expenditures by earmarked revenue largely pivot on the state 
level of the U.S. and on a limited scope in terms of government functions. Regarding expenditures 
for highways, education, and welfare, Deran (1965) finds only for the welfare a significant positive 
effect of earmarked revenue on expenditures. A later study differentiates between absolute levels 
of earmarked revenues and the earmarked share of total revenues (Dye & McGuire 1992). Only 
the latter specification yields a significantly negative effect in the case of education spending. In 
none of the models does earmarking significantly affect highway expenditures; Crowley and Hoffer 
(2012) explain this phenomena by crowding-out effects. They claim that the government uses the 
earmarked revenue to replace unbound funds which in sum leads to a growth of the total 
expenditures. Likewise, Nesbit & Kreft (2009) assess an almost proportional positive effect. On 
the contrary, Goel & Nelson (2003) report a 2.5 dollar decrease of highway expenditures for every 
dollar of motor-fuel taxes diverted for general fund purposes.  Afonso's (2015) results point in the 
same direction. Jung (2002), who focuses on data from Georgian counties, provides some evidence 
for a positive link. The earmarked revenues originate from sales taxes and are designated to finance 
local capital projects ranging from infrastructure for transportation (roads, streets, airport facilities), 
security (police, jails, courthouses, correctional facilities), to health (hospitals), et cetera. According 
to him, an extra dollar of earmarked revenue leads to a fifty percent increase in the envisaged 
spending area. Navarro (2002) and Evans & Zhang (2007) even estimate an increase of about 80 
percent when lottery revenues are linked with educational spending. In sum, earmarking seems 
rather to have a crowding-out effect that results in lower spending compared to general fund 
financing. 
The outlined overview should not give the impression of an unrestricted comparability of the 
results. Particularly when it comes to any international comparison, earmarks and their funds are 
shaped so differently that a mixing of the results could lead to false conclusions (Bird & Jun 2005). 
Nevertheless, the literature review shows that there is neither theoretical nor empirical agreement 
among researchers as to whether earmarking has a positive or a negative effect on the efficiency of 
public service provision. 
2.2. Fiscal illusion 
The early literature, from which the idea of fiscal illusion emanates, dates back to Puviani (1903). 
He already mentions revenue characteristics such as debt financing or tax diversification that later 
drew a lot of attention in the literature. However, it took more than sixty years until the research 
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community jumped on the bandwagon.6 While Buchanan (1967) by and large seizes on the earlier 
ideas and repeats archaic superficial theories, Oates (1985) scrapes out the most important aspects, 
research-wise for today, and concisely defines fiscal illusion as the “systematic misperception of 
key fiscal parameters [that] significantly distort fiscal choices by the electorate”. The trigger for 
such a misperception may be various and Oates summarizes them under the following 
characteristics: 1. the complexity of the revenue structure, 2. the renter illusion, 3. the income 
elasticity of the tax structure, 4. the debt illusion and 5. the flypaper effect. In the meantime, Wagner 
(1976) was the first to test fiscal illusion empirically, whereas in the same paper, he developed a 
formal model which explains public overspending based on the complexity of the revenue system. 
After a bunch of further empirical studies assessing other revenue characteristics, Dollery & 
Worthington (1996) embedded the other four revenue characteristics in the formal model. 
Concentrating on the specificities of the flypaper effect alone, Wyckoff (1990) proposes a similar 
model which links overspending with intergovernmental transfers. In contrast to the Dollery & 
Worthington (1996) model though, Wyckoff (1990) shows that the voter’s misperception does not 
only lead to overspending but also to a stronger extraction of rents on the side of the bureaucrats. 
In other words, Wyckoff (1990) links an inefficient public service provision with intergovernmental 
grants. The theory chapter of the present work seizes on this idea (section 3.3) and adds the other 
revenue characteristics to it (section 3.4). 
Besides the before-mentioned relatively old papers, fiscal illusion was also tested empirically in 
more recent works. The most prominent variable among the revenue characteristics is the amount 
of grants and how this affects efficiency. Mostly, the papers report a negative effect (De Borger & 
Kerstens 1996; Balaguer-Coll et al. 2007; Kalb 2010b; Widmer & Zweifel 2012; Pérez-López et al. 
2015), while there are also ambiguous results (Loikkanen & Susiluoto 2005) and even 
counterexamples (Geys & Moesen 2009; Bönisch et al. 2011; Da Cruz & Marques 2014; Ashworth 
et al. 2014). Bischoff et al. (2017) put the latter results into question arguing that state entities with 
a lower fiscal capacity, on the one hand, are under stronger financial pressure and thus are forced 
to be more efficient, while on the other hand, these entities receive the most grants. Without taking 
into account some measure of the pre-grant capacity, the estimates are biased due to the omitted 
variable. The study of Porcelli (2014) contrasts the other papers in terms of the design. The author 
focuses on a tax reform in 1998, where the Italian regional governments started to gather their own 
earmarked taxes to finance their health domain instead of depending on earmarked grants. The 
results show that efficiency increased after the reform, which the author explains by the higher 
local autonomy. In sum, most empirical papers find evidence for the flypaper effect. 
Turning to the other sources of fiscal illusion, little has been done in relation to efficiency. In 
fact, the only aspect of fiscal illusion that has been tested besides the flypaper effect is the 
indebtedness. Benito et al. (2010) find, contrary to the theoretical prediction, an insignificant 
positive correlation between debt and efficiency. They argue that the current indebtedness is the 
result of former capital expenditures that allow greater efficiency today. Likewise providing 
insignificant results, Pérez-López et al. (2015) contribute little knowledge in this manner. Bischoff 
                                                 
6 Buchanan (1967) presumes that rather than negligence, a lack of knowledge is what prevented the fiscal illusion idea 
from sparking a broader discussion. Until its translation in 1960 into German, Puviani's (1903) book existed only in 
Italian. 
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et al. (2017) claim that governments with high debt face fiscal stress and they are therefore forced 
to provide the services more efficiently. Indeed, they find a positive effect of the debt on efficiency 
for municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Using Portuguese municipal data, Da Cruz & Marques (2014) 
and Cordero et al. (2017) provide some evidence for debt illusion without specifically discussing it. 
Also Ashworth et al. (2014) find a significant negative relationship between indebtedness and 
efficiency in Flemish municipalities, but they do not refer to the fiscal illusion literature. Altogether, 
it seems that the researchers working in the field of efficiency analysis are not interested in or aware 
of the full scope of the fiscal illusion theory. Yet, the few studies taking the debt into account do 
report illusionary tendencies. 
Among the tax related variables (i.e. tax complexity, progressivity, and diversification), only one 
study provides some empirical insights on their effect on efficiency. Boetti et al. (2012) finds Italian 
municipalities work less efficiently if their share of non-tax revenues (i.e. fees and charges) is high.  
2.3. Interim conclusion 
Today’s limited interest in the theoretical literature on earmarking in relation to efficiency makes 
it arduous to recognize that the existing literature actually left a gap. On one side, there are the 
public finance scholars who reject earmarking due to its inflexibility in terms of budget allocation 
(Lee & Wagner 1991). On the other side, public choice scholars see earmarking as a solution to 
tame the Leviathan (Buchanan 1963). Ultimately, it is the fundamentally different views of 
humanity that sunder the two camps, which possibly impedes a final agreement. And yet, it is 
possible to criticize public administration scholars as most of them insufficiently substantiate their 
argument as to why earmarking should have a negative impact on technical efficiency. Only a few 
papers unify earmarking and technical efficiency in a formalized theory but they disregard the 
supposed underlying mechanism of the causal effect, or the theory covers only one specific field 
(Martínez 2014; Brennan & Buchanan 1978; Bös 2000). Just as in the theoretical literature, the 
empirical papers assessing the effect of earmarking on efficiency are very rare. 
When it comes to further revenue features that potentially affect efficiency, the theoretical 
literature is much more developed. Since the seminal paper by Oates (1985), the idea of fiscal 
illusion disseminated into different directions and encouraged researchers to advance the theory. 
Today, five sources of fiscal illusion are broadly accepted and three of them have also been tested 
empirically with technical efficiency as a dependent variable. However, neither grants nor 
indebtedness furnishes unambiguous evidence for a negative or positive effect on efficiency. Only 
one study exists with respect to tax complexity and this hardly suffices for a substantial statement. 
3. Theoretical models 
This chapter aims at theoretically predicting in what direction and why the different revenue 
characteristics influence the efficiency of public service provision. In order to reach that objective, 
a discussion of debate prevention and the flypaper effect both constitute a separate section that 
develops a theoretical model based on the public choice framework. They thereby cover earmarked 
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revenues and transfers as explaining variables of inefficiency. Because the development of the 
debate prevention theory turns out to be rather technical, a separate section first presents the 
intuition behind the theory and stipulates its limits. The fourth subsection embeds the remaining 
revenue characteristics in the mutual theory of fiscal illusion. 
As to the dependent variable, all models understand inefficiency as a positive monetary rent that 
politicians or bureaucrats use for means other than public service provision (see Le Maux 2009 for 
an equivalent interpretation). In other words inefficiency means “to hire more staff than necessary, 
to hire more capital than necessary, to pay workers more than necessary, or to fund perquisites of 
office such as lavish offices, large expense accounts, short working hours, etc.” (Wyckoff 1988: 
272).7 Therefore, a positive rent either induces excessive expenditures or insufficient public good 
provision, which are both attributes of technical inefficiency. Eventually, each model predicts the 
expected direction of the causality between the revenue characteristics and the rent, i.e. efficiency. 
While the models formalizing fiscal illusion and the flypaper effect are established in the current 
literature, debate prevention is a novel theory. 
Beginning with a standard public choice framework, debate prevention takes up the result of an 
established voting model with uncertainty and an ideological bias (Persson & Tabellini 2002). 
Because of the latter two factors, politicians in office manage to appropriate a personal rent even 
under electoral competition. The extent of the rent depends on some transaction cost, which this 
established model considers as exogenously given. At this point, the new aspect - i.e. the herein 
developed theory called debate prevention – comes into play, arguing that the transaction cost 
depends on the monitoring activities within the governing council. The monitoring activities, in 
turn, are a function of the earmarked part of the total budget linked via ministerial incentives. 
Hence, the debate prevention theory eventually creates a connection between earmarking and a 
monetary rent which translates into inefficiency. This chain of reasoning grounds the central 
hypothesis (H1): A higher share of earmarked revenues leads to less efficient public service 
provision, other things equal. 
The hypotheses concerning the further revenue characteristics derive from the fiscal illusion 
idea (Oates 1985). That is, the voter underestimates the price for the public service which opens 
up the leeway for bureaucrats to appropriate rents. The voter’s misperception originates from 
different revenue characteristics which all engender their own hypothesis. The most prominent 
among them stems from intergovernmental transfers, which often appear under the label of the 
flypaper effect (Courant et al. 1979). It states that a higher share of transfers implies poor efficiency 
levels (H2) (Wyckoff 1990). Debt illusion, for its part, predicts a lower efficiency for highly indebted 
states (H3). Likewise, the voters may be misled by the sheer amount of revenue sources, which 
substantiates the fourth hypothesis: A more complex tax system, ceteris paribus, results in lower 
efficiency levels (H4). Finally, the voters might misjudge the price for public services if it rises due 
to the non-linear tax curve. Hence the prediction that a rising income in combination with a 
stronger tax progressivity provokes poor efficiency (H5). 
                                                 
7 The literature also uses terms such as discretionary slack or fiscal residuum as synonyms for the monetary rent when 
referring to the difference between the total revenue and total cost of production (Le Maux 2009). 
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3.1. The intuition behind debate prevention and its limits 
The subsequent fairly extensive and detailed development of the debate prevention theory calls 
for a brief intuitive introduction. At the same time this section contrasts the theory with existing 
public choice models related to earmarked revenue and thereby clarifies its limits. To this end, 
Figure 1 shows the main actors involved in the dynamics of earmarked revenues. On top, the 
ministers illustrated as eyes form a pentagon representing the governing council’s debate about the 
budget. In Niskanen's (1994) terminology, the eyes are equivalent to bureaus while the governing 
council together with the parliament can be viewed as the sponsor.8 Within the executive branch 
of government, the ministers monitor each other; this is shown by the grey arrows. While four 
ministers both actively participate in monitoring activities and passively face their colleague’s 
pressure, minister A hides behind a wall protecting him from the respective surveillance. The wall 
signifies a special financing. On the bottom, the voters establish the foundation of the parliament 
and of the executive government branch. 
Figure 1 – Interrelationship of the debate prevention with the public choice models  
 
                                                 
8 Niskanen (1994, p.28) recognizes the budget evolving from a two-stage process with the executive reviewing it in the 
first stage and the legislature in the second. Accordingly, the tandem executive-legislative (i.e. the government) 
positions as a composite sponsor. 
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 Source: Own illustration 
The parliament (1) is the first actor motivated to install a wall around minister A. As mentioned 
in the literature review (section 2.1), the parliament, well aware of its ephemerality, attempts to lock 
future budgets according to its current preferences (Jackson 2013). While budget restrictions on 
future governments affect the budget allocation, they have no effect, per se, on the technical 
implementation, cost, nor the allocative efficiency.9 Instead, they might reduce the welfare since 
the earmark prevents politicians from adjusting the budget according to the voters’ preferences 
(Lee & Wagner 1991). The scope of the paper at hand encompasses only the efficiency aspect and 
leaves aside the welfare considerations. 
The second arrow takes up the voter’s (2) desire to earmark certain revenues in order to 
strengthen their preferences (Buchanan 1963). In the same vein as above, the earmarked revenues 
should ensure a certain budget allocation, which again links to welfare rather than to efficiency. 
Accordingly, the parliamentary incentives and interests to establish new special financings falls 
likewise outside the scope of this analysis. 
The third relationship refers to the dynamics within the governing council (3) and it illustrates 
debate prevention. In the first budget round, the five ministers present their policy programs along 
with the corresponding financial needs (the fraction of the light and dark grey areas attached to 
each corner). When designing their policy programs, the ministers choose their degree of 
engagement to reach a certain quality, which simultaneously entails a cost (e.g. longer working 
hours, etc.). A higher quality ensures that the monitoring activities of the other ministers (i.e. the 
grey arrow’s ends pointing towards each minister) are less effective and that the proposals pass the 
budgetary discussions without substantial cuts; the combination of the own quality and the other 
ministers’ effort yields the absolute bargaining power. At the same time, the ministers try to convert 
the other minister’s budget share to their own use by monitoring their colleagues (i.e. the arrow’s 
ends pointing away from each minister). If the monitoring is successful and the ministers find 
potential savings in their colleagues’ programs, the free-up funds remain on the negotiation table. 
After the first budget round, each minister defends the light grey fraction of the budget. In the 
subsequent budgetary rounds, the ministers allocate the rest of the budget (i.e. the dark grey area) 
amongst each other according to their relative bargaining power.10 
Yet, during all these debates, the budgetary fraction behind minister A’s special financing wall 
remains undisputable. Out of A’s demanded budget, there is only a small part up for discussion 
and this alleviates any incentive to monitor A’s policy programs in the first place. Being less 
monitored, minister A enjoys a larger leeway to generate budgetary slack and consequently he offers 
the services within his domain less efficiently. In general, the larger the share behind earmark-walls, 
the less incentive the ministers have to monitor each other and the less efficient the public service 
will be provided. 
                                                 
9 Remember the earlier definition, according to which budget allocation refers to the allotment of public resources to 
the different public services (outputs); technical efficiency describes a production process that converts a given its 
bundle of inputs into the maximum number of outputs. Finally, allocative efficiency denotes the optimal combination 
of inputs taking their prices into account. 
10 Note that debate prevention entails no Nash equilibrium but a Nash bargaining solution making implicitly use of 
the axiomatic approach as proposed by  Nash (1950). In other words, the ministers define some conditions that the 
outcome of the bargaining game has to satisfy.  
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The rather specific setup of the model raises the question of its applicability to an environment 
outside of Switzerland. Answering this question requires some contemplation about the central 
elements and whether they are exclusively present in the Swiss case. The most critical of which is 
the formally equal distribution of power among the ministers debating about the budget allocation. 
Such a system is unique in the world. Yet, it is likely that the dynamics are similar in a system with 
a president or a prime minister who takes the executive branch’s final decision about the budget. 
The subordinate ministers still debate about their share of the budget and the tactics to protect 
one’s own budget share or to snag a part of the other minister’s budget share remain the same. 
Although, the minister’s incentives to monitor their colleagues are less clear, because – depending 
on the concrete budgeting process – the president or the prime minister can decide upon the budget 
allocation independently of the possibly found weaknesses in some policies. For instance, if the 
prime minister has an ideological preference for a specific public service, she might provide 
generous financial resources in spite of considerable flaws in the respective policy proposals. 
Ministers who face such a prime minister have less incentive to monitor their colleagues, which 
disperses the negative effect that earmarking has on monitoring. In sum, debate prevention might 
affect the budgeting process in other countries too, but its effect is possibly less distinct. 
3.2. A formal model of debate prevention 
Primal median voter models with electoral competition à la Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) came to 
the gratifying conclusion that politicians cannot reap rents in equilibrium. If the politicians do so, 
another candidate would waive his own rent in order to increase the public service provision or 
decrease taxes. With a more efficient combination of public services and taxes, the candidate can 
kick the incumbent out of office. The anticipatory incumbent therefore reduces his rent to zero in 
the first place, guaranteeing the voters an optimal bundle. Referring to Polo (1998), Persson & 
Tabellini (2002) introduce in their probabilistic voting model not only an uncertainty about the 
election outcome but also ideological preferences and thereby they formulate the conditions under 
which politicians can obtain positive rents, even under electoral competition. An extension of 
Persson & Tabellini’s model reveals the effect earmarking has on the extent to which politicians 
can retain rents. Equally, the modification of the model accounts for the specific composition of 
collegial governments. In contrast to the usual probabilistic voting model, here elected politicians 
cannot rule the government by themselves as a monolithic planner and executer, but they make 
part of a governing council, where they take over a department that provides specific public goods. 
The literature calls this type of government consensus democracies with executive power-sharing 
(Vatter & Freitag 2007). When running for office, the candidates commit to an overall policy 
platform, since, before the election, they do not know which department they will undertake.11  
In the following, capital letters in equations denote functions while lowercase letters signify 
parameters. Upper bars on letters indicate externally given parameters whereas a tilde marks a guess 
                                                 
11 Admittedly, there is usually more than one candidate running for office. As Persson & Tabellini (2002) show though, 
additional candidates lead to a lower extraction of rents, but as long as the number of candidates does not go to infinity, 
there are still some rents left. It is therefore appropriate to only consider two candidates for the sake of simplicity. 
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based on incomplete information. Consider a large number of voters-consumers-taxpayers who 
have the quasi-linear preferences 𝑤𝑤 depending on their consumption of two market-delivered 
goods 𝑐𝑐 and 𝑥𝑥 as well as of two types of publicly-provided goods 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔: 
𝑤𝑤 = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝐻𝐻(𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 ,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔, 𝑥𝑥)  (1) 
The concave increasing function 𝐻𝐻(•) describes the voter’s appreciation for the respective 
goods. The way the voter’s preferences are modelled goes deeper into detail than the original 
formulation in two aspects. First, there are two types of publicly-provided goods that differ in the 
manner they are financed. While the source of funding of 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 is the general fund from ordinary 
taxes, 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 obtains its resources from taxes or charges imposed on a related market good 𝑥𝑥. Typical 
market goods 𝑥𝑥 with earmarked taxes are fuel, the lottery, et cetera. Second, 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 is not a particular 
publicly provided good but a bundle (for a similar interpretation see Goetz, 1968). Concretely, 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 
typically contains goods that do not allow excluding anyone from their use: security, foreign policy, 
et cetera. The opposite applies to 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒, which represents health, roads, or education. It would be easy 
to extend the model by splitting the publicly-provided goods 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 into their individual 
components and to regard each separately. However, such an extension would only complicate the 
model while leading to the same result.12 The possibility of splitting is useful in a later stage of this 
analysis though, once the candidates are in office. The government budget must balance out and is 
restricted by 
𝜏𝜏𝑦𝑦� + 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥 = 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 + 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 + 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔  (2) 
The governmental revenue on the left-hand side of equation (2) stems from the taxes 𝜏𝜏 imposed 
on the given income 𝑦𝑦� and the taxes 𝜑𝜑 on the good 𝑥𝑥. The total expenditures consist of spending 
for the politician’s rents 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 and 𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 and for the two publicly-provided goods 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔. Both 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 
and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 have constant production costs (i.e. shadow prices) normalized to unity. Since the revenue 
generated through the taxation of the market good 𝑥𝑥 is earmarked, it must not be used to produce 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔. Indeed, the revenue can either flow into the production of 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 or into rents 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 that politicians 
can convert to their own use (McMahon & Sprenkle 1970). In formal terms the earmarking 
constraint is: 
𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 + 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 = 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥 (3) 
With the parameters defined so far, the voter’s budget constraint is 
𝑐𝑐 + (1 + 𝜑𝜑)𝑥𝑥 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑦𝑦� (4) 
The voters can consume as much from the private goods 𝑐𝑐 as they have left after paying taxes 
on their income and after having consumed the market good 𝑥𝑥 taxed at rate 𝜑𝜑. The equal sign 
reflects the assumption that voters cannot save anything from their income and they cannot 
consume on credit. For simplicity, define for now the total operational public expenditures as 𝑔𝑔 ≡
𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 + 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 and the total rent as 𝑟𝑟 ≡ 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔. Combining (1), (2), (3) and (4) yields the voter’s policy 
preferences 
                                                 
12 Note that, in contrast to the median voter model, the probabilistic voting model eludes cyclic majorities when 
aggregating 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 (Blankart 2012). 
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𝑊𝑊(𝒑𝒑) = 𝑦𝑦� − 𝑔𝑔 − 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑥𝑥 + 𝐻𝐻(𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 ,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔, 𝑥𝑥) where 𝒑𝒑 ≡ (𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 ,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔, 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 , 𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔,𝜑𝜑) (5) 
The vector 𝒑𝒑 subsumes the policy platform, that is to say the variables that politicians can adjust. 
Note that 𝜑𝜑 does not appear in (5), which implies that the voter does not care about the level of 
the tax on the market good 𝑥𝑥. To see why, solve the government’s budget restriction (2) for 𝜏𝜏 and 
replace the respective variable in (4). Then, solve the resulting expression for c whereby 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥 cancels 
out. How can the disappearance of 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥 be interpreted? On the one hand, the tax paid on the market 
good 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥 enters positively in the voter’s budget constraint as it reduces the income tax required to 
reach the same public budget level. On the other hand, 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥 decreases the voter’s budget constraint 
as it limits the scope to consume 𝑐𝑐. In essence, the two effects neutralize each other. Consequently, 
the politician can arbitrarily alter 𝜑𝜑 such that the earmark constraint (3) holds however he sets 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 
and 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 (Bös 2000). The earmark constraint is therefore in fact non-restrictive. The disappearance 
of the earmarking constraint is only possible because the voter can directly express her preferences 
about the amount of each public good individually. 
Now turn to the politician’s objective. The politician benefits from being in office, which 
manifests in ego rents 𝑅𝑅�(𝑁𝑁�(𝑔𝑔) + 𝑏𝑏�). In the ego rents, politicians aggregate expected non-monetary 
benefits 𝑏𝑏� such as power, prestige, et cetera and Niskanen-type utility 𝑁𝑁�(•) (Niskanen 1975; Bös 
2000). The latter depends on the operational governmental expenditures 𝑔𝑔. While 𝑔𝑔 is part of the 
policy platform, 𝑏𝑏� is non-discretionary and equal for each politician before the election. Also, 
before the election, the politicians do not know exactly how to achieve the ego rents; that is, the 
functional form of 𝑁𝑁�(•) and which of its parameters become discretionary once the politicians are 
in office is unknown. They know, though, that 𝑅𝑅�(•) is an increasing function of 𝑁𝑁�(•) and 𝑏𝑏�, while 
𝑁𝑁�(•) increases in 𝑔𝑔. The ego rents do not appear in the governmental budget as, on the one hand, 
they partly coincide with government spending 𝑔𝑔 and, on the other hand, they reflect non-
monetary benefits 𝑏𝑏�. 
Besides ego rents, politicians benefit from endogenous monetary rents 𝑟𝑟. To what extent 
politicians can achieve them depends on the transaction costs 𝛾𝛾�. The higher 𝛾𝛾�, the lower the 
transaction costs and the easier politicians can internalize the monetary rents. As a concrete 
example of transaction costs, Persson & Tabellini (2002) name the transparency of the budget or 
administrative procedures. In the pre-election stage, the politicians cannot manipulate the 
transaction cost and they have to take it as externally given. The politicians can appropriate the ego 
and the monetary rents only if they are elected, whereas the probability of being elected is denoted 
by 𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝. As the voters, politicians have a quasi-linear objective too. Politician 𝑃𝑃’s objective function 
reads as 
𝔼𝔼�𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝� = 𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝�𝑅𝑅�(𝑁𝑁�(𝑔𝑔) + 𝑏𝑏�) + 𝛾𝛾�𝑟𝑟� (6) 
where 𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝 is the politician 𝑃𝑃’s stochastic utility. In line with Persson & Tabellini (2002), assume 
that voters have an individual ideological bias 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 towards candidate B. The reason why 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 might 
be different from zero are attributes of the politician that each voter esteems differently and 
additionally to the economic policy platform. Concrete examples are the politicians’ educational 
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background, the origin, et cetera. The bias can take positive or negative values, whereas the latter 
case indicates a preference for the candidate. Among the entire population, the bias is uniformly 
distributed with density 𝜙𝜙 and mean zero: 
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖~𝑈𝑈 �− 1
2𝜙𝜙
, 1
2𝜙𝜙
�  (7) 
As a second stochastic term, 𝛿𝛿 measures the average relative popularity of candidate B. This 
parameter can also take values above and below zero with negative values implying that candidate 
enjoys relatively more popularity in the entire population. Note that 𝛿𝛿 is the same for all voters and 
therewith might be interpreted as attributes of the politician such as, for instance, scandals. The 
politician cannot observe his relative popularity before election, but indeed, he knows its 
distribution. It is also assumed to be uniform with density 𝜓𝜓 and mean zero:13 
𝛿𝛿~𝑈𝑈 �− 1
2𝜓𝜓
, 1
2𝜓𝜓
�  (8) 
Having outlined the model’s setting, consider the timing of events: 
[1] The incumbent and a challenging candidate learn the distributions of 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 and 𝜓𝜓 as well as the 
voters’ preferences 𝑊𝑊(𝒑𝒑). Based on this information, they proclaim simultaneously and non-
cooperatively their policy platforms 𝒑𝒑 that maximize their objective 𝔼𝔼�𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝�.  
[2] On election day, their actual relative average popularity 𝛿𝛿 becomes publicly known. 
[3] Elections are held. 
[4] The elected politicians learn about the practice in the governing council and become 
acquainted with their council colleagues. Based on that, they specify their objective 𝜉𝜉. 
[5] The governing council debates the details of the policy program by dispersing the total 
budget. 
[6] The governing council implements the detailed policy program. 
Since politicians are aware of the electoral procedure, they use backwards induction to maximize 
their objective function (6). As they know the voters’ preferences, they can anticipate their 
probability of winning the election. They therefore need to identify the condition under which the 
voters actually prefer them. From politician A’s point of view this condition is 
𝑊𝑊(𝒑𝒑𝐴𝐴) > 𝑊𝑊(𝒑𝒑𝐵𝐵) + 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 ⇔ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 < 𝑊𝑊(𝒑𝒑𝐴𝐴) −𝑊𝑊(𝒑𝒑𝐵𝐵) − 𝛿𝛿 (9) 
The rearranged equation (9) shows that all the voters whose ideological bias towards candidate 
B is smaller than the term on the right-hand side prefer candidate A. By the distributional 
assumption on 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 , A’s vote share therefore is 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝜙𝜙 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 + 12𝜙𝜙� = 𝜙𝜙(𝑊𝑊(𝒑𝒑𝐴𝐴) −𝑊𝑊(𝒑𝒑𝐵𝐵) − 𝛿𝛿) + 12  (10) 
The probability that A wins the election equals the probability of acquiring more than half of 
the votes: 
𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 �𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 > 12� = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊(𝒑𝒑𝑨𝑨) −𝑊𝑊(𝒑𝒑𝑩𝑩) > 𝛿𝛿) = 12 + 𝜓𝜓�𝑊𝑊(𝒑𝒑𝑨𝑨) −𝑊𝑊(𝒑𝒑𝑩𝑩)�  (11) 
                                                 
13 These distributions might appear rather particular. As Persson & Tabellini (2002) state though, non-uniform 
distributions would lead to equal final results, while they complicate the calculations considerably. 
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Exploiting the distributional assumption on 𝛿𝛿 yields the third equality of (11). With the 
knowledge about his probability of winning, politician A maximizes his objective function. Since 
the focus is on rents, the first derivative of the politician’s objective with respect to 𝑟𝑟 promises 
interesting insights: 
𝜕𝜕𝔼𝔼[𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴]
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
�𝑅𝑅�(𝑁𝑁�(𝑔𝑔) + 𝑏𝑏�) + 𝛾𝛾�𝑟𝑟� + 𝛾𝛾�𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴 = −𝜓𝜓�𝑅𝑅��𝑁𝑁�(𝑔𝑔),𝑏𝑏�� + 𝛾𝛾�𝑟𝑟� + 12 𝛾𝛾� = 0  (12) 
Since the objectives of the two politicians are the same, in equilibrium their probability of 
winning is one-half, which justifies the second equality. The same reasoning determines the content 
of 𝑔𝑔, which is exactly the combination of publicly-provided goods that the median voter wants. 
Solving for 𝑟𝑟 yields the equilibrium rents: 
𝑟𝑟 = max �0, 1
2𝜓𝜓
−
𝑅𝑅�𝑁𝑁�(𝑔𝑔)+𝑏𝑏��
𝛾𝛾�
�  (13) 
Primarily, the result (13) shows that, in certain circumstances, politicians can nail down rents in 
equilibrium even under competition. The circumstances depend first and foremost on the density 
of the politician’s relative popularity, which is the base for the monetary rent. The more uncertain 
the outcome of the election, meaning the lower the popularity density, the larger the possible 
monetary rents. Second, higher ego rents, scaled by the transaction cost, reduce the scope of the 
monetary rents. Remember that the higher the transaction costs, the lower the 𝛾𝛾�. Thus, high 
transaction costs unsurprisingly diminish the monetary rents. The further analysis about the 
politicians in office reveals what factors determine the transaction cost. Up to this point, when the 
elections are held, the model followed by and large what Persson & Tabellini (2002) outlined earlier. 
The novel part follows with the politicians debating about the detailed governmental budget 
(indicated as stage [4] above). Nevertheless, the repetition of the base model proves useful, as its 
results remain stable even under partial earmarked funding. 
As soon as the politician is elected, he does not have to care about the probability of winning 
anymore as 𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝 equals one by definition. Due to the politician’s commitment during the campaign, 
he has to stick with his proposed policy platform 𝒑𝒑∗.14 Consequently, the total government 
spending ?̅?𝑔 and the monetary rent ?̅?𝑟 are externally given parameters in the upcoming budgetary 
debate. The claim at the opening of this section was that splitting the two types of publicly-provided 
goods 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 into their individual components would lead to the same results. For the further 
analysis, remember that ?̅?𝑔 actually contains several separate publicly provided goods of each type. 
Once the politicians are in office, the imaginary partition of ?̅?𝑔 into more than only two parts makes 
sense, because otherwise, in the debate, they could not allocate the budget in detail to the different 
departments. Moreover, the politicians in office do not have to form expectations anymore as they 
learn about the functional form of the Niskanen-type utility 𝑁𝑁(•), the non-monetary benefits 𝑏𝑏� 
and the transaction cost 𝛾𝛾�. Once in office, the minister A’s objective (6) becomes 
                                                 
14 Admittedly, the assumption that politicians have to stick with their promises is a rather strong one. In fact, some 
models extend the probabilistic voting model by allowing for post-election alterations of the policy platform. However, 
the debate prevention model uses the policy platform more as a guideline for further budgetary debate, which makes 
the assumption less far-fetched after all. Because the platforms respond to citizens’ demand in the first place these 
promises have a constraining character to politicians (Rubin 1990).  
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𝜉𝜉𝐴𝐴 = 𝑅𝑅(𝑁𝑁(?̅?𝑔) + 𝑏𝑏�) + 𝛾𝛾�?̅?𝑟 (14) 
The elected politician learns about the practice in the governing council, that is he learns how 
the budgeting and spending processes, discussed empirically in section 4.1 below, proceed. In either 
process, the governing council plays an important role in allocating the resources to the 
departments, as they debate about the share each department receives of the total government 
budget ?̅?𝑔. Note that a budgetary debate within the government is a major difference to classic 
bureaucracy models because it breaks the executive’s monopoly power to some extent (i.e. its 
Leviathan status) (Brennan & Buchanan 1978; Niskanen 1975). 
Consider 𝐷𝐷 as all departments different from A henceforth, i.e. 𝐷𝐷 ≡ {1, … , … ,𝑛𝑛} and 𝐷𝐷+𝐴𝐴 
respectively includes the department A, that is 𝐷𝐷+𝐴𝐴 ≡ {𝐴𝐴, 1, … ,𝑛𝑛}. In the debate, each minister 
starts with a certain share of the budget ?̅?𝜆𝐷𝐷+𝐴𝐴 ≡
𝑔𝑔�𝐴𝐴
𝑔𝑔�
 depending on the promises about 𝑔𝑔� the 
politicians made during the campaign. As such the ex-post share ?̅?𝜆𝐷𝐷+𝐴𝐴 is externally given. Naturally, 
𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷+𝐴𝐴 takes only values between zero and one and the shares of all ministers must sum up to one. 
As regards the minister of department A, his goal in the debate is to maximize his own share of 
the total budget that gives him the Niskanen-type utility 𝑁𝑁(•). In order to reach that objective, he 
has an offensive and a defensive possibility. In the defensive case, minister A seeks to protect his 
own budgetary claims and sets a certain level of quality 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 in his policy programs. At the same 
time, he faces the other ministers’ monitoring effort ?̅?𝑒𝐷𝐷. His absolute bargaining power then turns 
out to be Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞) = Ω(?̅?𝑒𝐷𝐷 ,𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴). A higher dossier quality makes it hard to challenge his proposals 
even if extensively screened by the other ministers, i.e. Ω(•) increases in 𝑞𝑞. More intense screening 
reveals further weaknesses, which is why Ω(•) decreases with respect to ?̅?𝑒𝐷𝐷. The bargaining power 
is normalized to one, where one is the highest bargaining power and zero the lowest. Assume that 
the second derivative of Ω(•) with respect to 𝑒𝑒 and 𝑞𝑞 is negative, which is plausible since politicians 
pick the low hanging fruits first when engaging in monitoring effort. The concavity with respect to 
the quality connotes a decreasing marginal effect.  
Given the earmarked budget share ?̅?𝜂 ≡ 𝑔𝑔�𝑒𝑒
𝑔𝑔�
 and the total budget ?̅?𝑔, minister A can claim the 
following part of the budget based on his own defensive activities in the debate:  
?̅?𝜆𝐴𝐴Ω(?̅?𝑒𝐷𝐷, 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴)(1 − 𝜂𝜂)?̅?𝑔 = ?̅?𝜆𝐴𝐴Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞)(1 − 𝜂𝜂)?̅?𝑔 (15) 
In the offensive case, minister A interferes with the other departments’ bargaining power by 
monitoring them with an effort 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴. They in turn repel the monitor-attack by ensuring a high quality 
of their policy programs 𝑞𝑞�𝐷𝐷. From A’s viewpoint, the resulting bargaining power parameters of 
ministers D are Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒) = Ω(𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴, 𝑞𝑞�𝐷𝐷). Unless all ministers manage to reach a bargaining power of 
one, some resources remain undistributed after the first budgetary round. In fact, all resources that 
the ministers cannot claim for their department accumulate to an unbound residual, that is 
Φ(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) ≡ 1+𝑛𝑛�−∑ Ω(𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴,𝑞𝑞�𝐷𝐷)−Ω(?̅?𝑒𝐷𝐷,𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴)𝐷𝐷
1+𝑛𝑛�
= 1+𝑛𝑛�−∑ Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)−Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞)𝐷𝐷
1+𝑛𝑛�
  (16) 
The nominator indicates simply the total number of departments including A minus the sum of 
the shares each department successfully claimed during the debate. To obtain a share, the 
nominator is divided by the number of departments. Based on the same logic as in the first round, 
the ministers use their bargaining power to demand a part of the residual, which again incentivizes 
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the other ministers to make a monitoring effort. Since all ministers stick to their initial quality 𝑞𝑞 
and monitoring effort 𝑒𝑒, the entire budget eventually divides among all departments according to 
the relative bargaining power of each minister. The relative bargaining power is therefore 
Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) ≡ Ω�?̅?𝑒𝐷𝐷𝜗𝜗�𝐷𝐷,𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝜗𝜗�𝐴𝐴�∑ Ω�𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝜗𝜗�𝐴𝐴,𝑞𝑞�𝐷𝐷𝜗𝜗�𝐷𝐷�+Ω�?̅?𝑒𝐷𝐷𝜗𝜗�𝐷𝐷,𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝜗𝜗�𝐴𝐴�𝐷𝐷 = Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞)∑ Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)+Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞)𝐷𝐷    (17) 
The total government budget partly consists of earmarked resources that must flow into a 
specific department. Each department receives a fix and externally given share 𝛼𝛼�𝐷𝐷+𝐴𝐴 ≡
𝑔𝑔�
𝑒𝑒,𝐷𝐷+𝐴𝐴
𝑔𝑔�𝑒𝑒
 of 
the earmarked revenue 𝑔𝑔�𝑒𝑒. Therefore, the earmarked share of the budget ?̅?𝜂 cannot be allocated 
discretionarily and is not up for discussion. Finally, making an effort as well as increasing the quality 
induces non-monetary costs 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) to the ministers. 𝐶𝐶(•) is an increasing convex function in both 
its arguments and the marginal cost is zero when the effort is zero, i.e. 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑒𝑒=0,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
= 0. In sum, 
combining (20), (21), (22) and adding the cost leads to the following functional form of the 
Niskanen-type utility: 
𝑁𝑁(?̅?𝑔) = 𝑁𝑁(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) = (1 − ?̅?𝜂)?̅?𝑔� ?̅?𝜆𝐴𝐴Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞) + Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞)Φ(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞)� + 𝛼𝛼�𝐴𝐴?̅?𝜂?̅?𝑔 − 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞)  (18) 
The Niskanen-type utility (18) reveals the two roles of the bargaining power. First, the absolute 
bargaining power determines the residual share Φ(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) that remains after allocating the budget 
according to the promised share ?̅?𝜆. Second, it sets the relative bargaining power Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) and 
thereby the share each department can claim out of the residual. 
In addition to the detailed Niskanen-type utility, minister A learns his true non-monetary 
benefits: 
𝑏𝑏� = 𝑏𝑏� (19) 
Turning to the transaction costs, remember that they indicate to what extent politicians can 
pocket monetary rents. Thereby, the higher the 𝛾𝛾, the more rents politicians can rake in. Following 
the discussion above, it is straightforward to claim that transaction costs for minister A are high, if 
his colleagues invest a lot in monitoring activities.15 Transaction costs are therefore 
𝛾𝛾� = 1
1+?̅?𝑒
  (20) 
When inserting (18), (19), and (20) in (14), minister A’s objective becomes 
𝜉𝜉𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) = 𝑏𝑏� + (1 − ?̅?𝜂)?̅?𝑔� ?̅?𝜆𝐴𝐴Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞) + Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞)Φ(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞)� + 𝛼𝛼�𝐴𝐴?̅?𝜂?̅?𝑔 − 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) + 11+?̅?𝑒  ?̅?𝜆𝐴𝐴?̅?𝑟  (21) 
In short, minister A’s objective contains seven parts. The first term of (21), i.e. 𝑏𝑏�, denotes the 
politician’s non-monetary benefits. The second term, i.e. (1 − ?̅?𝜂)?̅?𝑔, marks the non-earmarked part 
of the total budget. The third term, i.e. 𝜆𝜆𝐴𝐴Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞), represents minister A’s claim of the non-
earmarked budget depending on the promises during the campaign and his absolute bargaining 
power. The fourth term, i.e. ΨA(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞)Φ(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞), captures the budget he can grab from the other 
minister’s budget depending on his relative bargaining power and the residual share of the budget. 
The fifth term is the budget share earmarked for department A. The sixth term subtracts the cost 
accruing from the effort put into monitoring and quality. Finally, the last term is A’s share of the 
                                                 
15 For a discussion of how monitoring potentially disciplines the ministers see Nagin et al. (2002). 
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monetary rents depending on A’s ex-post share and the transaction cost. In order to maximize his 
objective, each minister can only choose the levels of effort 𝑒𝑒 and quality 𝑞𝑞. Since the emphasis lies 
on the last term including the monetary rent ?̅?𝑟, the relevant variable is 𝑒𝑒. Minister A finds his 
optimal monitoring effort level by differentiating (21) with respect to 𝑒𝑒 and setting it equal to zero. 
Rearranging then yields16 (1 − ?̅?𝜂)?̅?𝑔?̅?𝜗𝐴𝐴 �𝜕𝜕Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 Φ(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) + 𝜕𝜕Φ(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞)� = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒   (22) 
where 𝜕𝜕Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
> 0   [residual share after first budgetary round] 
 𝜕𝜕Φ(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
> 0   [A’s relative offensive bargaining power] 
 𝜕𝜕Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
< 0 𝜕𝜕2Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
< 0 [A’s absolute offensive bargaining power] 
 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
≥ 0 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
> 0 [cost function] 
 
Equation (22) contains a basic result from microeconomics: Utility maximization means 
equalizing the marginal cost and the marginal revenue. Here, the marginal revenue on the left-hand 
side is additionally weighted by the earmarked revenue share ?̅?𝜂 and the available budget ?̅?𝑔. Note 
that minister A needs to keep the two sides balanced in order to achieve maximum utility. For our 
analysis, the relevant question is how a change of the earmarked revenue share affects the minister’s 
decision about his monitoring effort. The standard approach to answer this question would be to 
solve for 𝑒𝑒 followed by a derivation with respect to ?̅?𝜂. For the sake of generality, neither Ω(•) nor 
𝐶𝐶(•) was defined, which makes solving for 𝑒𝑒 impossible.  
To find the respective answer in a different way, consider the derived marginal effects listed in 
(22). If the earmarked share of the budget ?̅?𝜂 increases, the left-hand side of (22) decreases. That is, 
changing ?̅?𝜂 linearly alters the marginal benefit of the monitoring effort 𝑒𝑒, whereas its cost on the 
right-hand side remains equal. In order to reach the maximum of his objective (21), minister A 
equalizes (22) again. Unfortunately, the so far imposed assumptions are not sufficient to show that 
there is one and only one intersection curve between the marginal cost and the marginal benefit. 
Appendix A. 1 develops the necessary assumption, which is basically a sufficiently high second 
order derivative of the offensive bargaining power. Under this weak additional assumption, 𝑒𝑒 and 
?̅?𝜂 are negatively linked. Therefore, minister A will set his monitoring effort 𝑒𝑒 lower the higher the 
earmarked share 𝜂𝜂 is. An interim conclusion leads to the realization that the monitoring effort is 
actually a function of the earmarked share of the budget ?̅?𝜂, i.e. 
𝑒𝑒(?̅?𝜂)  where 𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒(𝜂𝜂�)
𝜕𝜕𝜂𝜂�
< 0 (23) 
That is, the effort depends on the external factor ?̅?𝜂 and the higher the share of earmarked 
revenue becomes, the less politicians engage in monitoring activities. An intuitive explanation for 
this relation is that monitoring activities do not pay off enough anymore if the earmarked revenue 
share increases. Put differently, a high earmarked revenue share partly prevents ministers from 
engaging in the budgetary process debate. 
                                                 
16 See appendix A. 1. 
  
  
  23 
The insights regarding the dependence of the monitoring activities 𝑒𝑒 and the earmarked revenue 
share ?̅?𝜂 puts another complexion on the transaction cost 𝛾𝛾� as defined in (20). Since 𝑒𝑒 decreases in 
?̅?𝜂, the transaction costs decrease (i.e. 𝛾𝛾� increases) as the share of earmarked revenue increases. The 
full specification of the transaction costs is therefore 
𝛾𝛾�(?̅?𝜂) = 1
1+?̅?𝑒(𝜂𝜂�) where 𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾�(𝜂𝜂�)𝜕𝜕𝜂𝜂� > 0 (24) 
With reference to equation (2), the efficiency is some relation between financial inputs (i.e. 𝜏𝜏𝑦𝑦� +
𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥) and outputs (i.e. 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 + 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔) whereas larger rents (i.e. 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 +  𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔) decrease efficiency by demanding 
more inputs per output. A precise definition of efficiency and its different forms follows in chapter 
6. Concretely, the efficiency measure applied later focusses on input efficiency, which means 
considering the outputs fixed while inputs are flexible. With respect to the theory, the fixed outputs 
hypothesis translates into fix 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔, leaving politicians to propose a policy platform containing 
their rents that imply the input. Facing lower transaction costs 𝛾𝛾�, politicians appropriate rents 
easier. From the politicians’ point of view, the specification of the transaction cost (24) is not 
relevant, as they cannot manipulate the earmarked revenue share ?̅?𝜂 once in office – and before 
their swearing in they cannot tell the functional form of the ego rents 𝑅𝑅�(•). Taking the long run 
perspective from a policy advisor though, 𝜂𝜂 can possibly be altered with some nudges. One of 
them is to set the hurdle for an earmark high. Hence, it shall be one of the main objectives of our 
analysis to empirically test whether the predicted relation between the earmarked revenue share 
and the efficiency of public service provision exists. 
3.3. Flypaper effect 
In contrast to the previous section, the two that follow draw on the existing models rather than 
developing new ones. Applying the traditional median voter model on a government that posts 
revenue from taxes and from transfers of other state entities, Bradford & Oates (1971) arrive at a 
relatively disenchanting conclusion. Whether the government’s budget constraint increases due to 
the higher income of its citizens or because of lump-sum grants from other governments has no 
effect on the amount of additional public goods supplied.17 The irrelevance comes from the 
unchanged preference curves of the voter-taxpayer and the steady relative prices of the public and 
the private good. In economic terms, both regimes only have an income but no substitution effect 
(Bailey & Connolly 1998). Interpreted differently, the source of revenue divided into lump-sum 
transfers and taxes has no influence on the quantity of public goods provided. Among the first to 
do so, Gramlich et al. (1973) tested the theoretical prediction with United States data for the period 
1954 to 1972 and found contradictory results. An additional dollar of transfer triggers an additional 
public spending of 0.43 dollars, while an income increase of citizens only stimulates expenditures 
by 0.1 dollar. The difference between the two effects suggests that the government does not pass 
                                                 
17 With a lump-sum grant the government can allocate the resources arbitrarily among the public goods and even, by 
reducing taxes, provide its citizens with the possibility of using them for more private goods. In contrast, a matching 
grant is earmarked and requires the government use it for the designated task or program. 
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the grants to the citizens in the form of lower taxes. The puzzling phenomena that money sticks 
where it hits came to be known as the flypaper effect (Courant et al. 1979). 
Since the detection of this anomaly, researchers have pursued different paths to find theoretical 
explanations. While the fiscal illusion is one possibility (see section 3.4), slack maximizing 
bureaucrats might also trigger the effect.18 Even after four decades of discussion, there remains no 
consensus in the literature regarding the explanations of the flypaper effect nor whether it indeed 
exists. At this juncture, our analysis rests on the model that includes inefficiency as a link in its 
chain of reasoning. Like the next section, no modifications—apart from some specific 
interpretations—on the model are needed to address the purpose of the analysis. Therefore, the 
explanation serves to prime the elements. 
If a Migué et al. (1974) type bureaucrat, who maximizes his discretionary slack (i.e. the rent), 
attains some grants from other state entities, his reaction turns out to partly explain the flypaper 
effect (Wyckoff 1990).19 More importantly for the current analysis though, lump-sum and matching 
grants allow the bureaucrat to increase his discretionary slack. The slack is the difference between 
the revenue, i.e. the tax the bureaucrat levies as a reward for the public good, and the cost of its 
production. When the bureaucrat maximizes his slack, he compiles, from the taxpayer’s viewpoint, 
the worst possible combination of taxes and public goods. The larger the slack, the less technically 
efficient the bureaucrat’s provided public service. Therefore, if a grant helps the bureaucrat to 
increase his slack, the public service provision becomes less efficient the more grants the bureaucrat 
receives. Figure 2 illustrates that grants indeed support the bureaucrat to expand his slack. 
  
                                                 
18 For a dated but still excellent overview of the different attempts to explain the flypaper effect see Bailey & Connolly 
(1998). 
19 Musgrave & Musgrave (1989: 461 et seqq.) show with a similar model that the effect also results under the assumption 
of a benevolent administration who uses the lump-sum grant partly to reduce taxes. Clearly, a Migué et al. (1974) type 
bureaucrat has no incentives to do so. 
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Figure 2 – Bureaucrat’s reaction on lump-sum and earmarked transfers 
  
Source: Adapted from Wyckoff (1990) 
The pre-grant budget constraint AY���� sets the limit of each possible combination of goods that 
the citizens can buy. 0𝑌𝑌���� represents the citizens’ income. They can choose between the public good 
g or all other goods. As the latter is measured in one Swiss franc unit, the slope of the budget 
constraint indicates the negative constant per unit costs of the public good g as the citizens face it. 
The per-unit-cost does not necessarily coincide with the true cost of production. In fact, the slack 
maximizing bureaucrat exploits his information advantage to impose charges to the citizens that 
exceed the true cost. The citizens have an indifference curve 𝑢𝑢0, which sets the utility they obtain 
without public provision of the good 𝑔𝑔. Imagine 𝑢𝑢0 would intersect with the ‘all other goods axis’ 
at 𝑌𝑌, that is, its position is slightly on the left of the true 𝑢𝑢0. The indifference curve would then 
stop at 𝑌𝑌 because negative amounts of the public good 𝑔𝑔 do not make sense. Such an indifference 
curve would depict any combination of 𝑔𝑔 and the other goods that provide the same utility to the 
citizens, as if no private good was available. As Figure 2 is drawn though, 𝑢𝑢0 does not intersect 
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with the ‘all other goods axis’ at 𝑌𝑌 which means that private (but imperfect) substitutes for the 
public good exist.20 
It is worthwhile to further examine what determines the position of the indifference curve – an 
aspect Wyckoff (1990) discusses briefly in his paper. Imagine that there is a perfect substitute for 
the public good for which a competitive market exists. The competitive prices implicitly inform 
voters about the true production cost of the good 𝑔𝑔, because every supplier has to offer 𝑔𝑔 at the 
price of marginal costs (Frank 2006, p.385). Based on information about the cost, voters know 
their true budget constraint and they end up with the indifference curve 𝑢𝑢∗. Therefore, the 
illustrated (solid) budget constraint AY���� represents the voters’ budget as if the public good would 
be produced at its true production cost. Now, the government has two instruments to deceive the 
voter. First, since the state usually provides services for which a competitive market does not exist, 
the government can claim to bear higher production costs, such that they coincide with the price 
of the voters’ next best solution; i.e. that is the substitute of the publicly provided good. This means 
that in reality the voter perceives the imaginary (dotted) budget constraint that is tangent to 𝑢𝑢0. 
Accordingly, the less there are appropriate possibilities to substitute 𝑔𝑔 and the less informed voters 
are about the true cost of producing 𝑔𝑔, the more the government can force voters to set their 
indifference curve closer to the origin by turning the imaginary budget constraint counterclockwise 
around 𝑌𝑌. Second, by disguising the true governmental budget, the state can make the voter believe 
that her own budget restriction seems smaller than it actually is. Again, the virtual reduction of the 
governmental budget turns the voter’s budget constraint counterclockwise around 𝑌𝑌. In a nutshell, 
the government imposes the minimal indifference curve 𝑢𝑢0 on the voter by turning the budget 
constraint as far counterclockwise as possible. 
Based on the knowledge of what 𝑢𝑢0 actually denotes, it is clear that a slack maximizing 
bureaucrat must provide the citizens with at least the utility 𝑢𝑢0. At the same time, the bureaucrat 
needs to acknowledge the citizens’ true budget constraint AY����. Therefore, the area between the 
minimum indifference curve 𝑢𝑢0 and the true budget constraint AY���� is the government’s room for 
maneuver as a monopolist; any point is feasible in terms of production and will be accepted from 
the voter (Wyckoff 1990). As a slack maximizer, the government seeks the longest distance between 
these two restrictions which is 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻����. In 𝐻𝐻 the slope of the indifference curve equals the slope of the 
budget line. The bureaucrat then pretends the cost of producing 𝑔𝑔∗ is 𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌��� (whereas it truly is 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌����), 
which leaves the voter 𝐼𝐼0�  to consume all other goods. The slack the bureaucrat withdraws is 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼�  – 
the distance he intended to maximize. 
Starting from the equilibrium derived above, consider another state entity transfers a lump-sum 
grant of 𝑌𝑌′𝑌𝑌����� to the bureaucrat. The citizens’ budget constraint therefore moves parallel further 
away of the origin to 𝐴𝐴′𝑌𝑌′����� . At the same time, the median voter’s indifference curve 𝑢𝑢0 remains 
where it was, because the lump-sum grant does not change the price of the next best alternative, 
i.e. the imaginary (dotted) budget constraint. How does the bureaucrat react to the new situation? 
                                                 
20 Note that spending the entire available budget for all the other goods yields an inferior utility than 𝑢𝑢0, as such a 
point lies left of the indifference curve. Since 𝑢𝑢0 does not go through Y, the citizen cannot entirely relinquish the 
public good (such as security, for instance) and she instead seeks a private substitute (such as a private security firm). 
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The new budget constraint 𝐴𝐴′𝑌𝑌′����� has the same slope and it is the slope that determines the amount 
of the public good the bureaucrat provides. Thus, the supplied public good is still 𝑔𝑔∗. With the new 
budget constraint, though, the bureaucrat can extract even more slack. The governments 
expenditures increase exactly by the same amount it received as an intergovernmental lump-sum 
grant and they now sum up to 0Y'����. Still 0I�  flows into the consumption of all other goods and 
𝑆𝑆′𝑌𝑌′����� = 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌���� is the true production cost of the public good. It remains 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆′���� as slack for the bureaucrat. 
Thus, in terms of efficiency, a grant only increases the expenditures while the public good provision 
freezes. In terms of the flypaper effect, the model predicts public expenditures to grow 100 percent 
of the lump-sum grant and the bureaucrat does not refund the citizen through lower taxes. 
Wyckoff (1990) examined another situation, where the grant is not lump-sum but earmarked 
for the public good under investigation. Figure 2 also reveals the bureaucrat’s reaction to this kind 
of matching grant. While earmarked grants have no effect on all other goods, they decrease the 
price of the public good which graphically translates into a flatter budget constraint that crosses 𝑌𝑌. 
Remember that the donor transferred 𝑌𝑌′𝑌𝑌����� = 𝐻𝐻′𝐻𝐻����� as lump-sum aid in the example above. 
Anticipating the receiving government’s reaction, the donor’s aim is to assign exactly the same 
amount as the matching grant. Thus, the budget restriction under an earmarked grant regime is 
𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴′′�����. As before, the slack maximizing bureaucrat supplies the amount of public good that 
maximizes the distance between the budget constraint and the indifference curve. The 
maximization problem leads him to 𝑔𝑔∗∗ where he can extract a slack of 𝐻𝐻′′𝐻𝐻′′��������. This slack under 
earmarked grants is smaller than the one under the lump-sum regime (i.e. 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆′����). Thus, in terms of 
efficiency, earmarking grants have a less negative effect on efficiency compared to lump-sum 
grants. In terms of the flypaper effect, the model predicts no effect of earmarked grants on public 
expenditures. 
In sum, whether the donor government transfers lump-sum or earmarked matching grants, the 
bureaucrat’s slack and therewith the inefficiency of the public service provision increases with 
higher grants. A comparison of the two regimes in relation to the slack shows meaningful 
differences. Under earmarked grants, the bureaucrat withdraws a smaller slack than under lump-
sum grants. The magnitude of the difference between the two regimes depends on the cost of the 
public good and on the marginal rate of the substitution. 
3.4. Other sources of fiscal illusion 
The refined discussion about the position of the reservation indifference curve 𝑢𝑢0 in Figure 2 
lays the ground for some simple extensions of the formal model. Indeed, voter misperception of 
the true production cost or the true governmental budget suffices to explain not only higher public 
expenditures but also a lower efficiency. Therefore, any further revenue characteristic that 
potentially leads to a misperception, eventually impairs the efficiency of the public service 
provision. The ongoing research on ‘fiscal illusion’ has generated various factors that mislead the 
voters in telling the true production costs of public services or the true state budget. 
28 
In particular, Oates (1985) names four sources of fiscal illusion besides transfers, and each 
source has its own mechanism in terms of how it misleads the voter; Dollery & Worthington (1996) 
add some examples of empirical papers to each of the four sources of fiscal illusion. First, the tax 
composition entails the tax complexity and the tax diversification. A highly complex tax structure 
challenges the voter to keep the overview of the total amount payed to the government. In contrast, 
the more fragmented and diversified the tax system is, the less the government depends on one 
single tax source. This reasonable goal from the finance department’s point of view is often 
accompanied by other agendas seeking to distribute the tax burden more equally or to attain easier 
public acceptability (Carroll 2009). An administration, reasoning with an equal distribution, the 
public acceptability, and financial stability potentially distorts less the perception of the true cost of 
the public service provision. Thus, revenue diversification is primarily a strategy to prevent severe 
slumps in revenue, while revenue complexity supposedly reduces efficiency (Dollery & 
Worthington 1996). 
Second, the income elasticity of the revenue system refers to the progressivity of the tax system 
(Oates 1985). The idea that the progressivity of the tax system allegedly veils the true cost of the 
public service provision is linked to the voter’s reference when she pays her taxes. The theory posits 
that people are more aware of the base tax rate than of their actual tax bill. If their income grows 
and they in turn pay more taxes due to the progressivity, voters perceive the tax bill to be lower 
than if the base tax rate increases. Put differently, people care more about the base tax rate than 
the tax bill (Oates 1975). As long as public expenditures are fundable without raising the tax rate, 
people will not oppose (Dollery & Worthington 1996). These statements are already provocative, 
but even if such a mechanism exists, there is an immediate counter argument. Changing the tax 
rate involves a high transaction cost because an adjustment usually needs some democratic 
legitimation. The legitimation may come from the parliamentary process or even a ballot, and the 
latter makes a change even more costly and difficult. This means that people might desire a 
progressive tax system in order to prevent the government from constantly changing the tax rate, 
which finds reflection in a less efficient government (Lee & Wagner 1991). In this case though, if 
any, a positive effect of the progressivity on efficiency would result. 
Third, the voter may experience debt illusion. This happens because individuals actually observe 
the true cost of a public service if they have to pay for it immediately. Alternatively, if the 
government defers the cost by borrowing the money and inflates its debt, individuals will 
underestimate the true cost. This myopic view challenges the traditional Ricardo-Barrow theorem. 
Barro (1988) denies a difference between tax and debt financing as indebtedness simply results in 
a higher present value of discounted future tax liabilities. Assuming there is myopia instead of a 
rational equivalence, the voter effectively perceives the two financing sources differently and higher 
debt triggers lower efficiency levels. 
Fourth, the renter illusion targets the different taxation of property and income which makes 
the tenant underestimate the governmental cost because she is not subject to the property tax. The 
landlord who faces the tax directly is aware of these costs and probably even forwards the taxation 
partly to the tenant through higher rents. The tenant, however, cannot differentiate between the 
part of the rent that originates from the property value and the premium due to the tax. Hence, a 
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lower proportion of property owners presumably leads to less efficiently provided public services 
(Oates 1985; Dollery & Worthington 1996). 
It is worth mentioning that Martínez (2014) could have simply added earmarks to the sources 
of fiscal illusion, since his model is based on the idea that the administration has an information 
advantage towards its citizens. He assumes that the latter are less informed about earmarked 
revenues as they stem from royalties. Given the funding sources of earmarked revenues, rather the 
contrary is true. Namely, citizens are likely better informed about earmarked revenues. 
3.5. Interim conclusion 
Based on the public choice framework, this chapter theoretically develops the link between 
various revenue characteristics and a monetary rent that the bureaucrat can appropriate for his own 
use. Concretely, the rent can be observed, for instance, through oversized bureaus in terms of 
physical and personal resources, which, eventually, is tantamount to inefficient public service 
provision. Reasoning with a diminishing incentive between ministers to monitor each other, the 
debate prevention theory founds the central hypothesis (H1): A higher share of earmarked revenues 
leads to less efficient public service provision, other things equal. 
The hypotheses concerning further revenue characteristics derive from the fiscal illusion idea 
(Oates 1985). That is, the voter underestimates the price for the public service which then opens 
up leeway for bureaucrats to appropriate rents. The voter’s misperception originates from different 
revenue characteristics which all engender their own hypothesis. The most prominent among them 
stems from intergovernmental transfers, which often appears under the label of the flypaper effect 
(Courant et al. 1979). It states that a higher share of transfers implies poor efficiency levels (H2) 
(Wyckoff 1990). Debt illusion, for its part, predicts a lower efficiency for highly indebted states 
(H3). Likewise, the voters may be misled by the sheer amount of revenue sources, which 
substantiates the fourth hypothesis: A more complex tax system, ceteris paribus, results in lower 
efficiency levels (H4). Finally, the voters might misjudge the price for public services if it rises 
because of the non-linear tax curve. Hence the prediction that a rising income in combination with 
greater tax progressivity provokes poor efficiency (H5). 
In succession, all the revenue characteristics and the notion of efficiency require an adequate 
operationalization, before the hypotheses face the empirical testing. In the first instance, the 
subsequent chapter provides some background information about the empirical context in which 
the hypotheses will be tested. 
4. Empirical context 
In order to test the previously outlined hypotheses, the empirical foundation must not only be 
comparable in terms of the institutional and legal settings, but it should also provide enough 
variation in the relevant variables. The 26 Swiss cantons meet these conditions and thus they are 
an adequate laboratory for the estimations. This chapter deals with the first requirement and goes 
through the budgeting and spending process whose understanding is key to evaluate the theories’ 
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suitability to the Swiss case. Subsequently, it follows a brief overview of the public domains under 
investigation. Operationalizing and summarizing the variables are dealt with in the next chapter. 
Debate prevention possibly intervenes in the cantonal budgeting and spending process in 
two stages. If ministers want to undertake a larger project, they need to pass the governing council 
and convince their colleagues of the adequacy and necessity of their plan. If the project exceeds a 
certain financial threshold, it goes through the government council twice. The governing council 
first decides upon therewith contingent appropriations (i.e. the credit) and in a second stage the 
project requires the annual budgetary appropriations (i.e. the budget). In both stages, debate 
prevention may affect the dynamics of the negotiations. 
To account for a possible heterogeneity of the effect in question, the analysis distinguishes 
between ten different government functions. The division goes along the line used in the official 
financial statistics. A look on the expenditure share of each government function identifies the 
education, social security, and health as the top cantonal domains. Later on, the focus is on the two 
domains transportation and culture that occupy ranks six and nine, respectively. 
4.1. Budgeting and spending process  
The financial figures and stats of public policies reported in the public annual accounts are the 
result of relatively complex dynamics that take place within the administration. Understanding the 
interplay that leads to public spending requires knowledge of the budgeting and the spending 
process. An explanation of how these two processes work in the Swiss cantons is forthcoming.  
Stemming from the fairly high autonomy of the Swiss cantons, there is no law determining how to 
design budgeting and spending. However, there is a non-binding recommendation regarding the 
organization of fiscal policy and the accounting standards, namely the second Swiss harmonized 
accounting model for the cantons and municipalities (HAM2) (Conference of cantonal finance 
directors 2008).21 The according manual contains an annotated model law concerning financial 
interests which sets the scene for the budgeting process (art. 14 to 20 of the model financial budget 
law, MFHG) and the spending process (art. 36 to 48 MFHG). Because these are only 
recommendations, the manner in which the budget is designed and implemented differs from one 
canton to another and consequently, this section traces only one possibility. Still, once the 
exemplary processes presented here are understood, the knowledge can easily be transferred to the 
other ones. There is less divergence between the cantons with respect to the spending process 
because the HAM2 treats it in more detail. As a second reference, particularly to reveal the 
budgeting process, the canton of Solothurn fills the gaps which the HAM2 lefts over and serves as 
an illustrative example.22 Table 1 helps to follow the subsequent explanations. 
                                                 
21 The HAM2 was developed by the conference of the Swiss cantonal directors of finance and follows to some extent 
the international public accounting standards (IPSAS). The most recent version is published online; see: 
http://www.srs-cspcp.ch/. 
22 Note the link to chapter 7.8, where the canton of Solothurn also serves as a case study. The canton of Solothurn 
regulates the budgetary and spending process in the impact-oriented administration management law (WoV-G SO) 
and its respective decree (WoV-Vo SO). Additional information stems from an interview conducted with the finance 
manager of the canton of Solothurn and one of his controllers on August 29th 2016. 
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The budgeting process starts with two parallel actions. On one side, each spending office gives 
its input into the electronic accounting system [1.1].23 Each accounting area specifies their expected 
revenues and requests expenditures which results in most cases in negative balances. The 
aggregation from these inputs results in a budget with an institutional perspective (Pfäffli 2011). At 
the same time, the parliamentary finance commission (corresponds approximatively to the 
appropriation committee in the U.S. system) decides upon the budgetary targets for the attention 
of the government council [1.2]. The targets are based on a rolling 4-years-ahead financial blueprint 
(§ 22 WoV-G SO). The finance commission’s view is, in contrast to the spending offices, rather 
macroeconomically driven with a strategic perspective. The finance office then receives the 
commission’s budgetary targets and prepares the government council’s answer to it [1.3]. 
Concretely, in the case of the canton of Solothurn, after some informal talks between the finance 
minister and his financial manager, the finance office writes the comments for the government 
council who then simply passes them on [1.5]. The answer of the government council goes 
afterwards back to the finance commission, which discusses and comments upon it [1.7]. Once the 
spending offices have placed their input into the accounting system, the finance office collects the 
tentative information on behalf of the government council [1.4]. The government council then 
instructs each department on how much they have to cut their budgeted expenditures in order to 
meet the target of the finance commission or at least to come close to it [1.6]. The government 
council’s instructions mark the end of the first version of the budget. 
For the purpose of complying with the financial target set by the finance commission, the 
financial manager, together with one of his controllers, meets a delegation of the spending offices 
to discuss possible budget adjustments [2.1]. Once the spending ministers have adjusted the inputs 
in the accounting system, the finance office prepares the government council’s budget report [2.2]. 
In fact, some cantons (the canton of Aargau, for instance) even pass the prior consultation of the 
finance commission and start their budgeting process with the government council setting the 
budgetary targets and instructing the spending offices. As a final step in the administration stage, 
the government council transfers the compiled budget to the parliament [2.3]. 
Having passed the executive, the budget proceeds to the parliamentary stage. There, the 
functional commissions (e.g. social and health commission, education and culture commission etc.) 
contemplate the budget within their occupation and propose adjustments for the attention of the 
finance commission [3.1]. The latter then discusses the budget as a whole, taking into account the 
adjustment proposals of the functional commissions [3.2]. In particular, the finance commission is 
concerned about financial ratios and accordingly agrees on or rejects the budget adjustments of the 
various functional commissions. The latter then reconcile the differences together with the finance 
commission, if there are any [3.3]. The adjusted budget goes back to the finance office [3.4] that 
integrates the adjustments into the accounting system and prepares the government council’s 
comments on it [3.5]. The government council then passes on the comments to the attention of 
the parliament without modifications in the budget [3.6]. Finally, the parliament discusses the 
budget and decides on it [3.7]. 
                                                 
23 The number in brackets refers to the budgeting stage in Table 1. 
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Table 1 – Budgeting process 
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Table 1 – Budgeting process (continued) 
Source: own composition 
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Once the budget is effective, the executive is, in principle, authorized to actually spend the 
money. This is only true for expenses that fulfill certain conditions though. In the words of the 
model financial budget law, an expense is a financial liability that in any case needs a certain type 
of credit before it is incurred (art. 36 MFHG). The model law distinguishes between four types of 
credit: 
• the ordinary budgetary credit is decided upon and approved automatically through the 
accounting balances of budget and is thus valuable for one year (art. 44 MFHG); 
• the supplementary credit brings to bear if the approved ordinary budget credit is 
insufficient or if there is none (art. 46 MFHG); 
• the contingent credit is used for projects whose expenses exceed a certain threshold or 
endure several years (art. 37 MFHG); 
• the ancillary credit is needed if the approved contingent credit is insufficient (Art. 43 
MFHG). 
 The spending process comes only into play for projects that need more than the ordinary 
budget credit. Consider some spending office that intends to carry out a new project, which requires 
a non-ordinary credit, i.e. a supplementary, contingent, or ancillary credit [4.1]. The office prepares 
a report justifying the need for the project and discussing the financial liabilities expected [4.2]. In 
order to avoid overly large discrepancies in the government council, the spending office then opens 
a co-report procedure where it invites the possibly interested offices. As soon as a project requires 
financial resources, inviting the finance office to comment upon the report is mandatory anyway 
(§ 26 WoV-Vo SO). In its co-report the finance office evaluates the project with respect to the 
question of whether the funds are applied economically [4.3]. In the next step the government 
council debates the project, taking into account the report as well as the co-reports. Depending on 
the level of expenses, the government council can definitively decide, or it must pass the report on 
to the attention of the parliament (art. 37 MFHG) [4.4, 4.5]. After a prior consultation of the 
functional or the finance commission [4.7, 4.6], the parliament discusses the project together with 
the credit [4.8]. Again, depending on the level of expenses, the parliament definitively decides or a 
referendum applies. If the last resort, be it the government council, the parliament or the voters, 
approved the credit, the spending office may spend the money within the frame defined in the 
credit request [4.9]. 
The two parallel processes serve as a reference for the previously presented debate prevention 
theory. A special focus lies on the actions between [1.1] and [2.3] for the budgeting process and 
between [4.2] and [4.5] for the expenditure process. The interplay between the executive and 
earmarking is key in these two phases, and this matches with the debate prevention theory. Note 
that the debate prevention theory did not differentiate between the budgeting and the spending 
process. Indeed, both processes are relevant for what the researcher finally observes in terms of 
public expenditures (inputs) and public service (outputs). The mutual consideration seems 
therefore appropriate. 
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Table 2 – Spending process for non-ordinary credits 
Source: own composition 
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4.2. Public domains under investigation 
The functional chart of accounts of the HAM2 guarantees a certain comparability between the 
cantons and years with reference to the various categories of government function. The HAM2 
discusses ten functional categories in which the cantons classify their expenditures. Each of these 
categories has several sub and sub-sub categories (Conference of cantonal finance directors 2008). 
Table 3 lists the ten superior categories together with some prominent sub categories as examples 
and the respective expenditures in absolute and relative terms in 2014. The figures provide a feeling 
for the absolute and relative sizes of the government functions. The last column anticipates the 
operationalization of the variable related to earmarked revenues. Concretely, it shows the fraction 
of expenditures that is funded through earmarked revenues. 
Table 3 – Cantonal expenditures and earmarked funding in 2014 by government function 
Government function Prominent sub and sub-sub categories 
Expenditures 
(in 1’000 CHF) 
Expenditures 
(in percent) 
Earmarked 
revenues1  
General administration General services, executive and legislative 
organs 
65’34’036 7.67 0.28 
Public order and security, defense Police, justice, corrections, army 77’02’816 9.04 1.71 
Education Obligatory schooling, universities, research 239’21’269 28.07 0.37 
Culture, church, sport and 
leisure 
Theaters, cultural heritage, libraries, sport 
events 
16’82’716 1.97 32.80 
Health Hospitals, preventive care 120’17’287 14.10 0.53 
Social Security Old age and survivors, disability, social welfare 172’50’345 20.24 3.24 
Transportation and 
communication 
Construction and maintenance of roads, public 
transport 
61’98’567 7.27 28.35 
Protection of the environment and 
spatial planning 
Sewage disposal, waste management 14’54’930 1.71 11.73 
National economy Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing 44’73’515 5.25 3.81 
Financing and taxes Asset and debt management, fiscal equalization 39’84’959 4.68 n.a. 
1 in percent of expenditures 
Source: Federal Finance Administration (2016);  
The three largest expenditure categories are education, social security, and health. Together 
they account for almost three quarters of the total expenditures of all cantons in 2014. Even if 
defense falls completely under the responsibility of the confederation, the domain of public order 
and security, defense (hereafter public order and security) still ranks fourth. Note that general 
administration appears rather high on the list. One reason is that this domain captures not only the 
parliaments and executives, but also a large part of the financial administration and the tax 
authority. Transportation and communication (hereafter transportation) takes a middle position 
and, on the cantonal level, is reduced to tasks related to transportation, as communication is by 
and large settled on the national level. The national economy is positioned seventh on the list, 
representing the administration, regulations, and – to a limited extent – the support of different 
industries and sectors. The function of financing and taxes does not provide any public service per 
se, but it does encompass interest payments, financial flows of the fiscal equalization, et cetera. The 
last two functions each account for less than two percent of the expenditures. In both domains, in 
protection of the environment and special planning as well as in culture, church, sport and leisure 
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(hereafter culture), the municipalities as the lowest state layers play a significant role, which explains 
the limited cantonal expenditures. 
In contrast to its meager weight with respect to expenditures, earmarking plays the most 
important role in the government function of culture as the later analysis shows. Around one third 
of all expenditures for culture were funded through earmarked revenue in 2014; the share remains 
about the same when considering the entire timespan from 2000 to 2014 (see Table 27 in the 
appendix). With almost thirty percent earmarked funding, transportation comes second (over the 
entire timespan the share is slightly smaller). In recent years, the domain of protection of the 
environment and spatial planning also reaches shares of more than ten percent of expenditures 
funded through special financings. In the remaining functions, earmarking is almost negligible with 
percentage figures in the low one-digit range. Consequently, this analysis concentrates on the two 
domains of culture and transportation, while all the data and the estimations of the other functions 
largely appears in the appendix. 
4.3. Interim conclusion 
Although a theory can describe reality only in an abstract manner, it still needs to account for 
the central elements of the relationship it approaches.  Concretely, the debate prevention theory 
predicts less monitoring between ministers if they benefit from earmarked revenue, which 
eventually leads to a less efficient public service provision. This chapter identifies the stages in the 
budgeting and spending process, where these configurations typically occur and are thus 
observable. If ministers want to achieve a larger project, they need to pass the governing council 
and convince their colleagues of the adequacy and necessity of their plan. If the project exceeds a 
certain financial threshold, it goes through the government council twice. First the governing 
council decides upon therewith accruing liabilities (i.e. the credit) and in a second stage the project 
requires the annual financial allotments (i.e. the budget). In both stages, debate prevention may 
affect the dynamics of the negotiations. 
To account for a possible heterogeneity of the effect in question, this analysis distinguishes 
between ten different government functions. The division follows what is used in the official 
financial statistics. A look at the expenditure share of each government function identifies 
education, social security, and health as the top cantonal domains. Later on, the focus is on the two 
domains of transportation and culture that occupy ranks six and nine, respectively. 
5. Operationalization of revenue characteristics 
A glance on the existing literature in section 2.1 demonstrates the prevalence of earmarking 
practices. While the idea of earmarking in general is to dedicate certain revenues to a specific 
purpose, its understanding in practice varies vastly. Anecdotal evidence comes from an episode in 
the United States Bush Administration era. In 2007, the Congress passed the Honest Leadership 
and Open Government Act which, inter alia, demands a public disclosure of each earmarking 
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request that made it to the bill.24 During the Senate debate, the question of how to define earmarks 
arose. While the Senate’s original version of the act only covered appropriations contained in the 
bill’s text, a finally passed amendment extended the definition to earmarks listed in the report to 
the bill. This subtle difference increased the requests in question nearly twentyfold (Finnigan 
2007).25 Similar issues on how to define earmarks arise in Switzerland, where the cantons use them, 
usually under the term special financing, very heterogeneously. 
Thanks to the HAM1 and HAM2, the definitions of debt, tax complexity and transfers turn 
out more spontaneously. Having said this, the transfers are broken down into an earmarked and a 
non-earmarked subgroup. Although this refinement complicates the operationalization to some 
extent, some existing operationalizations in this matter give some guidance. Tax progressivity as a 
last revenue characteristic imposes further operationalization issues. A novel approach yields 
interesting insights here. 
Once the terms are defined and operationalized, this chapter provides an overview of the 
practical relevance of the revenue characteristics. There are two cantonal domains in which 
earmarks play a significant role. On average, the cantons fund 35 percent of their expenditures via 
earmarked revenues in the cultural domain. In the transportation domain this share still adds up to 
24 percent. The remaining domains yield amounts between 0.5 percent (education) and 12.1 
percent (environment and spatial planning) and they therefore are not analyzed in closer detail 
(summary statistics are given in Table 27 in the appendix). 
5.1. Earmarked revenue 
Before going into the details of the operationalization of earmarked revenues using data of the 
Swiss cantons, a more general discussion embeds the term ‘earmarked fund’ into a broader context.  
Figure 3 comprises the possible financial flows related to earmarked funds. The filled boxes and 
arrows represent elements that are directly linked through the chain of financial flows, while the 
hatched arrows connote in- or outflows. Theoretically, in- and outflows are possible, but if inflows 
are present, the respective earmarked fund is, according to the definition used here, not considered 
as such anymore.26 Note that the exclusion of inflows prevents any crowding out of general fund 
financing of a specific purpose by earmarked revenues. In addition, there is obviously no outflow 
from the earmarked fund to the general budget or to any other specific purpose, which is the core 
of the earmarking idea. For this to hold in reality, the benefitting good must be defined in a 
sufficiently narrow way. 
The diagram of the financial flows starts with a tax for a private good (e.g. gasoline) or a charge 
for a public service (e.g. fee for hunting license). The revenue stemming from either source then 
                                                 
24 In 2005, the House Appropriations Committee received almost 35’000 requests out of which about a third effectively 
found their way into the bill (Porter & Walsh 2008). 
25 Ultimately, in 2008, President Bush issued an executive order forcing the administration only to expend on the basis 
of the text of the laws. Since only the bill itself but not the corresponding report entails the characteristic of a law, this 
order implicitly forced Congress to include all earmarks in the bill (Porter & Walsh 2008). 
26 Of course, different understandings are possible. For a classification of different types of earmarked funds see Bird 
& Jun (2005). According to their typology, earmarked revenue as it is grasped here, would be considered substantive 
earmarking, in which an increase of earmarked revenues has a direct effect on the special fund or the linked 
expenditures. 
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flows either entirely – equipped with an earmark – into the respective fund, or a part of it 
contributes to the general budget. In addition to the earmarked revenue, the parliament could 
theoretically add additional financial resources of the general budget to the earmarked fund. In this 
case though, the fund is excluded from any further analysis. The stock of financial resources in the 
earmarked funds then flows (labelled ‘expenditures through special financings’) to a previously 
specified public good. This good also possibly collects further resources from the general budget. 
In this case, again, the earmarked fund is not taken into account as such anymore. 
Figure 3 – Financial flows of earmarked funds 
 
Source: Own illustration 
Using the aforementioned definition of earmarked funds, it is clear that the spirit and purpose 
of earmarking revenues is to ensure that they are used solely for a specific predefined application. 
From a bookkeeping point of view, a separately reported account guarantees the claimed exclusive 
use while keeping the disclosure transparent. In such a system, earmarked revenues still enter the 
general financial statement and they are subsumed under the total revenues. Likewise, the 
corresponding expenditures represent a part of the total expenses of the annual financial statement. 
However, by the end of the year, the specific purpose account (called earmarked fund above) nets 
the earmarked revenue and the corresponding expenditures independently of all other transactions. 
If the balance is positive, then a credit note increases the respective account in the balance sheet. 
Otherwise, the account decreases by the amount of the deficit. The process is explicated using the 
diagram in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 – Accounting diagram of earmarked revenues 
 
Source: Own illustration 
The example in Figure 4 describes the case in which the specific purpose account (i.e. above the 
dotted line) in the income statement closes positively. The surplus increases the specific purpose 
account of the balance sheet. At the same time, the total income statement shows a deficit, which 
in turn decreases the equity, or, if the equity becomes negative, requires additional borrowings. In 
this sense, the specific purpose accounts sit in between equity and debt capital. On the one hand, 
they can be viewed as debt capital, which the government owes to the respective purpose. On the 
other hand, they share characteristics with equity as their revenue stems from saved surpluses. The 
same arguments hold if the specific purpose account is in deficit. The HAM1 acknowledged only 
the first reasoning and assigned specific purpose accounts to debt capital (recommendation 454 of 
the HAM1; Conference of cantonal finance directors, 1981).27 The HAM2 solves the ambiguity by 
defining criteria as to the leeway in decision-making over the account. Depending on whether the 
superior law or the state entity itself determines the earmarking and details the use, the specific 
purpose account is part of the debt capital or the equity (recommendation 8 of the HAM2; 
Conference of cantonal finance directors, 2008). 
Since the two domains of transportation and culture are central in the forthcoming analysis, it 
is worth looking closer at their concrete earmarked revenues and, accordingly, at their legal base. 
For transportation, the most prevalent specific purpose accounts hold resources for roads. 
Comparing their legal bases reveals that the revenue sources are similar in most cantons. The 
generic revenues are taxes and fees for motor vehicles, federal transfers stemming from the 
petroleum tax and from the heavy vehicle fee (Leistungsabhängige Schwerverkehrsabgabe, LSVA), and 
fees for excessive or special use.28 Despite the federal law urging cantons to use the before-
mentioned transfers specifically for the roads, 29 they can nevertheless decide on their own whether 
they want to set up an affiliated specific purpose account. Cantons can additionally and 
                                                 
27 At the same time, the chart of accounts of HAM1 assigns the specific purpose accounts to distinct category. 
28 See, for instance, § 24 road law of the canton of Solothurn as of 24 September 2000, § 35 road and route law of 
the canton of Zug as of 30 Mai 1996. 
29 See, for instance, 85(2) Swiss Federal Constitution as of 18 April 1999. 
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autonomously define whether the transfers exclusively fund road maintenance and construction or 
if the means can also be used for the periphery (wildlife corridors for instance). Hence, the cantonal 
parliaments decide independently of the federal law on the installation of a specific purpose account 
in the transportation domain. 
In comparison, in the cultural domain, the usage of specific purpose accounts differs more from 
one canton to another. Following the inter-cantonal agreement on the joint implementation of 
lotteries as of 26 Mai 1937 (Interkantonale Vereinbarung betreffend die gemeinsame Durchführung von 
Lotterien), every canton maintains a specific purpose account for accumulating lottery profits. 
Consequently, the amount of earmarked revenues deposited in these accounts depends on the 
players’ appetite to bet. Besides the lottery fund, most cantons support culture, sport and leisure 
with other specific purpose accounts that are funded with a yearly fixed amount of the general 
budget, with revenues from specific divestments, fines for misdemeanors or with pecuniary 
compensations.30 Also in the cultural domain, it is the cantonal parliament that decides upon the 
specific purpose account. 
The term ‘specific purpose account’ defines a family of accounts whose resources are 
earmarked. The HAM1 and HAM2 name several types that differ significantly in kind: 
• Special financings: According to HAM1 „[t]he term special financing denotes […] the 
fully or partial assignment of revenue sources to specific functions (earmarked 
revenues)” (Conference of cantonal finance directors 1981: 27)31. The revised HAM2 
stayed with the same definition (recommendation 8). The two standards specify the 
purpose of special financings in restricting their scope to domains where there is a real 
causality between the charge and the service. Since such a causality hardly exists between 
ordinary (income, property, profit and capital) taxes and any government function, the 
recommendation is to desist from earmarking them. Because special financings 
potentially and rather restrictively narrow financial leeway, they need a legal basis. 
Special financings can be part of the equity or the debt capital under the HAM2. The 
HAM1 creates a third category within the liabilities only for special financings. 
• (Special) funds: When developing the HAM1, the authors recognized that the term 
‘fund’ signifies different things in financial practice. They therefore explicitly avoided 
using the term (item 453 HAM1). With the revision, the HAM2 reintroduced funds as 
a light version of special financings. Funds also require a legal basis. In contrast to special 
financings, funds get along without a causality between the revenue and their intended 
use. Therefore, even taxes can be earmarked and allocated to a fund (see the description 
of the account 1091 ‘receivables from funds within the debt capital’; Conference of 
cantonal finance directors, 2008). Funds can be part of the equity or the debt capital. 
• Legacies and foundations: If third parties want to contribute financially to closely related 
government functions, they usually donate in form of legacies or foundations. The 
canton administers these donations and allocates the resources according to the 
testament or to the foundation goal. The HAM1 recommends displaying neither legacies 
                                                 
30 See, for instance, 2(1) law regarding the fund for contemporaneous art of the canton of Geneva as of 7 May 2010 
or 16 nature and heritage protection law of the canton of the canton of Glarus as of 2 May 1971. 
31 Translated from the German version. 
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nor foundations in the balance sheet because they are not funded by general public 
revenues (item 1023 and 1043 et seq.). The HAM2 reverses the old recommendation by 
listing specific accounts for legacies and donations in the balance sheet. Both can be 
part of the equity or the debt capital. 
• Leftover accounts with earmarked resources: Because the HAM1 stretched the special 
financing further than the HAM2, the former did not need a leftover category. HAM2 
names research contributions as a concrete example for the leftover accounts (account 
2093). The leftover accounts exist only within the debt capital. Apart from that, the 
manual provides no further additional information or a recommendation concerning 
these accounts. 
• Prefinancings: Particularly for larger projects, prefinancings serve to spread the 
expenditures over several preceding years before the government achieves a not yet 
legally decided project (item 445 HAM1 and recommendation 8 HAM2; Conference of 
cantonal finance directors, 2008). HAM1 did not provide a specific account but 
recommended to use special financings instead (item 453 HAM1). As such, they are 
always part of the debt capital. The revision of the accounting standard relaxed the 
recommendation concerning prefinancings. HAM2 views them as a reserve and creates 
a separate account for them which consequently is part of the equity (see the description 
of the account 293 ‘prefinancings’; Conference of cantonal finance directors, 2008). 
• Reserves from domains managed through global budgets: Global budgets are an 
instrument from the new public management (NPM) approach. Instead of governing 
the administration by granting a certain amount of resources for every task (i.e. input 
control), NPM suggests targeting indicator goals (i.e. output control) and grant global 
budgets for an entire department (Pfäffli 2011). In addition, global budgets do not 
necessarily expire by the end of the year, but the departments can deposit surpluses in 
reserves in order to tap them later on. Because the parliament approves global budgets 
for a specific department, it is the only one that can have access to the respective 
reserves. In this sense, the resources are earmarked too (art. 48(3) MFHG and its 
corresponding comment; Conference of cantonal finance directors, 2008). As the name 
suggests, reserves from domains managed through global budgets are always part of the 
equity. As far as the old standard is concerned, global budgets did not exist at the time 
the HAM1 was developed. 
• Provisions: If at the end of the year, the exact amount and/or the due date for a yet 
unpaid but justified, probable, legal or factual liability is unknown, then a provision 
applies. In the subsequent year, the provision serves to settle the invoice. In comparison 
to the HAM1 (item 425), the HAM2 (recommendation 9) only expands on the number 
of accounts of specific provisions but otherwise the respective recommendation 
remained equal. In particular, they both decree that a provision must be used for the 
purpose it was formed for. Provisions are always part of the debt capital. 
• Deferments: In contrast to provisions, deferments apply for the short term and if the 
amount to be paid is fairly sure. In all other aspects, deferments are equal to provisions 
(see comment to recommendation 9 HAM2 and item 426 HAM1). 
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• General reserves: The HAM1 simply qualifies ‘false provisions’ to cover future liabilities 
for deliveries and services as general reserves and bars them (item 425). Neither does 
the HAM2 provide an accurate definition. Instead, it provides the scope of the general 
reserves. Two accounts are the result of purely accounting transactions: restatements 
and reevaluations. The aim of the third, i.e. fiscal reserve (account number 294), involves 
reducing the deficit of the income statement or financing future capital expenditures. It 
is also known as the economic cycle or the compensation reserve. General reserves are 
always part of the equity. 
With their different characteristics, not all of the previously listed candidates for specific purpose 
accounts comply with the debate prevention theory in section 3.1. This only applies to specific 
purpose accounts that satisfy the conditions described above as comment to Figure 3 and Figure 
4. Simply referring to the list above in order to determine which account to exclude from the 
analysis is impossible, however, because the HAM1 as well as the HAM2 are only non-binding 
recommendations, something which leaves the cantons the leeway to interpret them somewhat 
differently. The practical applications do not necessarily coincide with the example description 
above and the cantons may use different accounts for the same transaction. The subsequent 
paragraphs examine whether the example case of each specific purpose account meets the relevant 
assumptions from the theory section. In case it exists, a counterexample is included to demonstrate 
that the cantons indeed use the respective account in different ways. Table 4 gives an overview of 
the accounts and states whether they take part in the analysis: 
Table 4 – Specific purpose accounts of HAM1 and HAM2 and their consideration 
Account To consider in principle Counterexample where (not) to consider the account 
anyway 
Special financings yes special financing for road construction, canton of 
Solothurn 
(Special) funds yes fund for disabled people; canton of Aargau 
Legacy / Foundation no N/A 
Leftover accounts with earmarked resources yes N/A 
Prefinancings HAM1: yes  
HAM2: no 
N/A 
Reserves from domains managed through 
global budgets 
no N/A 
Provisions no N/A 
Deferments no N/A 
General reserves no alcohol-tenth; canton of Aargau 
Source: own composition 
The first theoretical assumption is about the appropriation. Indeed, the revenue has to be 
earmarked in the sense that the scope is sufficiently narrow in order to allocate the revenue to a 
specific department. If this assumption does not hold, then there might still emerge a debate about 
the allocation and the incentives to monitor revert. In the words of Wilkinson (1994), who classified 
different types of earmarking, this assumption refers to narrow earmarks. General reserves leave 
considerable room for manoeuver and provoke potentially tough debates when it comes to their 
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distribution among departments. Therefore, there is no real, or at least no restricting, earmarking 
ascertainable and the general reserves in principle drop out of the analysis.32 
 The second assumption the theory makes concerns the externality of the earmarked share. 
Concretely, the law predetermines the allocation of earmarked revenue to certain public services. 
In the budgetary process, each department receives a given fixed proportion of earmarked revenue 
(denoted as 𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷+𝐴𝐴 above). This assumption rules out the consideration of reserves from domains 
managed through global budgets, provisions, deferments, and potentially prefinancings. Albeit the 
credits of all these accounts are earmarked for specific purposes, their revenue source is not. For 
instance, a department whose domain is managed through a global budget must debate on the part 
it receives from the general budget just as all the other departments do. Only if it manages to 
acquire a surplus does the latter flow into the earmarked account. The same reasoning holds true 
for provisions and deferments.33 In terms of prefinancings, their principle exclusion depends on 
the accounting standard. HAM1 assigns them to special financings that comply with the theory. 
Under HAM2, prefinancings embody a discrete account whose resources are allocated either by 
law or during the budgetary process to certain public services. In the former case, the law effectively 
prevents the debate, either by stipulating a fixed amount or by allowing the apportioning of a 
potential surplus to the prefinancing at the end of the year.34 In the latter case, the first assumption 
rules out prefinancings from being considered because they do not prevent the debate.35  
  Legacies and foundations do not necessarily conflict with the two assumptions (i.e. 
appropriation and externality) above. However, they differ fundamentally from the other accounts 
in one aspect—legacies and foundations are always a voluntary donation to the state and not a 
charge or a tax imposed on the citizens. With regard to the theory, they should be classed among 
the market delivered goods (denoted 𝑐𝑐 above) rather than among the public goods. People can 
freely decide whether they want to contribute to the charitable good. The state only acts as a service 
supplier who fiduciary manages the donation. In addition, some cantons even have rules listing the 
conditions under which they accept donations in the form of legacies and foundations. 
Consequently, legacies and foundations are disregarded from this analysis without any exceptions. 
Finally, three special purpose accounts remain. Special financings, funds, and leftover accounts 
with earmarked resources are paragons for the stocks of earmarked revenue, as detailed by the 
                                                 
32 The canton of Aargau provides a counterexample to the previously described typical usage of general reserves. 
Whereas most of the cantons use a special financing to register the so-called alcohol-tenth, the canton of Aargau enters 
it as general reserve (i.e. ‘Rücklagen’) in its books. The alcohol-tenth is the part of the federal tax on alcoholic beverages 
passed to the cantons. The alcohol law obliges the cantons to use their share for combating alcoholism and other 
addictive substances (art. 45(2) Alcohol Law as of 21 June 1932). 
33 There are no counterexamples for deferments, provisions, and reserves from domains managed through global 
budgets. They do not need to be considered in the analysis. 
34 The canton of Fribourg established a prefinancing funded with surpluses. According to the Financial Budget Law 
of the canton of Fribourg, the government can appropriate a part of the possible surplus at the end of the year to the 
prefinancing for infrastructures (art. 42abis of the Financial Budget Law as of 25 November 1994). The canton of 
Appenzell Ausserrhoden provides an example of a law that stipulates a fixed amount, originating from a revaluation 
surplus of its hospitals, and deposits it in a prefinancing (art. 31 of the Hospital Network Law as of 19 September 
2011, ’Spitalverbundgesetz’). 
35 For instance, the canton of Nidwald maintains diverse prefinancings. Their purposes range from compensating 
shortfalls from tax revisions, to revenue shortfalls due to decreased profit distribution of the central bank, to pre-
finance the hospital (see the appendix of the annual financial statement of the canton of Nidwald for the year 2014). 
To build the capital stock of these prefinancings, the cantonal Financial Budget Law requests a respective decision 
during the budgetary process (art. 10(2) of the Financial Budget Law as of 21 April 2010). 
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theory explanation in section 3.1. In principle, they combine the beforementioned assumptions 
about the appropriation and the externality of the revenue share. Likewise, their source of funding 
is public, i.e. taxes or charges. Despite these characteristics, there still exist counterexamples.36 
Special financings deserve a more detailed discussion according to the example of the special 
financing for road construction in the canton of Solothurn. When the canton advanced to the 
HAM2, it decided to depreciate its roads linearly over their useful life instead of immediately and 
it registered the recovery value within the special financing.37 As illustrated in Figure 4, the deposits 
in or the withdrawals from special financings balance out the income statement of the specific 
purpose account. Therefore, under immediate depreciation all transactions of specific purpose 
accounts are neutral with respect to the overall balance of the income statement. Under non-
immediate depreciation, the depreciations in the income statement differ from the net capital 
expenditures. This difference, together with the deposits and withdrawals, then determines the 
stock change of the special financing. Put differently, the stock change of the special financing not 
solely represents the balance of the income statement of the specific purpose account, but also the 
difference between net capital expenditures and depreciations. In addition, under non-immediate 
depreciation the special financing inflates the balance sheet because it contains the recovery value, 
i.e. the administrative property. If the transactions of the specific purpose account are no longer 
neutral with respect to the overall income statement, then the respective domain is exposed to the 
budgetary debate again. Consequently, special financings with such a system must drop out of the 
analysis. Having said that, most cantons decided to register potential recovery values outside of the 
special financings when they changed to a non-immediate depreciation, which makes the 
transactions of the specific purpose account neutral. In this case, the respective domain can prevent 
the debate, which is in line with the theory.  
The bullet points above list stock-accounts, whereas the hypothesis utilizes profit and loss 
accounts. More precisely, the theory hypothesizes that a higher proportion of the expenditures for 
a specific purpose in comparison to the total expenditures leads to less efficiency. With reference 
to Figure 4, the required data are located above the dotted line of the income statement. Although 
neither the HAM1 nor the HAM2 explicitly recommends it, some cantons individually provide 
income statements and balance sheets of the specific purpose accounts in the appendix of the 
annual financial statements, thus furnishing the information in the most transparent way. The 
second-best solution is to run cost centers financed entirely through one specific purpose account 
and to report these cost centers individually in the institutional classification of the annual financial 
statement. Lastly, there are cantons in which the information is not publicly accessible. Most of the 
cantons of the last category are cooperative and provide the information upon request. 
                                                 
36 The canton of Aargau partly uses funds for accumulating donations for a specific purpose (§ 32 of the Decree about 
the Impact Oriented Management of Tasks and Financial Resources as of 5 June 2012). As such, they are a third 
possibility besides legacies and foundations to stock donated earmarked revenue. Hence, they are not considered in 
this analysis. There are no counterexamples for leftover accounts with earmarked resources and they are therefore 
always considered in this analysis. 
37 Figure 23 in the appendix schematically illustrates the mechanism of an accounting regime with non-immediate 
depreciations. As comparison, Figure 24 draws on the same example while depreciating immediately. 
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5.2. Transfers 
In contrast to the earmarked revenue, HAM2 proves more useful in directly identifying the 
transfers the cantons receive. The federal finance administration publishes the cantonal financial 
data in a harmonized and hence comparable form in accordance with these very standards. 
Accordingly, it suffices to determine the relevant accounts of the HAM2 with respect to transfers. 
The obvious account category to consider is transfer receipts (item 46 HAM2). The category 
subsumes receipt shares (item 460 HAM2), compensations (item 461 HAM2), fiscal equalization 
and cost compensation (item 462 HAM2), contributions from public authorities and third parties 
(item 463 HAM2), and a residual account (item 469 HAM2). Also for capital expenditures, the 
cantons receive additional funding from other state entities. Namely, the category contributions on 
capital expenditures (item 67 HAM2) pools receipts from different sources: the confederation, 
cantons, concordats, et cetera. Together, the transfer revenue and the transfer receipt constitute 
the total transfers. 
The operationalization of the earmarked part of the transfers is less simple. The de-
appropriation of the transfers was one of the objectives of the fiscal equalization reform 
implemented in 2008 (Swiss Federal Council 2001). As a consequence, the federal council reviews 
how successfully the reform achieves this goal in the quadrennial efficacy report (Swiss Federal 
Council 2014). The report defines the earmarked transfers as the sum of the cantonal shares of the 
heavy vehicle fee (Leistungsabhängige Schwerverkehrsabgabe, LSVA) (item 46008 HAM2), the petroleum 
tax (item 46005 HAM2), and the alcohol tax (item 46003 HAM2). Contributions from public 
authorities and third parties (item 463 HAM2) and contributions on capital expenditures (item 67 
HAM2) are included alike; see Table 5.01 of the report (Swiss Federal Council 2014). From the 
confederation’s point of view, this definition seems reasonable as it reflects the legal requirements. 
For instance, according to art. 85(2) Swiss Federal Constitution as of 18 April 1999 the net receipts 
of the heavy vehicle fee must be used to cover road traffic related costs. Yet, the reality in the 
cantons looks different as a report of the Federal Office for Spatial Development (2009) reveals. 
As per their own declaration, six cantons enter the respective resources into the general budget, 
while others comply more strictly with the law or even establish a specific purpose account. This 
example justifies a closer focus on the effective implementation in the cantons. 
In order to capture the earmarking of the transfers more appropriately, the money inflows are 
categorized into three tiers. The first tier contains all transfers, for which the canton itself 
elaborated a law to earmark them. This category overlaps with the definition of earmarked transfers 
from above (Swiss Federal Council 2014) but is more restrictive. Also, such a definition allows for 
variation between the cantons instead of simply lumping entire accounts together. The second tier 
encompasses transfers that are carried in the books of departments with specific tasks that are 
different from those of the financial department. Typical examples of this category are 
compensations (item 462 HAM2) or contributions (item 463 HAM2). The third tier includes only 
transfers that enter the books of the financial department that is responsible for the general budget; 
example transfers here are those of the fiscal equalization system after its reform in 2008. A 
differentiation between tier two and three is important because of the different obstacles to get at 
the money. If a transfer is affiliated with the general budget, it becomes part of the general budget 
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debate, while transfers flowing directly to a department are no longer up for discussion. Admittedly, 
the departments that benefit largely from such direct transfers might face more difficulties in 
withdrawing means from the general budget. In this sense, transfers of the second tier entail a 
crowding out effect. Tier one and two can be seen together as quasi-earmarked transfers. 
5.3. Further variables related to fiscal illusion 
To measure the complexity and the diversification of the tax system, it is useful to look more at 
the fiscal possibilities of the cantons. The HAM2 differentiates between the following taxes that 
apply to the cantons: income tax (natural persons), wealth tax (natural persons), withholding tax 
(natural persons), personal tax (natural persons), other direct taxes (natural persons), profit tax 
(legal entities), tax on capital (legal entities), other direct taxes (legal entities), property tax, capital 
gains tax, capital transfer tax, inheritance and gift tax, casino and slot machine tax, motor vehicle 
tax, boat tax, entertainment tax, dog license, and other property and expenditure taxes (Conference 
of cantonal finance directors 2008). The list shows that the cantons are able to exploit a fairly broad 
tax base which also underlines the importance of the federal system in Switzerland (Feld & Reulier 
2009). At the same time, some elements of the list raise the question as to why the analysis is limited 
to tax sources instead of also considering other types of revenue. There are at least two reasons for 
this. First, the coverage is already exceptionally large as some items are in fact charges and not 
taxes. Second, as Oates (1985) states, other revenue sources have other properties with respect to 
their visibility and are therefore incomparable to the tax sources listed above. 
Measuring tax complexity and diversity is straightforward, given the concrete tax sources and 
their respective importance with respect to the revenue they generate for the cantons. According 
to Carroll (2009), the tax diversity refers to the number of tax sources a canton actually exploits. 
Tax complexity takes the relative importance of each source into account and is based on the 
normalized Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (nHHI).38 Concretely, the index builds on the 
proportion of each tax source 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 and is calculated as 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼 = ∑ �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1� �𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 2 while its 
normalized version is 𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼 = (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼 − 1/𝑁𝑁) ∗ (1 − 1/𝑁𝑁)−1. Normalizing facilitates its 
interpretation as the nHHI ranges from zero to one instead of 1/𝑁𝑁 to one. Yet, the normalization 
dumps the information about the number of tax sources. In the concrete case of the tax sources 
of the Swiss cantons, the results of the two indices prove to be very similar, which speaks in favor 
of the nHHI due to its more intuitive interpretability. 
Operationalizing the progressivity of the tax system is tricky for several reasons. First, the 
different state layers usually have diverse tax bases with varying rates. It is unclear though, whether 
and how this heterogeneity can be combined into a single variable (Oates 1985). Second, 
progressivity often manifests in a staircase form rather than a smoothed function. Likewise, this 
circumstance complicates finding a single parameter to describe the curvature. Third, often only 
aggregated data is available, something which poorly approximates individual revenue elasticity. All 
                                                 
38 See Pommerehne & Schneider (1978) who exploited the Swiss data in a similar way in an early empirical paper on 
the subject. 
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these deficiencies leave the research community somewhat frustrated about the proposed ways of 
a possible operationalization (Dollery & Worthington 1996). Oates (1975) uses the ratio of income 
tax revenues to total tax revenues. He thereby ignores that tax revenues other than the income tax 
are subject to some – admittedly much smaller – progressivity too. Further possibilities include the 
ratio of the tax burdens of the highest quintile of a state's income distribution to that of the lowest 
quintile (Chernick 2005) or a measure based on the idea of the Gini-ratio39 (Suits 1977). While 
Oates (1975) approaches progressivity roughly, the other two methods require information about 
the distribution of tax revenue among income classes. This information is not publicly available on 
the cantonal level for the cantonal tax in Switzerland.40 In sum, none of these options seem 
appropriate or feasible in the present context. 
A viable and yet exhaustive way to measure the progressivity of the cantonal tax system is a 
logarithmic approximation of the tax curve. Concretely, the method exploits the fact that most of 
the tax rates as a function of the income follow a logarithmic curve, which in turn depends on two 
parameters. The first parameter 𝑏𝑏 indicates the curve’s position, while the second parameter 𝑎𝑎 
stands for the curvature. Together they characterize the logarithmic function  
𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) = 𝑎𝑎 ∗ ln(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + 𝑏𝑏, whereas 𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) represents the tax rate as a function of the income 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖. 
Particularly, the tax rate corresponds to the rate a married couple with two children has to pay at 
the cantonal chief city. Since the tax rate is a steadily increasing function of the income in every 
canton, the parameter 𝑎𝑎 > 0. Naturally, if 𝑎𝑎 = 0 then 𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) = 𝑏𝑏 and the curve is flat without any 
progressivity. As 𝑎𝑎 increases, so does the progressivity of the tax system and, technically, there is 
no upper limit. In reaction to the curvature parameter 𝑎𝑎, the position parameter 𝑏𝑏 automatically 
adjusts in order to guarantee the curve’s intersection around the origin. Usually, the function 
intersects the (horizontal) income axis to the right of the origin, meaning that the tax burden only 
takes effect at some positive income. The simple manner of measuring progressivity has its 
drawbacks though. Particularly, the interpretation of the curvature parameter 𝑎𝑎 is not intuitive and 
only permits qualitative statements. In addition, the reliability of the approximation significantly 
correlates with the curvature parameter itself. The higher the curvature parameter 𝑎𝑎, the better the 
logarithmic function approximates the observed tax rate as a function of the income. Moreover, 
the misspecification is systematic in the sense that the curvature parameter is downwards biased. 
Using the curvature parameter as a measure of progressivity therefore underestimates any true 
effect. However, given the first deficiency that only qualitative statements are possible anyway, the 
systematic error does not impose a further problem. 
The operationalization of the debt happens optimally in net terms in order to prevent misleading 
interpretations if the debt decreases due to sold assets (Brennan 2012). However, empirical analyses 
reveal the problem of the valuation of the assets. If the same asset has a different value depending 
on the government that holds it, the gross debt approximates the concept more appropriately after 
                                                 
39 Concretely, the 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 = ∑ 0.5�𝑇𝑇(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖) + 𝑇𝑇(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1)�(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 , where 𝑇𝑇(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖) is the accumulated percent 
of the tax burden as a function of the accumulated percent income 𝑦𝑦 and the running indices 𝑜𝑜 to 𝑁𝑁 are the known 
stepladders of the tax structure. 
40 Indeed, Schmidheiny (2006) exploits such data in a study covering the two demi-cantons Basel Landschaft and Basel 
Stadt. However, the fact that he actually uses individual level data reveals that he has direct access to information from 
the cantonal tax departments.  
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all. In the case of the Swiss cantons, the harmonized accounting standards do not necessarily 
guarantee a comparability of the asset valuation, but they suggest a composition of the gross debt 
(recommendation 18 of the HAM2). According to this definition, the gross debt is the sum of the 
current liabilities (item 200 HAM2), the short-term financial liabilities (item 201 HAM2) less the 
derivative financial instruments (item 2016 HAM2), and the long-term liabilities (item 206 HAM2) 
less the passivated contributions on capital expenditures (item 2068 HAM2). 
To operationalize the renter illusion, a common measure is the percentage of housing owners 
(Dollery & Worthington 1996). Unfortunately, the respective statistics for the Swiss cantons are 
only available as of 2010. Accounting for the renter illusion would therefore dramatically reduce 
the sample which is why the concept is dropped for the further analysis. 
5.4. Practical relevance of the revenue characteristics 
This section gives an overview of the manifestation of the different revenue characteristics in 
the Swiss cantons. Depending on the variable, a temporal (i.e. along the time axis) or a cross-
sectional (i.e. among cantons) illustration promises more fruitful insights.41 Table 5 contains the 
standard descriptive statistics together with the source of the data. Note that the descriptive 
statistics cover all cantons and all years provided the data is available. The four variables that differ 
from one public domain to another are shown for the functions of culture and transportation. It 
is in these two domains, where the cantons fund the most expenditures through special financings 
as measured by the total expenditures. The first and second moment per revenue characteristic are 
shown separately for the other domains in Table 26 in the appendix.  
                                                 
41 If the graph shows the data canton-wise, the corresponding graph illustrating the development over the years can 
be found in the appendix. 
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Table 5 – Descriptive statistics of the revenue characteristics 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum Data source f 
Tax complexity (normalized HHI in %) 40.374 7.071 21.966 58.849 federal finance administration 
Tax diversification (number of tax sources) 9.040 1.529 6 12 federal finance administration 
Tax progressivity (curvature parameter) 5.588 1.343 2.522 7.753 federal tax administration 
Gross debt per capita (in 1’000 Swiss francs) 6.502 6.595 1.051 37.097 federal finance administration 
Domain: Culture      
Expenditures through special financings a e 35.431 20.296 0.000 116.698 cantonal annual financial statements 
Volume of the special financing b 1.104 0.776 0.000 3.849 cantonal annual financial statements 
Transfers c 26.783 21.609 0.331 86.925 federal finance administration 
Pseudo-earmarked transfers d 96.324 11.946 12.806 100 federal finance administration 
Domain: Transportation      
Expenditures through special financings a e 23.628 33.455 0.000 200.197 cantonal annual financial statements 
Volume of the special financing b 1.131 3.253 -14.512 12.456 cantonal annual financial statements 
Transfers c 3.58 12.892 0.000 88.428 federal finance administration 
Pseudo-earmarked transfers d 97.284 11.622 35.956 100 federal finance administration 
a In percent of total expenditures 
b In percent of the balance sheet’s total 
c In percent of total revenues 
d In percent of total transfers 
e Values above 100% possible due to different data sources of the nominator (cantonal annual financial statements) and the 
denominator (federal finance administration) 
f All data are subject to own calculations based on the data source indicated in the last column 
Notes: Without missing values there should be 390 observations (26 cantons and 15 years); the true N = 301; missing cantons 
(and years) are BS (if year < 2013), VD (all years), TG (all years), LU (all years), GR (all years), GL (all years), GE (2014); the N 
can be slightly smaller in some regressions in section 7.5 due to excluded outliers. 
Source: own composition 
Figure 5 – Expenditures through special financings 2000 to 2014 
  
Source: Own illustration based on data from the cantonal annual financial statements  
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Figure 6 – Volume of special financings 2000 to 2014 
  
Source: Own illustration based on data from the cantonal annual financial statements 
In a temporal comparison of the expenditure shares that are funded with earmarked revenues 
(Figure 5), the mean value stays roughly stable over time. On average, the cantons fund their 
expenditures by 35 percent (culture) and 24 percent (transportation) using the aid of special 
financings. The interquartile range among the cantons is relatively large compared to the temporal 
variation. The small changes over time are surprising particularly around the year 2008 when the 
new fiscal equalization scheme took effect. It would have been a window of opportunity for the 
cantons to rethink their earmarks, yet from an expenditure point of view little has changed.  
Focusing on the volumes (Figure 6) shows a completely different picture. Starting from 2007, the 
mean volume of special financings and particularly the 75th percentile of the distribution rose 
sharply in the transportation domain. Taken together, the two graphs suggest a drastic increase of 
earmarked revenues for transportation, while the expenditures remained roughly constant. The 
culture domain seems not to have experienced a similar break in 2008, and if anything, the 
expenditures and the volume shrink. 
The relation between the volume’s interquartile range and its mean (Figure 6) illustrate an 
interesting phenomenon. Given the highly right-skewed distribution, the mean value lies above the 
75th percentile from 2000 to 2007. Thus, most cantons have very poorly funded special financings, 
while in a few, the stocks of earmarked revenues represent a considerable part of their balance 
sheets. Also note that the interquartile range of the volume does not contain any negative values 
while the minimum indeed falls below zero, suggesting that only a scarce number of cantons are 
indebted vis-à-vis their special financing. 
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Figure 7 – Total (in million CHF) and percentage of different tiers of earmarked  
transfers 2000 to 2014 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data from the Federal Finance Administration (2016) 
Figure 7 illustrates the cantonal dependency on earmarks in different aspects. The dashed line 
refers to the left axis and traces the total transfers (revenue and receipts) taken in by the cantons. 
Its upward slope corresponds largely to the general increasing trend of the total revenues. 
Consequently, the transfer share stagnates at a level of around 40 percent, as the solid line (right 
axis) emphasizes. Overall, the transfer share varies widely between 11.48 percent (Geneva in 2000) 
and 53.63 percent (Jura in 2009). From 2007 to 2008, the average share jumps from 36 percent to 
40 percent, which, again, may be due to the fiscal equalization reform. Another rather technical 
explanation for the jump is a revision of the manner in which the federal finance administration 
harmonizes the financial data (Federal Finance Administration 2016). 
Zooming in reveals the destination of the transfers. On average, 66.77 percent of them are either 
earmarked or flow directly into specific departments rather than into the general budget of the 
financial department. In the canton of Jura, the pseudo-earmarked share goes up to 83.53 percent 
in 2004, whereas the canton of Zug appropriates only 31.01 percent directly or indirectly in 2008. 
Note that these values vary across governmental domain, which, as mentioned above, justifies the 
more detailed array in Table 27 in the appendix. 
The different tiers of earmarked transfers also record a discontinuity. The first tier, covering 
truly earmarked transfers, decreases from 38 percent in 2007 to 32 percent in 2008. At the same 
time, the third tier (i.e. the non-appropriated transfers, right axis) climbs from 27 percent to 35 
percent. In combination with Figure 5, this shift from earmarked to non-earmarked transfers is 
striking given that the expenditures through special financings do not replicate such a pattern. For 
the transfers, this shift signifies that the aim of the reform, namely to increase cantonal autonomy 
by reducing earmarked transfers, was successful (Swiss Federal Council 2001; Swiss Federal 
Council 2014). However, there appears to be a slight backlash as the first tier’s share reaches 36 
percent again in 2014. The second tier’s share (transfers in favor of a specific department without 
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explicit earmark) declined almost constantly over the interval, moving from 38 percent in 2000 to 
32 percent in 2014. 
Figure 8 – Tax complexity and diversification by canton 2000 to 2014 
 
Source: Own illustration 
Since the two concepts are closely related, tax diversification and complexity are plotted together 
in Figure 8. The mean of the normalized HHI (boxplot, left axis) that measures the tax complexity 
is relatively high at 40.37 percent, meaning that about one half of the tax revenue is based on a 
single source (the income tax). The variation is fairly small with the canton of Uri representing the 
upper end of the scale (58.50%) in 2003 and the canton of Ticino reaching the smallest value in 
2014 (21.97%). The low value, indicating a somewhat higher complexity, stems from the 
geographic location of the canton of Ticino and hence its comparably high revenue from the 
withholding tax (tax at source). Overall, the cantons follow a trend towards a less complex tax 
system that particularly originates in a revenue concentration on a few tax sources rather than in 
an effective reduction of tax sources (see Figure 25 in the appendix). 
Clearly, tax complexity is linked with tax diversification (range pillar, right axis in Figure 8) 
because only cantons with a large number of tax sources can spread their base and increase 
complexity. It is therefore reasonable that tax diversification also does not vary strongly. In fact, 
half of the cantons kept the same number of tax sources over the observed time span. Due to the 
small variation, a classical boxplot illustration is futile. Thus, the crosshatched pillars mark the 
entire range of the tax diversification of a canton throughout the years 2000 to 2014 with the 
diamond figuring the median. On average, the cantons have nine tax sources while some cantons 
expanded this to twelve (Ticino over the entire time range and Geneva between 2011 and 2013) 
and another gets along with six (Zurich starting from 2002 and ongoing).  
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Figure 9 – Progressivity of the tax system by canton 2000 to 2014 
 
Notes: The ordinate shows the estimated 𝑎𝑎-value of the logarithmic function 𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) = 𝑎𝑎 ∗ ln(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + 𝑏𝑏 fitted into data on the tax 
rate (𝑡𝑡) and income (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) of a household consisting of a married couple with two children. 
Source: Own illustration 
The boxplot in Figure 9 shows the differences between the cantons with respect to the 
exploitation of the tax progressivity parameter (see section 5.3 for an explanation of the parameter). 
Even if the parameter itself is hard to interpret, the variation still permits qualitative statements. As 
the classification by canton reveals, the variation between the cantons is usually more important 
than the difference between the years within a single canton. In most of the years under 
investigation, the tax system of the canton of Zug was the least progressive one (in 2014 the 
parameter is 2.522). That is, the curve tracing the percental tax burden per income is flat. In 
contrast, the most progressive tax systems are found in the canton of Jura, Solothurn, and Geneva 
(each in 2000). In these cases, the tax burden still increases sharply even in higher income classes. 
As regards the variation within, the canton of Uri underwent a massive and rapid tax reform that 
became effective in 2009 (Governing Council of the Canton of Uri 2008). The lack of whiskers, 
which cover here the distance from the minimal (maximal) observed value to the first (third) 
quartile, point out that there is almost no variation before and after the reform; that is, all the 
variation comes from the one reform. The same is true for the canton of Obwalden, whose tax 
system reform occurred in 2006 (Governing Council of the Canton of Obwalden 2005). The 
canton of Ticino is different with its long upper whisker that originates in an early tax reform 
(taking effect in 2001). Since that reform, the canton of Ticino has maintained roughly the same 
progressivity. On the contrary, the cantons with two long whiskers, as the canton of Lucerne for 
instance, smoothly adjusted their tax over the years. Taken together, all cantons flattened their tax 
system between 2000 and 2014, something which can be condensed into a decreasing trend in the 
progressivity parameter (see Figure 26 in the appendix). 
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Figure 10 – Gross debt (in 1’000 CHF per capita) by canton 2000 to 2014 
 
Source: Own illustration 
When comparing cantonal debt per capita, the canton of Basel Stadt and the Canton of Geneva 
immediately attract attention; the situation in Basel Stadt is somewhat special as the fiscal data 
cover the canton and the capital city. Even if the variation within the two cantons is remarkable, 
their whiskers do not overlap with those of the other cantons. Again, here the whiskers cover the 
distance from the minimal (maximal) observed value to the first (third) quartile. In defiance of the 
two extreme cantons, the within as well as the between variation of the remaining cantons cover a 
relatively broad range. Among these cantons, the canton of Ticino’s upper whisker leaps to the eye. 
While its debt amounted to 9’241 Swiss francs per capita in 2013, the canton moved up to the third 
rank in 2014 with an indebtedness of 15’132 Swiss francs per capita in 2014. On average, the 
cantonal gross debt fluctuates on a low level of around 6’519 Swiss francs per capita. The least 
indebted canton was Appenzell Innerrhoden in 2010, with only 1’051 Swiss francs per capita. As 
regards the overall development of the debt among the cantons, the mean remains roughly stable 
around 5’000 Swiss francs per capita (see Figure 27 in the appendix). 
5.5. Interim conclusion 
The practical relevance of the different revenue characteristics delivers on the promise of the 
previous chapter. With considerable variation in terms of earmarked revenue, transfers, tax 
complexity, tax progressivity, and indebtedness, the Swiss cantons provide a welcome data source 
to assess potential determinants of efficiency. Among the different revenue characteristics, this 
analysis mainly focuses on the earmarked revenue as an explaining variable of efficiency. The 
descriptive statistics therefore justify concentrating on the domains of culture and transportation 
as the most prominent beneficiaries of earmarks. 
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6. Approaching efficiency 
While the revenue characteristics as right-hand side variables are observable, the efficiency as 
dependent variable only manifests when combining different factors. In his seminal paper, Farrell 
(1957, p.254) notices that “[w]hen one talks about the efficiency of a firm one usually means its 
success in producing as large as possible an output from a given set of inputs”. This statement 
inspires two questions. What exactly are inputs and outputs? How to combine several inputs and 
outputs? Regarding the first question, little help comes from the theoretical literature to support 
the researcher trying to identify the relevant inputs and outputs. With respect to inputs, at any rate, 
the OECD (2001) has established the KLEMS categories referring to capital, labor, energy, and 
material. In terms of outputs, the literature actually differentiates between outputs, outcomes, and 
impacts. While outputs measure what is actually produced within the scope of a policy, outcomes 
cover the effects of a policy on a broader social group, and the impact describes the reaction of the 
policy’s target group (Jann & Wegrich 2007). 42 The identification of the relevant inputs and outputs 
pave the way for the actual estimation of efficiencies. Due to the lack of data, this analysis mostly 
relies here on outputs. 
In regard to the second question, this chapter extensively develops the two most prominent 
methods that aggregate inputs and outputs and that finally produce a measure of efficiency. Among 
researchers in the field of efficiency, there is a fairly sharp line between proponents of the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and its parametric counterpart, the Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA). The separation stems from a fundamental disagreement in some basic assumptions of both 
methods. Consequently, it seems appropriate to apply both and test the robustness of the results. 
However, the emphasis is on the DEA which eventually provides more distinct results. 
Throughout this and the subsequent chapter, several terms appear repeatedly and should be 
defined. A ‘reference set’ describes a vector of input and output values of all observed peers 
(benchmarks could be used as a synonym for peers) taken into account to estimate DEA efficiency 
scores. Following the distinction of Tulkens & Eeckenhaut (1995), a ‘contemporaneous reference 
set’ considers only those peers’ values that are observed in the same year. By contrast, the 
‘intertemporal reference set’ covers the peer’s values of all years and, hence, it pools the data. 
Accordingly, ‘intertemporal efficiency scores’ stem from a DEA estimation using an intertemporal 
reference set, whereas ‘contemporaneous efficiency scores’ are based on a contemporaneous 
reference set. 
Applying the extensively reviewed performance measurement methods and the 
operationalization of inputs and outputs, this chapter lists mean DEA and SFA estimates across 
the Swiss cantons from 2000 to 2014. In anticipation of when this analysis will narrow down to 
focus on the two domains of culture and transportation, the comments are confined to their results. 
For culture, the DEA attests a mean efficiency of about 57 percent, while the SFA’s mean climbs 
to 98 percent. Their rank correlation amounts to only 19 percent. Accordingly, both results should 
be interpreted cautiously. For the transportation domain, the mean efficiencies come to 67 (DEA) 
                                                 
42 Note that the usage of the three terms is not coherent in the literature. Niskanen (1994, p.26), for instance, contends 
that “[b]ureaucrats and their sponsors do not, in fact, talk much about output – in terms of military capability, the 
value of educational services, the number and condition of the poor, etc.” This entire enumeration actually lists impacts, 
while his example of ‘activity levels’ (the number of the poor served by a program) actually describes an output. 
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and 21 (SFA) percent with a rank correlation of -16 percent, respectively. Additional evaluations 
revealed that the DEA results are more trustworthy in the further analysis. 
6.1. Efficiency measurement in general 
There are various models to measure efficiency, all of which share one basic idea. They are all 
based on a production frontier in which efficiency is expressed as the relative distance to this 
frontier (Farrell 1957). Efficiency therefore depends on the so-called decision-making units (DMU) 
or firms under investigation and specifically on the DMU that produces a set of outputs using a set 
of inputs in the most efficient manner. Most efficient means that given a fixed set of inputs, the 
DMU maximizes its output set, or, given a set of outputs, it maximizes the input set. The difference 
between the various models lies in the way to find and describe such a frontier. Two general strands, 
deterministic and stochastic, have developed in the literature, both with different strengths and 
weaknesses. The deterministic strand claims to find the exact frontier given the observed data. By 
imposed this kind of strong claim, deterministic approaches generally do not need, but also do not 
allow for conducting statistical inference.43 The stochastic strand acknowledges that the observed 
data is only a sample, which prevents determining the exact frontier. Instead, stochastic approaches 
estimate the frontier which thus enables statistical inference (Bogetoft 2013). 
Both strands embrace a further categorization with respect to the functional form of the 
frontier. While the classic stochastic models are parametric and need to assume a specific functional 
form, recent developments also propose non-parametric approaches without such assumptions. 
The differentiation between parametric and non-parametric models also exists within the 
deterministic family. Table 6 gives an overview of the different categories of efficiency 
measurement methods and names the respective models as examples. 
Table 6 – Categorization of efficiency measurement methods 
 Deterministic Stochastic 
Parametric • Corrected Ordinary Least Squares 
• Modified Ordinary Least Squares 
• Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
• Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
• Distribution Free Approach 
• Thick Frontier Approach 
• True fixed / random effect model 
Non-
parametric 
• Data Envelopment Analysis 
• Free Disposal Hull 
• Stochastic Data Envelopment 
Analysis 
Source: Own illustration 
Exponents of the deterministic family are the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), the Free 
Disposal Hull (FDH), and Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS). All these approaches 
somehow envelop the data points on an input-output plane. Figure 11 illustrates their respective 
efficiency frontiers. The data points A to H represent input-output combinations of the decision-
                                                 
43 The deterministic character, which is actually an assumption, is relaxed later. 
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making units under investigation. As shown, DEA can further distinguish between a constant 
returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS) model (Cooper et al. 2007).44  
Figure 11 – Deterministic efficient frontiers 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Kalb (2010a) 
The two DEA models differ in the form with which they envelop the data. Constant returns to 
scale DEA draws the efficient frontier as a straight line from the origin to the point closest to the 
upper left corner (Charnes et al. 1978). The underlying assumption is that all decision-making units, 
irrespective of their size of production, can theoretically produce on the same production frontier. 
The only fully efficient decision-making unit in terms of constant return to scale is C. Variable 
returns to scale DEA accounts for possible scale efficiencies by enveloping the data points convexly 
(Banker et al. 1984). Now the fully efficient decision-making units are A, F, C, and D. The 
intersection of the two frontiers, that is decision-making unit C, identifies the input volume up to 
which a DMU can become more efficient by increasing its input. Above the intersection, the DMU 
can increase its efficiency by reducing the input. In between the constant and the increasing returns 
to scale model there is the non-increasing return to scale (NIRS) DEA, which Figure 11 does not 
explicitly illustrate.45 As the name suggests, it combines the two models by drawing the efficient 
frontier from the origin to the intersection, which corresponds to the constant returns to scale 
DEA. From the intersection upwards, the frontier of the non-decreasing DEA is equal to the 
frontier of the variable returns to scale DEA. Likewise the non-decreasing returns to scale (NDRS) 
DEA first follows the variable returns to scale DEA frontier up to the intersection and then 
corresponds to the constant returns to scale DEA (Charnes et al. 1978). 
                                                 
44 Often the constant returns to scale DEA model is referred to as the CCR model named after its authors Charnes, 
Cooper & Rhodes (1978). The variable returns to scale DEA model is also known as BCC model according to its 
authors Banker, Charnes & Cooper (1984). 
45 For further illustrations of the models see for example Kalb (2010). 
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Criticism of the DEA models is linked to the direct connections between the data points and 
argues that these input output combinations are only theoretical and not feasible. To account for 
that critique, Free Disposal Hull (FDH) envelopes the data only with lines parallel to the axes 
(Deprins et al. 2006). The resulting frontier ensures that only real input output combinations act as 
reference. Thereby even more decision-making units become fully efficient. The only inefficient 
decision-making units left are G and H. A small number of inefficient units is a usual result when 
applying FDH on small samples. In fact, the convergence rate of the FDH estimator is much 
smaller compared to the DEA estimator; the rate difference between the two methods is 
specifically severe, if the number of inputs and outputs exceeds two (Kneip et al. 2015). Therefore, 
FDH appears to be an invalid method to analyze the rather small sample investigated here. 
Turning to the parametric models within the deterministic family leads to Corrected Ordinary 
Least Squares (COLS) as proposed by Richmond (1974).46 As its name implies, it originates from 
Ordinary Least Squares. This econometric technique fits a straight line into the data on the input 
output plane such that it minimizes the squared distance between the data points and the line. The 
correction takes place in a parallel upwards shift of the line until it is tangent to the variable returns 
to scale DEA frontier. The tangency is reached in the decision-making unit F which is fully efficient 
under COLS. Note that even if COLS is based on an econometric approach, it is still deterministic. 
The reason is that it interprets the entire distance between the efficient frontier and the data points 
as inefficiency, leaving no room for statistic noise. 
Besides COLS, similar techniques like the Modified Ordinary Least Squares (MOLS) and 
specific forms of the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) have emerged. They basically differ 
in the assumption about the error term. Whereas COLS assumes normally distributed errors, in 
MOLS the error term follows a one-sided distribution (Afriat 1972; Richmond 1974). If estimated 
by MLE, for instance, the functional form of the error can be assumed to be gamma distributed 
(Greene 1980). Note that the different errors only alter the shift and possibly the slope of the 
regression line, but they do not change the deterministic character of the model. They all assign the 
entire error to inefficiency. 
The first authors who separated efficiency from statistical noise were Meeusen & Van den 
Broeck (1977), Aigner et al. (1977) and Battese & Corra (1977). They laid the foundation for the 
family of stochastic models which are mainly based on econometric ideas. Like the COLS model, 
stochastic models either explain the output by a combination of inputs through a production 
function or they explain the input by a combination of outputs and the input factor-prices through 
a cost function. While the stochastic noise has a symmetrical distribution around zero, the 
efficiency term is strictly positive and possibly follows some other distribution. Marrying the 
frontier idea and the standard econometric models paved the way for further developments, 
including the consideration of panel data, heteroscedasticity, endogeneity, et cetera. The respective 
models are accordingly called true fixed effects model, true random effects model, et cetera. Not 
least, the parametric approach also makes it possible to test many of the underlying assumptions 
based on some statistics (Kumbhakar et al. 2015). 
                                                 
46 Originally the idea of COLS dates back to Winsten (1957) but the actual model was only developed around twenty 
years later. 
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In anticipation of the 7th chapter a short note is appropriate. The proceeding paragraphs 
presented the different families of efficiency measures. As outlined, the DEA belongs to the 
category of non-parametric deterministic approaches since it does not presume a specific functional 
form of the production process while neither does it a priori allow for statistical noise. The lack of 
statistical noise is indeed consistent with its classification as a deterministic approach. However, 
from a statistical point of view, the deterministic character is an assumption rather than a property. 
This is an important distinction when it comes to the assumptions needed for the second stage. 
Since the second stage uses statistical methods to explain the previously estimated efficiency scores, 
the distribution of the scores as a dependent variable needs to be known – or plausibly assumed. 
Unfortunately the literature has only generated very limited results about the sampling distribution 
of efficiency estimates (Gijbels et al. 1999). By all means, as Simar & Wilson (2007, p.33) state, “[a] 
more serious problem in all of the two-stage studies that we have found arises from the fact that 
DEA efficiency estimates are serially correlated”.47 Section 7.1 shows that most of the statistical 
models used in the second stage rely on implicit underlying assumptions that are not consistently 
plausible. The chapter also outlines different possibilities of how to deal with such issues. 
6.2. Data Envelopment Analysis 
This section develops the different measures of Data Envelopment Analysis step by step. The 
new quasi fixed effects algorithm which follows in section 7.1 builds strongly on the ideas of DEA, 
which is why it is important to review this method in detail. Although mathematical concepts are 
reduced to a minimum, some are nonetheless necessary. To understand them, keep in mind the 
following coherent notation. While row or column vectors appear in small bold letters, 𝒙𝒙, matrices 
are in capital bold letters, 𝑿𝑿. The superscript T, as in 𝒙𝒙𝑇𝑇 for instance, indexes transposed vectors 
(i.e. scalars) and matrices. 
As mentioned above, the DEA is based on the idea that efficiency is a relationship between 
inputs and outputs. This fundamental thought is understood most easily by considering a 
production process that involves only one input, say clerks, and one output, say documents.48 Take 
departments A to H, where each treats a certain number documents employing a number of clerks 
as given in Table 7.  
                                                 
47 The correlation emerges from the fact that in finite samples every efficient observation expands the frontier and 
thereby alters the efficiency estimates of all or most of the other observations. 
48 The examples build on those from (Cooper et al. 2007). 
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Table 7 – Input-oriented DEA example with one input and one output 
Department (𝑜𝑜) A B C D E F G H 
I: Clerks 1 2 5 10 7 3 4 8 
O: Documents 8 12 70 100 77 45 36 72 
Documents/Clerk 8 6 14 10 11 15 9 9 
Efficiency 0.53 0.40 0.93 0.67 0.73 1.00 0.60 0.60 
Source: Own illustration inspired by Cooper et al. (2007) 
The number of documents treated per clerk is called the productivity. The department with 
the highest productivity (which is F here) is the relatively most efficient and therefore obtains an 
efficiency score of 1. Department F is thus the peer for the other departments, whose efficiency is 
the result of dividing their productivity by the productivity of the peer. Formally, in the one-input-
one-output case the efficiency is 
 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖/𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖max (𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖/𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)    where    𝑜𝑜 ∈ 𝑛𝑛 = {𝐴𝐴, … ,𝐻𝐻} (25) 
Note that, because of the compound fraction, the efficiency measure 𝜃𝜃 is unit invariant, that 
is, the number of documents could be in the hundreds or in the thousands while the efficiency of 
all departments remains equal. Furthermore, the efficiency measure is always between one and 
zero, i.e. 𝜃𝜃 ∈ (0,1] by construction. This property is maintained throughout the subsequent 
modifications if not stated otherwise. 
Besides treating documents, clerks might also answer inquiries. Table 8 introduces the number 
of inquiries to every department as an additional output variable. As before, divide the number of 
inquiries by the number of clerks to obtain the productivity of each department. Having two 
different productivities for each department at hand, efficiency can no longer be obtained by 
comparing each department with the peer. In fact, there are several peers now. While department 
F has the highest productivity in treating documents, department B answers the most inquiries per 
clerk. 
Table 8 – Input-oriented DEA example with one input and two outputs 
Department (𝑜𝑜) A B C D E F G H 
I: Clerks 1 2 5 10 7 3 4 8 
O: Documents 8 12 70 100 77 45 36 72 
O: Inquiries 40 120 60 300 280 48 220 160 
Documents/Clerk 8 6 14 10 11 15 9 9 
Inquiries/Clerk 40 60 12 30 40 16 55 20 
Efficiency 0.81 1 0.93 0.84 0.98 1 1 0.69 
Source: Own illustration inspired by Cooper et al. (2007) 
In order to identify the inefficient departments and their respective peer(s), Figure 12 plots 
productivity with respect to documents and with respect to inquiries. The line connecting the data 
points with the largest distance to the origin, the departments B, F, and G, is called the efficient 
frontier and serves as a reference to obtain the efficiency scores. Consider, for instance, the 
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department D. The line OD����� going through the origin O and department D’s data point intersects 
the frontier in Q. Note that Q’s coordinates (35.84, 11.95) are a direct result from those of F (16, 
15), G (55, 9), D (10,30) and O (0,0). The hypothetical department Q is D’s efficient analogue while 
F and G are its real reference set.  
Figure 12 – DEA example with one input and two outputs 
 
 Source: Own illustration inspired by Cooper et al. (2007) 
Geometrically, the part of the distance of OQ����� that is covered by OD����� is D’s efficiency. Formally 
D’s efficiency can be obtained using the coordinates of D (30, 10) and Q (35.84, 11.95) to calculate 
the ratio of the Euclidian distances to the origin, which is called the radial measure:  
𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷 = OD�����OQ����� = √302+102√35.842+11.952 = 0.84  (26) 
The efficiency score of 84% means that D should only use 84 percent of its input to produce 
the same output in order to be efficient. Likewise, the efficiency score indicates that D could 
increase both its outputs by (θ D -1 = 1.19) 19 percent to attain 100 percent efficiency. Calculating 
efficiency scores by the previously presented procedure is not easy to put into practice when the 
number of departments increases and not at all feasible if the number of outputs is further 
increased. For these purposes, Charnes et al. (1978) developed the so called CCR model that 
measures efficiency by linear programming. To reproduce the CCR model, recall equation (25) 
where the efficiency resulted from a ratio of ratios of one input and one output per department. 
As opposed to this, take 𝑤𝑤 inputs (𝑥𝑥) and 𝑞𝑞 outputs (𝑦𝑦) and add them up after attaching a weight 
(𝑢𝑢 and 𝑣𝑣) to each of them, which yields 
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟=1 /∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗=1∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟=1 /∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗=1   where     ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟=1∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗=1 = max𝑖𝑖=1,…,𝑛𝑛 �∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟=1∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗=1 � (27) 
Then, restrict the weights to be semi positive, i.e. 𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕 , 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0. Moreover, set the denominator of 
(27) (i.e. ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕=1 /∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗=1 ), which is the ratio of the most productive department (here 
department 𝑘𝑘), equal to one. In order to be in line with the ordinary textbook nomenclature, the 
departments are hereafter called decision-making units (DMU). The efficiency of each DMU is the 
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result of choosing the weights 𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕 , 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 of each input and each output that maximizes the value of the 
ratio of ratios subject to the two imposed restrictions. The optimal weights are a byproduct of the 
efficiency measurement, which is not relevant here. For the sake of simplicity, define the multipliers 
𝒖𝒖 and 𝒗𝒗 as vectors with their corresponding outputs 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖 and inputs 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 of department D. The 
fractional programming problem then reads as max
𝒖𝒖,𝒗𝒗 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝒖𝒖𝑇𝑇𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝒗𝒗𝑇𝑇𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖   (28) 
s.t. 𝒖𝒖
𝑇𝑇𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖
𝒗𝒗𝑇𝑇𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖
≤ 1 ∀ 𝑜𝑜 ∈ {1, … ,𝑛𝑛}   
 𝒖𝒖,𝒗𝒗 ≥ 𝟎𝟎  
Since a linear programming problem is easier to solve than a fractional one, next impose the 
restriction that the denominator of (28) (𝒗𝒗𝑇𝑇𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖), that is the sum of weighted inputs of the DMU 𝑜𝑜, 
is equal to one. In addition, under the assumption that 𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗 > 𝟎𝟎 for all 𝑗𝑗, rearrange the first restriction 
to obtain the linear programming problem that leads to the same results as (28): max
𝒖𝒖,𝒗𝒗 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝒖𝒖𝑇𝑇𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖   (29) 
s.t. 𝒖𝒖𝑇𝑇𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝒗𝒗𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 ∀ 𝑜𝑜 ∈ {1, … ,𝑛𝑛}   
 𝒗𝒗𝑇𝑇𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 = 1  
 𝒖𝒖,𝒗𝒗 ≥ 𝟎𝟎  
To simplify further, define the data matrices for the 𝑝𝑝 inputs, the 𝑞𝑞 outputs (rows), and the 𝑛𝑛 
DMUs (columns): 
input: 𝑿𝑿 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑥𝑥11 … 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 … 𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛
⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗1 … 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 … 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑥𝑥𝑤𝑤1 … 𝑥𝑥𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 … 𝑥𝑥𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎤
   and output: 𝒀𝒀 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑦𝑦11 … 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 … 𝑦𝑦1𝑛𝑛
⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕1 … 𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 … 𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑦𝑦𝑞𝑞1 … 𝑦𝑦𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 … 𝑦𝑦𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎤
  
Note that the repeatedly mentioned DMU D is one column of 𝑿𝑿 and 𝒀𝒀 just as 𝑜𝑜, for instance. 
To clarify, the weighting vectors are also written out in full here: 
input multiplier: 𝒖𝒖𝑇𝑇 = [𝑢𝑢1, … ,𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 , … , 𝑢𝑢𝑤𝑤]  and the output multiplier: 𝒗𝒗𝑇𝑇 = [𝑣𝑣1, … , 𝑣𝑣𝜕𝜕 , … , 𝑣𝑣𝑞𝑞] 
The (primal) linear programming problem in full matrix notation then reads as max
𝒖𝒖,𝒗𝒗 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝒖𝒖𝑇𝑇𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖   (30) 
s.t. 𝒀𝒀𝒖𝒖 − 𝑿𝑿𝒗𝒗 ≤ 𝟎𝟎  
 𝒗𝒗𝑇𝑇𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 = 1  
 𝒖𝒖,𝒗𝒗 ≥ 𝟎𝟎  
As (30) shows, the number of DMUs (𝑛𝑛) boosts the number of restrictions. Thus, since the 
number of DMUs is generally larger than the number of inputs (𝑝𝑝) plus outputs (𝑞𝑞), the efficiency 
measure 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is obtained more efficiently through solving the dual of (30). By turning to the dual, the 
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inputs plus the outputs yield the number of variables and the number of DMUs becomes the 
number of restrictions.49 Concretely, the dual of (30) is min
𝜃𝜃,𝝀𝝀 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖    (31) 
s.t. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 − 𝑿𝑿𝝀𝝀 ≥ 𝟎𝟎  
 𝒀𝒀𝝀𝝀 − 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝟎𝟎  
 𝝀𝝀 ≥ 𝟎𝟎  
with 𝝀𝝀 as column vector containing weights of the reference DMUs. Sometimes the dual (31) is 
referred to as the envelopment form while the primal (30) is the multiplier form. By the strong 
duality theorem of linear programming, the optimal value of 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is the same for both the primal and 
the dual. Turning back to the example of departments A to H, define the data matrices of the 
inputs and the outputs with reference to Table 8 as 
𝑿𝑿 = [18 2 5 10 7 3 4 8]  (32) 
𝒀𝒀 = � 8 12 70 100 77 45 36 7240 120 60 300 280 48 220 160�   
The application of the defined data matrices 𝒀𝒀 and 𝑿𝑿 in (32) to the linear programming problem 
(31) for each of the departments results in the efficiency measures presented in the last row of 
Table 8.50 Note that the calculation by the linear programming problem (31) provides the same 
result as the geometric calculation in (26). However, the linear programming allows additional 
inputs and outputs. 
Before developing this model further, it is worth backing up to reconsider the underlying data, 
specifically the outputs. All the outputs involved up to this point are desirable, that is, it is the very 
aim of an administration to process documents and inquiries. However, the communications unit 
might be exposed to complaints from the different departments, which is clearly not their intention. 
It is therefore clear that the number of complaints as a further output cannot be treated like the 
other two outputs; it is an undesirable or bad output. As the overview of Ramli & Munisamy (2013) 
demonstrates, the research has moved in many different directions trying to account for 
undesirable outputs. Following Seiford & Zhu (2002), Liang et al. (2009), Wu et al. (2013) and 
others, the approach is to transform undesirable outputs by a linear monotone function. The upside 
of this kind of transformation is that the standard DEA models are still applicable, which in the 
end keeps the estimation complexity on a reasonable level. On the downside, the transformation 
obscures the interpretation of the results, as it is less clear what the transformed variable actually 
measures. To address this concern intuitively, the proposed transformation function turns the 
parameter upside down and squeezes it between two boundaries. The resulting transformed vector 
is an index between 1 and 100, where the DMU with the lowest output attains an index of 100 and 
the highest output value equals to an index of 1. Concretely, the function transforms the bad output 
𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏 into the index 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 as follows51 
                                                 
49 For a detailed discussion of linear programming problems see Sydsæter & Hammond (2009). 
50 Sydsæter & Hammond (2009) explain the simplex method that solves linear programming problems. Software 
solutions like the MS Excel Solver makes it possible to solve this kind of problem using the simplex method. 
51 Note that the usual transformation sets 𝑏𝑏 = 1 and 𝑎𝑎 > arg max(𝒚𝒚𝑏𝑏) in order to ensure that 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖 > 0 (Seifert & 
Nieswand 2014; Liang et al. 2009; Wu et al. 2013). The resulting transformed output lacks any intuition though. 
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𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏 ∗ 𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏 where 𝑎𝑎 = 100 + 99 ∗ arg min (𝒚𝒚𝑏𝑏)
arg max�𝒚𝒚𝑏𝑏� − arg min (𝒚𝒚𝑏𝑏)  (33) 
  𝑏𝑏 = 99
arg max�𝒚𝒚𝑏𝑏� − arg min (𝒚𝒚𝑏𝑏)   
So far, illustrating the CCR model only shows one side of the situation. Instead of an input 
orientation that is minimizing the input while holding the output constant, the possibility of the 
opposite case is apparent. Of course, the presented linear programming problems are convertible 
to an output orientation where the inputs are kept fixed while maximizing the outputs. As the 
interpretation of the equation (26) result has shown, in the CCR model the output orientation is 
nothing other than the invert of the input orientation. It is equivalent whether a DMU decreases 
its inputs by 𝜃𝜃 or increases its outputs by 𝜃𝜃−1 as long as the proportion of the various outputs 
remains equal. This equivalence does not hold anymore, when the thus far implicitly imposed 
assumption of constant returns to scale is dropped. The respective theory comes from Banker et 
al. (1984), who gave the BCC model its name. 
Reconsider the very first example of the departments A to H that need only one input (clerks) 
to produce one output (documents). Table 7 provides the respective data. Plotted on a simple 
input-output plane, the data looks just like Figure 13. Remember that the CCR model identified 
department F to be fully efficient because it processes the most documents per number of clerks 
engaged. In fact, the output-input ratio of each department creates the slope of the line connecting 
each data point with the origin. The department with the steepest line can claim to be the most 
efficient. However, microeconomic theory, for instance, advises caution with respect to possible 
scale efficiencies (Frank 2006). The BCC model attends to this caution by enveloping the data with 
a convex curve rather than with a straight line to define the efficient frontier. Adapting the data in 
this way usually leads to more DMUs declared as efficient. While under the constant returns of 
scale assumption, department F is the only efficient department, under the variable returns to scale 
assumption the departments A, C, and E become efficient too. 
Figure 13 – DEA example with one input and one output 
  
 Source: Own illustration inspired by Cooper et al. (2007) 
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To demonstrate the different efficiency measures and how to decompose the technical 
efficiency examined above, take department E as an example. The CCR model evaluates E’s overall 
efficiency by equation (25), relating the steepness of the line OE����� to that of the line OF����. This is 
geometrically equal to relating the distance of SR���� to that of SE����. The efficient frontier, as it is defined 
by the BCC model, intersects the line SE���� at point Q (6.17, 77). The relation between SQ���� and SE���� 
therefore yields the technical efficiency, which evaluates efficiency under consideration of possible 
disadvantages of the size. Thus, the scale efficiency is the part of the overall efficiency that the technical 
efficiency cannot explain, as denoted in equation (34). 
𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦�������������
SR����/SE����  = 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦�����������SR����/SQ����  x 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦���������������SQ����/SE����  (34) 
Note that the overall efficiency equals the technical efficiency if there are no returns to scale. 
Banker et al. (1984) built on the CCR model to account for scale effects. For didactic reasons, 
consider the envelopment form of the CCR model (31). In fact, the BCC model needs only one 
additional constraint. Let 𝒆𝒆 be a vector of ones. The BBC model (35) then seeks to min
𝜃𝜃,𝝀𝝀 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖    (35) 
s.t. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 − 𝑿𝑿𝝀𝝀 ≥ 𝟎𝟎  
 𝒀𝒀𝝀𝝀 − 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝟎𝟎  
 𝝀𝝀 ≥ 𝟎𝟎  
 𝒆𝒆𝑇𝑇𝝀𝝀 = 𝟏𝟏  
The additional constraint 𝒆𝒆𝑇𝑇𝝀𝝀 = 𝟏𝟏 means that the multiplier 𝝀𝝀 contains in fact weights for the 
DMUs because the sum of all lambdas must be equal to one. While the second constraint holds 
the weighted average of the optimal output combinations fixed, the first constraint together with 
the objective minimizes the difference between the similarly weighted average of the input bundles 
and the input bundle of the DMU under examination (Ray 2004). As a concrete example take 
department E from the one input one output case above (see Table 7) where 𝑿𝑿 shrinks to a row 
vector with the inputs of the different departments as elements. Then lambda is  
𝝀𝝀𝑇𝑇 = [0, 0, 𝜆𝜆𝜕𝜕 , 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 , 0, 0, 0, 0] because department E has the fully efficient departments C and F as 
a reference set. The optimal input bundle of E are the opposite relative distances from Q to C and 
D, respectively; so 𝜆𝜆𝜕𝜕 = QD�����/DC���� and 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 = QC����/DC����. Holding these weights fixed, the objective 
seeks to minimize the distance between E and the DC���� line by only modifying the input value. 
Obviously, the minimum is EQ���� which yields the BCC efficiency measure of pure technical 
efficiency. Note that without the BCC constraint 𝒆𝒆𝑇𝑇𝝀𝝀 = 𝟏𝟏, Q would not lie on the line DC���� but on 
OF���� which corresponds to the CCR frontier. The expansion to the multiple input multiple output 
case is straightforward and proceeds parallel to the explanation of the CCR model above. Table 9 
reproduces both models in order to contrast them. 
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Table 9 – Input-oriented BCC vs. CCR model to estimate efficiency 
Technical efficiency (CCR model) Overall technical efficiency (BCC model) min
𝜃𝜃,𝝀𝝀 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅  min𝜃𝜃,𝝀𝝀 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕  
s.t. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 − 𝑿𝑿𝝀𝝀 ≥ 𝟎𝟎 s.t. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 − 𝑿𝑿𝝀𝝀 ≥ 𝟎𝟎 
 𝒀𝒀𝝀𝝀 − 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝟎𝟎  𝒀𝒀𝝀𝝀 − 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝟎𝟎 
 𝝀𝝀 ≥ 𝟎𝟎  𝝀𝝀 ≥ 𝟎𝟎 
   𝒆𝒆𝑇𝑇𝝀𝝀 = 𝟏𝟏 
Source: Own illustration inspired by Cooper et al. (2007) 
For further reference, consider the more compact form of writing the BCC model: 
 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑿𝑿,𝒀𝒀) = min
𝜃𝜃,𝝀𝝀 �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑿𝑿𝝀𝝀,𝒀𝒀𝝀𝝀 ≥ 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖,𝝀𝝀 ≥ 𝟎𝟎, 𝒆𝒆𝑇𝑇𝝀𝝀 = 𝟏𝟏 �    (36) 
As a comparison, Table 10 reproduces the data and provides the results from both models. 
Table 10 – Efficiencies of an input-oriented DEA example with one input and one output 
Department (𝑜𝑜) A B C D E F G H 
I: Clerks 1 2 5 10 7 3 4 8 
O: Documents 8 12 70 100 77 45 36 72 
Techn. efficiency 0.53 0.40 0.93 0.67 0.73 1.00 0.60 0.60 
Pure techn. efficiency 1.00 0.61 1.00 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.63 0.67 
Scale efficiency �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶� 0.53 0.66 0.93 0.67 0.83 1.00 0.95 0.90 
Source: Own illustration inspired by Cooper et al. (2007) 
For the practitioner, it is inconvenient to rely on a rather ad hoc assumption about whether one 
should impose the constant returns to scale restriction or allow variable returns to scale. At the 
same time, the literature has generated a statistical test to support the decision. Specifically, Simar 
& Wilson (2002) use the fact that 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 (the efficiency allowing for variables returns to scale) is 
always consistent, while 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅 (imposing the constant returns to scale restriction) is not; 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅 
conflates technical efficiency with scale efficiency if the true production frontier exhibits variable 
returns to scale. If the constant returns to scale restriction holds, then the 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅 should be used, 
since its estimates are more efficient in the econometric sense (Kneip et al. 2016). To decide upon 
the returns to scale, determine whether ?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐 = ∑ 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖,𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1∑ 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖,𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  significantly differs from one (i.e. 
H0: ?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐 = 1). The decision of whether ?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐 is close to one relies on a distribution that is 
approximated by the bootstrapping technique. When rejecting H0, the CRS and VRS frontiers are 
different and there are scale efficiencies. A similar question arises as to whether, given there are 
scale efficiencies, the frontier is convex or has the form of a stepladder. The latter would favor the 
FDH as the appropriate method. Although Kneip et al. (2016) propose a respective statistical test, 
it is not applicable to the data at hand since it requires a much higher number of observations in 
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order to provide useful results. Consequently, if the ?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐-test suggests variable returns to scale, 
convexity is assumed.  
The models discussed so far did not consider the time dimension. The inputs and outputs were 
assumed to operate within a production process that is not subject to change over time. Although 
entailing some logistical difficulties, longitudinal data exhibit several advantages. To mention the 
three most important ones in the present context, consider shocks that dramatically change the 
production frontier in one year, individual endogenous effects, and the limited number of decision 
making units for cross-sectional studies. 
Tulkens & Eeckenhaut (2006) concisely explain the different ways to treat panel data in the 
DEA framework. They also show what questions and difficulties arise from such data. One 
possibility that induced a particular strand in the literature is the Malmquist index (Malmquist 1953). 
The Malmquist index uses panel data in order to evaluate productivity change over time. 
Productivity splits in a change in efficiency (the catch up effect) and a frontier shift (the innovation 
effect) (Cooper et al. 2007). However, since it is the efficiencies but not their changes that are 
relevant in the present context, the Malmquist index is not an option to choose. A further 
possibility to account for panel data is the window analysis initially proposed by Klopp (1985).52 
His idea was first to define a time window typically between two and the total number of years 
available minus one; for illustrative purposes take four years. Klopp (1985) then treats the four 
observations stemming from the same unit but from different years as individual DMU, just as all 
the other DMUs in the data set. This provides him with four times the number of DMUs he 
originally had in the data set to conduct an ordinary DEA. In the last step, he calculates the mean 
per DMU of all efficiency scores to obtain the final efficiency. As Tulkens & Eeckenhaut (2006) 
point out, Klopp (1985) rules out regress, that is a negative innovation effect. If all decision-making 
units jointly fall below the efficient frontier in one period, he interprets it as inefficiency instead of 
acknowledging the regress. In addition, the window size is rather arbitrary. Therefore, neither 
window analysis is an option for the present study. 
The intertemporal and the contemporaneous reference set are two further alternatives to 
consider the time dimension. In fact, they are extreme cases of the window analysis. The former 
defines the window over the entire set of observations, assuming that there is no frontier shift at 
all. The latter sets the time window to one, letting the efficient frontier shift independently every 
year (Tulkens & Eeckenhaut 2006). Intuitively, the contemporaneous reference set is relatively 
simple, needs sparse assumptions and seems therefore to be the most appropriate option. Most 
importantly though, the thereby obtained efficiency scores yield an important property. Namely 
that they are bound between zero and one on a yearly basis (in case of an input-orientation). That 
is, if there is an unobserved fixed effect that varies every year, potentially even endogenously, the 
relative measure of efficiency absorbs it. This property unfolds visibly when considering the 
fractional form of the CCR model in equation (25). In order to interpret the result as relative 
efficiency, the CCR model rests upon the assumption of a constant production frontier (Cooper et 
al. 2007). A common frontier ensures that the different DMUs are comparable after all. However, 
if the frontier changes over time due to an altering contingent common factor – which becomes 
                                                 
52 Tulkens & Eeckenhaut (2006) actually treat the window analysis as an evaluation of time series data. As Cooper et 
al. (2007) demonstrate though, it is straight forward to use window analysis with panel data. 
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more likely the longer the time period analyzed – the assumption does not hold anymore. A 
contingent common factor could be a certain technology, a disaster, the statutory framework, et 
cetera. All these aspects are time specific but commonly influence either the required inputs or the 
achieved outputs of a production process. Adding the time to the outputs of the CCR fractional 
problem yields53 
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟=1 /∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗=1𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟=1 /∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗=1   where      𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟=1∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗=1 = max𝑖𝑖=1,…,𝑛𝑛 �𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟=1∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗=1 � = 1   (37) 
Because it is a relative measure, a contingent common factor 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 drops out of the analysis as long 
as it is the same over the entire time interval 𝑡𝑡. In this case the subscript 𝑡𝑡 becomes irrelevant. 
Therefore, under the assumption of a stable 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡, a DEA based on the intertemporal reference set is 
appropriate.54 However, if there are different points in time with a varying contingent common 
factor, then the time fixed effect may remain in force. In this case, the year fixed effect 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 biases 
the efficiency measure for all points in time 𝑡𝑡, in which 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 differs from that of the most efficient 
peer year. Since the time fixed effect is not directly observable, it is not separable from the inputs 
and outputs. Thus, liberating the inputs and outputs from an altering time fixed effect is only 
possible with a contemporaneous reference set. Using the contemporaneous reference set, the 
input-oriented CCR model writes as 
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅(𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡,𝒀𝒀𝑡𝑡) = min
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝝀𝝀𝑡𝑡 �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅�𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡𝝀𝝀𝑡𝑡 ,𝒀𝒀𝑡𝑡𝝀𝝀𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝝀𝝀𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝟎𝟎, 𝒆𝒆𝝀𝝀𝑡𝑡 = 𝟏𝟏 �    (38) 
Compared to the original CCR model (34) the contemporaneous reference set simply adds the 
index 𝑡𝑡 to indicate the year. Implementing (38) comes with a trade-off though. On the one hand, 
the resulting efficiency measure is unbiased in the sense that it only measures the actual efficiency 
but excludes changes, i.e. shifts, of the frontier. In this sense, year per year DEA incorporates the 
same advantages as de-meaning the data in linear panel data models. On the other hand, the 
number of DMUs per run shrinks drastically. A small number of DMUs negatively affects the 
efficiency estimates in two ways. First, it restricts the number of inputs and outputs.55 Second, as 
Simar & Wilson (2007) point out, the convergence rate of DEA is low. In small samples, the 
estimated efficiency scores most likely differ considerably from their true values. As usual, both 
caveats lose their importance as the number of observations increases. 
The last extension of the model introduces input prices. Recall the input-oriented case of the 
CCR model, i.e. with constant returns to scale.  Instead of simply regarding the amount of inputs 
used in the production process, cost efficiency models add another dimension to the efficiency 
measure by multiplying each input with its corresponding price.56 The input price matrix is: 
                                                 
53 It is irrelevant whether the time fixed effect is multiplied with the inputs or with the outputs. 
54 In fact, there is a test statistic based on the Malmquist-Index that makes it possible to evaluate whether there is 
innovation, i.e. productivity change, over time (Simar & Wilson 1999). If there is no productivity change, conducting 
a DEA with an intertemporal reference set in the first stage and running the Simar-Wilson procedure without time 
dummies in the second stage is appropriate. If there is productivity change, the quasi fixed effect estimator applies. 
55 As a rule of thumb, Cooper et al. (2007) propose choosing the number of inputs 𝑝𝑝 and outputs 𝑞𝑞 so that max {𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑞𝑞, 3 ∗ (𝑝𝑝 + 𝑞𝑞)} ≤ 𝑛𝑛. 
56 Banker et al. (2004) and others use the term ‘aggregated technical and allocative efficiency’ as synonym for cost 
efficiency. 
70 
𝑷𝑷 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑝𝑝11 … 𝑝𝑝1𝑖𝑖 … 𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛
⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗1 … 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 … 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤1 … 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 … 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎤
  (39) 
The respective linear program minimizes total input costs, i.e. the sum of all inputs multiplied 
with their price, while restricting the solution to be within the feasible frontier. Analytically, the 
cost-CCR model is therefore: (𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖)∗ = min𝑿𝑿,𝝀𝝀 {𝑷𝑷𝑇𝑇𝑿𝑿|𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑿𝑿𝝀𝝀,𝒀𝒀𝝀𝝀 ≥ 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖,𝝀𝝀 ≥ 𝟎𝟎}  
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕−𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅(𝑿𝑿,𝒀𝒀) = �𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖�∗
𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖
  
(40) 
The second line of equation (40) shows how the cost efficiency measure can be obtained based 
on the results of the linear program. The transformation to the cost-BCC model is done by simply 
adding the restriction 𝒆𝒆𝑇𝑇𝝀𝝀 = 𝟏𝟏. Adapting the time dimension is equally straightforward. To 
continue with the previous example, the number of computers refine the measurement of the input 
side and, by assumption, all departments face the same input prices. That is, each clerk receives 10 
units of salary, while each computer generates maintenance costs of three units. This yields the 
price matrix 𝑷𝑷: 
𝑷𝑷𝑇𝑇 = [𝒑𝒑1, … ,𝒑𝒑𝑗𝑗 , … ,𝒑𝒑𝑤𝑤] = [𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎,𝟑𝟑]  (41) 
The further data corresponds to the previous examples and is given in the upper part of Table 
11. The middle part of Table 11 results directly from the number of inputs with their prices and 
the number of outputs. Clerk cost is the product of the number of clerks and their wage, whereas 
computer cost is calculated by multiplying the number of computers with their maintenance cost. 
The next two lines divide the products with the output from the production process. The last three 
lines report the efficiency scores of the cost-CCR model in equation (54), of the CCR model in 
(31) and a combination of the two. More specifically, the allocative efficiency in the last line of 
Table 11 arises from the fact that the cost efficiency combines the technical and the cost efficiency 
(see equation (56) below). 
Table 11 – Efficiencies of an input-oriented DEA example with two inputs and one output 
Department (𝑜𝑜) A B C D E F G H 
I: Clerks 1 2 5 10 7 3 4 8 
I: Computers 1 1 4 4 7 3 3 6 
O: Documents 8 12 70 100 77 45 36 72 
Clerk cost 10 20 50 100 70 30 40 80 
Computer cost 3 3 12 12 21 9 9 18 
Clerk cost/Document 1.25 1.67 0.71 1.00 0.91 0.67 1.11 1.11 
Computer cost/Document 0.38 0.25 0.17 0.12 0.27 0.20 0.25 0.25 
Cost efficiency 0.53 0.45 0.98 0.77 0.73 1.00 0.64 0.64 
Technical efficiency 0.53 0.55 1.00 1.00 0.73 1.00 0.67 0.67 
Allocative efficiency 1.00 0.83 0.98 0.77 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 
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Source: Own illustration inspired by Cooper et al. (2007) 
To complete the example, a graphical illustration supports the previous explanation. Figure 14 
plots the clerks’ cost and the computer cost per document. As an example, take department B, 
whose connection line to the origin intersects the solid lined efficiency frontier at Q. As in the one-
input-two-output case, the overall efficiency follows from OQ�����/OB����. The relative price line FR���� is the 
tangent to the frontier and has the slope of the two inputs’ relative prices, i.e. −10/3. The 
intersection R represents a hypothetical DMU where B would be cost efficient. B’s cost efficiency is 
therefore OR����/OB����. 
Figure 14 – Cost frontier example with DEA 
  
 Source: Own illustration inspired by Cooper et al. (2007) 
Using Figure 14 as a graphical illustration of the data in Table 11, the origin of the last line 
becomes evident. The three efficiency measures are interrelated as follows: 
𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦�����������
OR����/OB����  = 𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦�������������OQ�����/OB����  x 𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦���������������OR����/OQ�����  (42) 
The last model presented to measure cost efficiency seems to have a rather high demand regarding 
data availability and it might therefore trigger doubts about the practical usability. However, Banker 
et al. (2004) summarize the following propositions proven in different papers, where the intuition 
comes from the unit invariance: 
• Cost efficiency with total cost data only: If the individual input prices are equal for all DMUs, 
then the cost-CCR and the cost-BCC model with individual input costs return the exact same 
cost efficiency scores as when the total costs apply as input in the CCR and the BCC model, 
respectively. 
• Overall efficiency with cost data only: If all input prices are equal for all DMUs, then the cost-
CCR and the cost-BCC model with individual input amounts and input prices returns exactly 
the same overall efficiency scores as when individual input costs are used as input in the CCR 
and the BCC model, respectively. 
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Applied to empirical data, the two propositions prove to be valuable when only cost data, i.e. 
expenditures on individual inputs, but no individual inputs or input prices, are available. In other 
words, contrary to the first impression, the cost efficiency model potentially helps to overcome 
data availability issues, because cost data are usually easier accessible. The word ‘potentially’ 
indicates that the propositions rely on the assumption of common prices among DMUs. To make 
use of the two propositions, first enter the input costs as multiple inputs either in the BCC or in 
the CCR model. The resulting scores denote the overall efficiency. Next, obtain the cost efficiency 
scores by using total expenditures, i.e. the sum of all input costs, as single input. Regarding Table 
11, whose data is based on uniform input prices for all departments, it suffices to know the clerk 
cost and the computer cost per DMU to obtain all three efficiencies. Neither the prices of each 
input nor the amounts of inputs are necessary. 
The introductory section to efficiency classified the DEA as a deterministic approach because 
the method interprets the entire distance to the production frontier as inefficiency. This fairly strict 
assumption is the reason why most econometricians are averse to this method, as they underline 
the problems coming with measurement errors and outliers (Tauchmann 2011). The issue of 
extreme values is particularly severe with the DEA because the observations determining the 
production frontier influence the efficiency of all the other DMUs. On the one hand, this criticism 
led to a research strand looking for methods to detect outliers. Two of these methods, i.e. order-𝛼𝛼 
(Aragon et al. 2005) and order-m (Cazals et al. 2002) efficiency, are employed here.57 On the other 
hand, the implementation of bootstrapping techniques accounts not only for a possible bias of the 
efficiency scores but also makes it possible to perform statistical inference. Simar & Wilson (2011a) 
show how to apply the bootstrap technique to obtain a pseudo-sample of 𝐵𝐵 estimates 𝜽𝜽�𝑏𝑏∗ (𝒙𝒙0,𝒚𝒚0), 
with which a bias-corrected efficiency estimate 𝜽𝜽��(𝒙𝒙0,𝒚𝒚0) results from  
𝜽𝜽��(𝒙𝒙0,𝒚𝒚0) = 2𝜽𝜽�(𝒙𝒙0,𝒚𝒚0) − 𝐵𝐵−1 ∑ 𝜽𝜽�𝑏𝑏∗ (𝒙𝒙0,𝒚𝒚0)𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏=1   (43) 
where 𝜽𝜽�(𝒙𝒙0,𝒚𝒚0) are the original efficiency estimates of each DMU using the linear program in 
equation (36), for instance. Note that the bias correction is independent of the assumption about 
the returns to scale. As will be shown below, under certain conditions the technique is also 
applicable using data from different time periods. Applying the bootstrap to the initial example 
with the data given in Table 8 yields efficiency estimates that are slightly smaller. The pseudo-
sample stems from a smoothed homogenous bootstrap with 2000 replications.58 As a comparison, 
Table 12 reports also the original efficiencies without bias correction. Both efficiencies are input 
oriented and the underlying production function is assumed to exhibit no scale efficiencies. 
                                                 
57 When calculating the order-m efficiency score, only 𝑚𝑚 randomly chosen observations form the efficient frontier. 
This leaves some DMUs outside the production possibility set and therefore their efficiency is bigger than one, i.e. 
they are super-efficient. Repeating the procedure many times theoretically yields robust estimations (Cazals et al. 2002). 
The order-𝛼𝛼 efficiency uses the (100 − 𝛼𝛼)th percentile of the peers’ inputs (or outputs, depending on the orientation) 
to define the frontier, which also results in super-efficient DMUs (Aragon et al. 2005). If 𝛼𝛼 = 100 then the order-𝛼𝛼 is 
equivalent to the FDH. 
58 The appropriate type of the bootstrap depends on the dependency between the set of inputs and the efficiency score 
(input-oriented case) or the set of outputs and the efficiency score (output-oriented case). If the efficiency is 
independent, then the simpler homogenous bootstrap produces consistent estimates. Otherwise the more complex 
and computationally more demanding heterogeneous bootstrap comes into play (Badunenko & Mozharovskyi 2016). 
The dependency is testable (Wilson 2003). 
   73 
Table 12 – Original vs. bootstrap-corrected efficiencies 
Department (𝑜𝑜) A B C D E F G H 
I: Clerks 1 2 5 10 7 3 4 8 
O: Documents 8 12 70 100 77 45 36 72 
O: Inquiries 40 120 60 300 280 48 220 160 
Original efficiency 0.81 1 0.93 0.84 0.98 1 1 0.69 
Bias-corrected efficiency 0.78 0.92 0.89 0.82 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.67 
Source: Own illustration 
The bootstrap identified DMU B’s original efficiency as a small sample artefact and downscaled 
it to 92 percent. The efficiency score of the DMUs F and G that were initially also fully efficient, 
are apparently more likely and therefore remain at 94 percent. 
6.3. Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
In principle, the SFA estimators are based on the same idea as the DEA, or, more generally, the 
non-parametric estimators (Aigner et al. 1977; Meeusen & Van den Broeck 1977). Resulting from 
some efficient frontier, the deviation of each observation represents its inefficiency to some extent. 
However, instead of forming the efficient frontier directly from the observed sample, the Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA) predefines a specific functional form of the frontier and fits it into the 
data. Also, in contrast to the two-step approach, where the methods to evaluate panel data are still 
in a very early stage of development, many different such models emerged within the one-step SFA 
framework. Hence, since there is no need to adjust the existing models for this analysis, this section 
reviews the SFA estimators more superficially and refers to the respective literature for more 
details. Unlike in the non-parametric framework, the usage of total cost instead of specific inputs 
needs to be modelled from the beginning. A simple adaptation, as in the case of DEA, does not 
exist. Therefore, this section treats both, the input distance function to estimate the technical 
efficiency and cost function to estimate the cost efficiency separately. 
Starting with the distance function, let 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖 be a vector of outputs and 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 a vector of inputs of 
individual 𝑜𝑜, as before. Based on this information, define the input-oriented production possibility 
function as 
𝑓𝑓(𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖,𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) = 0  where  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = exp(−𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖) and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ≥ 1 (44) 
The production possibility function specifies how the inputs, deflated by some inefficiency 
factor 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 , are transformed into a set of given outputs without leaving any spare resources. The 
efficiency term 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is interpreted in the same way it was for the DEA case and is also bound between 
zero and one. Unless the outputs are fixed, the 𝑓𝑓(∙) is also called the transformation function. Yet 
another way to write the transformation function in a more general fashion under the assumption 
of separability of the input and output function, is 
𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖)ℎ(𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) = 1   (45) 
where 𝐴𝐴 embodies observed and unobserved factors affecting the transformation function 
neutrally (Kumbhakar et al. 2015). For the simplicity of the further modifications, the 
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transformation function is normalized to one. At this stage, an assumption about the functional 
form of 𝑔𝑔(∙) and ℎ(∙) is necessary, which is characteristic for the parametric approaches as 
mentioned earlier. For simplicity, consider for now the Cobb-Douglas specification for both 𝑔𝑔(∙) 
and ℎ(∙) leading to the following transformation function 59 ln(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = ln(𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝜕𝜕=1 ln(𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖) + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗=2 ln�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖� + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  
 where  𝛼𝛼0 = ln(𝐴𝐴) and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 = �∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗=1 � ln(𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) (46) 
Even if the transformation function makes sense mathematically, estimating the coefficients 
econometrically is not feasible. This is because the right-hand side of the equation involves 
endogenous variables. Remember that input-orientation implies that the objective is to minimize 
the set of inputs, while holding outputs constant. As soon as one of the right-hand side inputs 
(outputs) increase, one or several outputs (inputs), which likewise act as independent variables, will 
increase too. Conveniently, the fact that this analysis requires an input-oriented efficiency measure 
facilitates solving the problem. The assumption of exogenous outputs is not only meaningful but 
also suitable. As Kumbhakar et al. (2015) show, with input-orientation and under constant returns 
to scale, the transformation function (46) can also be written as a distance function (Shepard 1953). 
For this purpose, a random input serves as reference – and as dependent variable – while all the 
inputs on the right-hand side are normalized by the reference input. This eliminates the endogeneity 
of the inputs (Kumbhakar et al. 2015). After adding stochastic noise, the input distance function 
with the Cobb-Douglas specification is 60 ln(𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝜕𝜕 ln(𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖) + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗=2 ln �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖� + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  
 where 𝛼𝛼0 = ln(𝐴𝐴) 
   𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 = − ln(𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) > 0 since  0 < 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 < 1 
   𝔼𝔼[𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] = 0  
(47) 
Taken together, the stochastic noise and the inefficiency constitute the error term of the 
estimation equation (46), i.e. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 . In order to identify both, the noise term 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 and the 
inefficiency term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 properly, they need to be either identically and independently distributed by 
assumption, or they can be independent and heteroscedastic by responding to certain 
environmental variables (see section 7.2). For the moment, ignore heteroscedasticity. In other 
words, the chance of observing a less efficient firm is equally large for any value of the random 
noise term 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 . While the noise term is usually assumed to follow a normal distribution with zero 
mean, pondering the distribution of the inefficiency term encouraged researches to come up with 
numerous models. For instance, the inefficiency term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 could be half-normally distributed (Aigner 
et al. 1977), truncated-normally distributed (Stevenson 1980), gamma distributed (Greene 1990) or 
it can follow a truncated distribution with the scaling property (Wang & Schmidt 2002). The 
                                                 
59 By definition, the transformation function with the Cobb-Douglas specification is  
𝐴𝐴∏ (𝒚𝒚𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕 ∏ �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 1. This function contains too many parameters to be identified, which justifies some 
normalizations. Therefore, set 𝛽𝛽1 = −1 resulting in the transformation function  
𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴∏ 𝒚𝒚𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕 ∏ 𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=2 . Taking logarithms on both sides yields equation (46).  
60 To obtain the distance function, normalize ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗=1 = −1. The constant returns to scale assumption is simply 
another term for what Kumbhakar et al. (2015, p.29) called the “homogeneity restriction”, which is necessary to 
separate the inputs from the outputs. 
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different approaches vary particularly in the number of parameters to be estimated. Naturally, more 
parameters mean more flexibility but also add complexity to the estimation. 
As in other econometric issues, the exploitation of panel data opens new possibilities to identify 
further parameters or to identify the parameters of interest more appropriately. Concretely, having 
several observations of the same individual enables excluding fixed effects. The true random- and 
true fixed effect model splits the error term into three parts, i.e.  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (Greene 
2005). The term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 thereby entails only the time-variant inefficiency. On the one hand, taking all 
persistency out of 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 eliminates the risk of confounding some unexplainable individual fixed 
effects (as a production shock, for instance) with time-persistent inefficiency. On the other hand, 
a latent time-persistent inefficiency remains unidentified too (Kumbhakar et al. 2014). Even so, the 
aim here is to explain efficiency differences based exclusively on time-varying environmental 
variables, which renders time-persistent efficiency estimates redundant. The input distance 
function estimated with the true-random or true-fixed effect model is 
CD: ln(𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝜕𝜕 ln(𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗=2 ln �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
 where 𝔼𝔼�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� = 0  [random effect] or  𝔼𝔼�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� ≠ 0 [fixed effect]  
   𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∽
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑁𝑁+(0,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2)  
   𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∽
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2)  
(48) 
Note that Greene (2005) assumes the input-oriented technical inefficiency 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 to follow a half 
normal distribution instead of a more flexible truncated one. He thereby circumvents the usual 
incidental parameter problem of other non-linear fixed effect models. The inefficiency term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
indicates the percentage overuse of inputs owed to inefficiency. After the estimation of equation 
(48), the technical efficiency can be obtained through 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝔼𝔼[𝑒𝑒−𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] (Battese & Coelli 1988). 
The rest of the error term consists of the firm fixed effect 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, and the stochastic noise 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 . As in 
the usual random- and fixed effects models, the decision of which suits the data better depends on 
the correlation of the fixed effect with the dependent variable. In case the individual fixed effects 
are endogenous, only the true fixed effect model is consistent. If the individual fixed effects are 
exogenous, the true random-effects model is consistent and, in addition, more efficient because it 
exploits more orthogonality conditions (Greene 2005). The Hausman-test supports the decision of 
which model to use. 
The adequacy of the model in equation (48) becomes apparent with the estimated coefficients. 
Unless 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 < 0 ∀ 𝑗𝑗 and 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 > 0 ∀ 𝑗𝑗 there is a problem in the specification. Such problems may arise 
because of the simplicity of the Cobb-Douglas function. While the function’s plainness facilitates 
the interpretation of the coefficients, it is not very flexible and therefore might not fit the data very 
well. The translog specification entails more flexibility in terms of aligning to the data, while it 
becomes rather complex if the number of inputs or outputs is high. With the translog specification 
estimation equation with the input distance function reads as 
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TL: ln(𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ln(𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 12 ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝜕𝜕 ln(𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) ln(𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕  
  +∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=2 ln �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� + 12 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ln �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� ln �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�𝑙𝑙=2𝑗𝑗=2  
 +∑ ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 ln �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� ln(𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑟𝑟=2𝑗𝑗=2 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 where �𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ,𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� = 0  [random effect] or  𝔼𝔼�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� ≠ 0 [fixed effect] 
   𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∽
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑁𝑁+(0,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2)  
   𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∽
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2)  
(49) 
The estimation equation (49) makes apparent why the translog (TL) specification rapidly 
becomes much more complex than the Cobb-Douglas (CD) counterpart in equation (48). While 
in the Cobb-Douglas case, only the logarithmized outputs act as independent variables, the translog 
specification adds cross products of each output pair. 
Like the DEA case, the question is raised as to what happens if only input costs but no individual 
amounts of inputs are available. It can be shown, that, as long as the input prices 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 do not vary 
among cantons and years, both estimation equations (48) and (49) yield the same results when 
replacing 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 by 𝒑𝒑𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. That is, as in the DEA case, input distance functions under the SFA 
framework make it possible to use the costs of each input instead of individual inputs and input 
prices to obtain the technical efficiency. While from a cross-sectional point of view equal prices 
might reasonably come from competitive markets, from which cantons purchase their resources 
(see section 6.4), it is less evident why prices should stay stable over time. Particularly if the time 
horizon is long, a certain inflation is expected. Consequently, all the input costs have to be deflated. 
In sum, equations (48) and (49) provide the intended estimates of the technical efficiency, when 
using ln (𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) as a dependent variable and ln �𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� as an independent variables. 
To estimate the cost efficiency, the cost function is the starting point. Consider a firm that faces 
a production function 𝑓𝑓(𝒙𝒙), which is specified later. Assume further that the firm wants to 
minimize its input costs subject to the production function given a certain amount of outputs. To 
achieve its goal, standard microeconomics suggests the firm to combine the inputs so that the slope 
of the isoquant equals the ratio of input prices (Frank 2006).61 The isoquant traces all input 
combinations with which the firm can produce the same level of outputs. For illustrative purposes, 
take the case where the firm utilizes only two inputs to fabricate one output. In this simplified case, 
the graphical illustration corresponds to the stylized example of the previous section (Figure 14). 
A comparison of Figure 15 with Figure 14 illustrates the difference between the parametric and the 
non-parametric approaches. While the isoquant in Figure 14 results from enveloping the 
observations, its counterpart in Figure 15 needs an assumption regarding the functional form of 
𝑓𝑓(𝒙𝒙). Assuming the specific functional form of Figure 15 and the ratio of input prices, at point A 
the firm is both allocatively and technically efficient, while at B it could increase its technical 
efficiency. At C it is neither allocatively nor technically efficient. 
                                                 
61 To see why, consider the firms’ optimization problem: min𝒑𝒑′𝒙𝒙 s.t. 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑓𝑓(𝒙𝒙). The first order conditions are then 
𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗
𝑓𝑓1
= 𝑝𝑝j
𝑝𝑝1
, 𝑗𝑗 = 2, …𝑤𝑤. 
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Figure 15 – Cost frontier example with SFA 
 
 Source: Adapted from Kumbhakar et al. (2015) 
The inefficiency shall now also be implemented analytically. For this purpose, multiply the 
inputs within the production function again with an efficiency factor 𝜃𝜃 = 𝑒𝑒−𝑢𝑢 where 𝑢𝑢 is the input-
oriented cost inefficiency. By definition, the inefficiency 𝑢𝑢 ≥ 1 and therefore the efficiency  1 ≥ 𝜃𝜃 > 0 as before. Hence, multiplying the 𝒙𝒙 with 𝜃𝜃 amounts to adjusting the observed inputs 
by the efficiency. As a result, the cost function 
𝐶𝐶∗(𝒑𝒑,𝒚𝒚) = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑒𝑒−𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗     (50) 
returns the hypothetical minimum cost, which is not observable. In Figure 15, A depicts the 
input allocation of the hypothetical minimum cost. The researcher only observes B, which results 
from the actual cost function62  
𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎(𝒑𝒑,𝒚𝒚) = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝐶𝐶∗(𝒑𝒑,𝒚𝒚)𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢    (51) 
As in the non-parametric case, the efficiency is the ratio of the two distances from the origin in 
Figure 15, i.e. the cost efficiency 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 = 0𝐴𝐴����
0𝐵𝐵����
= 𝜕𝜕∗(𝒑𝒑,𝒚𝒚)
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎(𝒑𝒑,𝒚𝒚) = 𝑒𝑒−𝑢𝑢. In case there is no allocative 
inefficiency, the ratio can also be interpreted as technical efficiency. In order to make the function 
stochastic and linear, logarithmize the actual cost function and add a noise term 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 . In addition, 
some potential individual fixed effect might interfere, which justifies adding 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖. The fixed effects, 
the noise term, and the inefficiency together constitute the error term of the estimation equation, 
i.e. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. ln𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 = ln𝐶𝐶∗(𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  where  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 > 0 
 𝔼𝔼[𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] = 0 (52) 
                                                 
62 Applying Shephard’s lemma, i.e. 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
∗
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
= 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑒𝑒−𝑢𝑢, justifies defining the cost share equations as 
𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ≡
𝜕𝜕 ln 𝜕𝜕∗
𝜕𝜕 ln 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
= 1
𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
−1
1
𝜕𝜕∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕∗
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
= 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑒𝑒−𝑢𝑢
𝜕𝜕∗
= 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑒𝑒−𝑢𝑢
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑒𝑒−𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗
= 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗
𝒑𝒑′𝒙𝒙
. Rearranging yields 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶∗𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢 and finally, summing up all 
inputs results in the actual cost function 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎(𝒑𝒑,𝑦𝑦) = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝒑𝒑′𝒙𝒙
𝐶𝐶∗𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢 = 𝐶𝐶∗𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢. 
0 
A 
x1 
x2 
B 
C 
p1 
p2 
𝑓𝑓(∙) 
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Again, to obtain an estimable function, the form of the minimum cost function 𝐶𝐶∗(𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) is 
assumed to be either Cobb-Douglas or translog. Naturally, the aforementioned advantages and 
drawbacks of each specification apply here, too. Also, in either specification, the prices 𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
appearing on the right-hand side of the estimation equation potentially imply a problem with 
regards to data availability. Yet, equally to the DEA models and the input distance functions, the 
prices drop out of the eventual estimation equation if they remain constant. The reason for their  
insignificance is that all coefficients related to the prices are not identified without variation and 
merge into the constant (Filippini & Wetzel 2014; Kumbhakar et al. 2015). Again, in order to 
guarantee price stability, the total cost on the left-hand side must enter in real instead of nominal 
terms. The same adjustment on the right-hand side ensures that prices do not vary over time and 
drop out. The estimation equations of the actual cost functions then read as 
CD:  ln𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝜷𝜷′ ln𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
TL:  ln𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝜷𝜷′ ln𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 12 ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐=1 ln𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕 ln 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞𝜕𝜕=1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
where 𝔼𝔼[𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖|𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] = 0 [random effect] or  𝔼𝔼[𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖|𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] ≠ 0[fixed effect] 
  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∽
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑁𝑁+(0,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2)  
  𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∽
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2)  
(53) 
The assumptions about the distributions, the efficiency, the noise, and the fixed effect are 
adopted from Greene's (2005) true random-effect or true fixed effect model where the inefficiency 
term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 follows a half-normal distribution with a constant variance 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2. The constant variance 
assumption will be relaxed later. To sum up, given the data at hand, the estimation equations (53) 
represent the most appropriate to approach to estimate cost efficiency using the SFA, while the 
same is true for equations (48) and (49) to estimate the technical efficiency. 
6.4. Inputs and Outputs 
Identifying the inputs and outputs of a production process imposes challenges comparable to 
the operationalization of the revenue characteristics. On the one hand, one wants to represent the 
inputs and outputs of a production process as closely as possible. On the other hand, finding 
specific quantitative measures along with the usual limited availability of data restricts the possible 
candidates. Following many former papers, the input side considers cost data instead of individual 
inputs and their prices (Seifert & Nieswand 2014; Widmer & Zweifel 2012; Afonso & Fernandes 
2008; Kellermann 2007; Balaguer-Coll et al. 2007). The total government expenditures proxy the 
cost of production. 
Yearly data on total cantonal expenditures (i.e. the sum of expenses of the current account and 
capital expenditures) is available in a harmonized form. The Swiss federal finance administration 
adjusts the annual financial statements in the sense that it applies the same consolidation scope to 
all cantons so that the data become comparable among cantons and years (Financial Statistics 
Section 2011). In addition, the functional chart of accounts of the HAM2 presented in section 4.2 
splits the public expenditures into different domains. While Table 3 shows the total expenditures 
of all cantons in one year, Table 13 presents detailed descriptive statistics of the expenditures within 
the different government functions. 
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Table 13 – Descriptive statistics of cantonal expenditures by government function 2000 to 2014 
Government function 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Sum squared 
between (B) 
Sum squared 
within (W) 
B/W- 
ratio 
General administration  691'482   973'748   34'291   12'336'754  1.75E+14 1.94E+14  0.90  
Public order and security  984'572   1'114'694   29'423   5'490'743  4.69E+14 1.40E+13  33.40  
Education  3'357'461   3'824'386   84'959   19'924'524  5.40E+15 2.93E+14  18.44  
Culture  257'741   308'305   5'514   1'337'992  3.62E+13 7.66E+11  47.26  
Health  2'004'178   2'138'203   57'787   8'720'812  1.69E+15 8.49E+13  19.94  
Social Security  2'664'654   2'875'202   84'839   11'783'220  3.10E+15 1.12E+14  27.69  
Transportation  1'047'560   1'012'224   22'692   5'483'575  3.75E+14 2.36E+13  15.87  
Environment and spatial planning  222'031   189'396   6'810   1'052'621  1.25E+13 1.42E+12  8.81  
National economy  784'209   751'659   66'407   4'546'419  2.06E+14 1.36E+13  15.11  
Financing and taxes  919'228   1'246'362   7'079   7'210'696  5.06E+14 9.81E+13  5.16  
Note: values in 1’000 Swiss francs; N = 390  
Source: Federal Finance Administration (2016) 
Regarding the means, Table 13 replicates the insights of Table 3 with education, social security, 
and health being the most expensive government functions. It is also in these domains, where the 
standard deviation is the highest. The extreme values in column three and four underline the rather 
large variation. The last three columns analyze where the variation comes from. They show the 
sums of the squared deviations from the means. ‘Within’ indicates the deviations from the group 
(i.e. cantonal) means and ‘between’ are the deviations of the group means from the grand mean; 
the B/W-ratio divides the between by the within variation, which simplifies the interpretation. 
Except the general administration domain, all government functions reveal ratios greater than one. 
A figure above (below) one means that the variation within cantons over the years is less (greater) 
than the variation between the cantons. This is not surprising given the enormous difference in 
scale between the cantons. The extent to which the ‘between’ variation exceeds the ‘within’ 
variation strongly depends on the government function though. The general administration has the 
most balanced variation followed by financing and taxes. Culture yields the most unbalanced 
variation, meaning that the amount the different cantons spend in that domain varies strongly while 
the individual cantons hold their expenditures constant over the years. 
Following the explanations of sections 6.2 and 6.3, using only the total expenditures does not 
suffice to estimate the technical efficiency. In order to approximate the individual input costs, Table 
26 in the appendix disaggregates the total expenditures into their types according to the chart of 
accounts of the HAM2 and yields the corresponding means and standard deviations. Table 14 is a 
more accessible summary and presents the expenditure share by expenditure type for each 
government function. It is noteworthy that the personnel, the operating, and the transfer 
expenditures together with the capital expenditures in tangible fixed assets constitute a large part 
of the total expenditures. The four expenditure types represent together between 68 and 90 percent 
of the total expenditures of six public domains. Yet, as far as regards the general administration, 
the protection of the environment and spatial planning, and the national economy domain, the 
four types are less representative and amount to 30 to 50 percent of the total expenditures. In these 
three domains, the extraordinary expenditures contribute largely to the total expenditures.  
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Table 14 – Cantonal expenditures by expenditure type and government function 2000 to 2014 
Government function 
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Personnel expenditure [P] 15.37% 56.59% 46.25% 17.06% 25.03% 7.14% 8.09% 13.37% 5.11% 0.88% 
General, administrative and 
operating expenditure [O] 10.90% 19.51% 7.59% 10.25% 9.96% 2.43% 10.62% 9.92% 3.03% 10.86% 
Defense expenditure 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Financial expenditure [F] 0.10% 0.04% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.25% 0.00% 0.00% 31.96% 
Transfer expenditure [F] 1.65% 3.01% 18.09% 55.90% 46.08% 79.84% 21.45% 9.32% 45.94% 56.31% 
Extraordinary expenditure 
[F] 64.25% 15.14% 24.11% 0.00% 0.58% 3.13% 0.00% 34.96% 28.73% 0.00% 
Tangible fixed assets [C] 3.16% 3.47% 2.86% 6.04% 3.14% 0.33% 36.47% 7.25% 0.47% 0.00% 
Capital expenditures on 
behalf of third parties [C] 0.01% 0.17% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.14% 1.02% 0.29% 0.00% 0.00% 
Capital expenditures, 
intangible fixed assets [C] 1.66% 0.81% 0.18% 0.13% 0.08% 0.38% 0.24% 2.09% 0.22% 0.00% 
Loans and financial 
interests [C] 0.53% 0.32% 0.16% 2.02% 1.23% 1.19% 7.12% 5.93% 5.11% 0.00% 
Loans [C] a 1.08% 0.24% 0.12% 2.97% 0.28% 0.41% 8.60% 1.69% 1.33% 0.00% 
Financial interests and 
share capital [C] 0.65% 0.07% 0.09% 0.47% 9.44% 4.27% 0.62% 0.00% 4.35% 0.00% 
a The separation of the loans into two positions stems from the harmonization process of the federal finance administration and 
is not relevant in the present context (Financial Statistics Section 2011). 
Notes: The letters in brackets indicate which category each expenditure type belongs to. 
Source: Own calculation based on data from the Federal Finance Administration (2016) 
In order to keep the number of inputs on a reasonable level, Table 14 implies the following 
combinations of expenditure types: 
• [P] Personnel expenditure (personnel expenditure) 
• [O] Operating expenditure (general, administrative and operating expenditure) 
• [F] Financial expenditure (financial expenditure; transfer expenditure; extraordinary 
expenditure) 
• [C] Capital expenditures (tangible fixed assets; capital expenditures on behalf of third parties; 
capital expenditures, intangible fixed assets; loans and financial interests; financial interests and 
share capital) 
For the following estimations of the technical efficiency, these four types serve as inputs while 
assuming identical factor prices among the cantons.63 The assumption of identical factor prices has 
provoked already clarifications in previous studies. Seifert & Nieswand (2014) make the same 
assumption for the French departments and argue that on the one hand the personnel costs should 
not vary widely because the central government largely regulates the wages. On the other hand, 
capital related expenditures should also face equal prices due to the equivalent access to the capital 
market. While the second argument seems reasonable for the Swiss cantons, too, the first is 
questionable. Since the cantons autonomously decide upon salary and wages regulation, the labor 
cost is not necessarily equivalent among cantons. The Swiss federal statistical office publishes the 
                                                 
63 Similar partitions of the total expenditures also exist for studies outside of Switzerland, see e.g. Bischoff et al., 2013, 
Bönisch et al., 2011 or, for an overview, Narbón-Perpiñá & De Witte (2017). 
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respective data to assess the question of equal labor costs. The data is not available by canton but 
only by greater region. Table 15 summarizes the mean monthly gross salaries in the public 
administration for the years 2010, 2012, and 2014. 
Table 15 – Monthly gross salaries in the public administration across greater regions 
Year 
Switzerland Geneva 
region 
Central 
plateau 
North-
western 
Switzerland 
Zurich Eastern 
Switzerland 
Central 
Switzerland 
Ticino 
2010 a 7’943 7’996 8’369 7’467 8’080 7’635 7’930 7’452 
2012 a 7’916 7’902 8’181 7’411 8’325 7’887 7’585 7’284 
2014 a 7’864 8’197 8’009 7’369 7’815 7’841 7’717 7’199 
2010 b                 100                  101                  105                   94                  102                   96                  100                   94  
2012 b                 100                   99                  103                   93                  105                   99                   95                   92  
2014 b                  99                  103                  101                   93                   98                   99                   97                   91  
a in Swiss francs; b index-based where Switzerland in 2010 equals 100 
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2016) 
The index-based values in the lower part of Table 15 reveal a salary range of fifteen percent 
among the greater regions. Admittedly, looking at greater regions instead of individual cantons 
crops eventual extreme values. However, the fact that the canton of Zurich and the canton of 
Ticino possibly represent such extreme cases refute the argument. In sum, compared to the 
relatively large variation of the personnel expenses (c.f. Table 28 in the appendix), the variation of 
the wages appears reasonably small thus retaining the assumption of equal factor prices. 
Consequently, the variation of the personnel expenses is mainly driven by the input (i.e. the 
personnel count) and not the price (i.e. the wages). 
Identifying and operationalizing outputs is less simple. On the one side, the true output of a 
public entity is already difficult to determine. On the other side, the limited data availability severely 
restricts the possible factors to be taken into account. These two challenges already became 
apparent in existing studies that have estimated the efficiency of public administrations. The 
selection of the outputs in the different public domains therefore mainly follows the previous 
literature. One important aspect concerns the separation of the outputs into quantitative and 
qualitative factors. While the broad empirical literature neglects qualitative measures, be it because 
of data unavailability or due to negligence, they play an important role in reality. There is no doubt 
that an agency that, for instance, operates at a higher error rate than another is less efficient, even 
if all other inputs and outputs are equal. Particularly under cost pressure, the quality is likely to 
decrease before the quantity. Thus, in order to capture the entire scope of output, the integration 
of qualitative measures is indispensable if the data availability allows it (Balaguer-Coll & Prior 2009). 
Accordingly, the itemization of the used outputs in Table 16 contains quantitative as qualitative 
measures and discloses the data source. 
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Table 16 – Descriptive statistics of output measures 
Government 
function Output Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum N Data Source 
General 
administration 
population (no. of 
inhabitants) 
294’469.2 305’002.4 14’977 1’446’354 390 federal finance 
administration 
firms (no.) 19’166.6 18’667.2 1’004 100’002 390 federal statistical office, 
central business names 
index 
interest rate on debt (index a) 58.9 17.8 1 100 390 federal statistical office 
Public order and 
security 
convicts (no.) 3802.7 3689.5 47 16’141 357 federal statistical office 
delinquencies registered at 
police (no.) 
85.6 17.4 1 100 356 federal statistical office, 
federal office of police 
prisoner on remand (no.) 75.9 113.9 1 506 357 federal statistical office 
Education students in higher education 
institutions (no.) 
3’577.1 3’696.2 128 16’589 390 federal statistical office 
university diplomas (no.) 643.6 691.8 15 3’565 390 federal statistical office 
successful high school 
graduation (no.) 
1’225.2 1’204.5 36 6’171 390 federal statistical office 
Culture participation in courses and 
camps of Youth and Sport 
(no.) 
20'670.1 21'887.4  703 124'804  361 federal office of sport 
museum tickets sold (no.) 558'391.4  846'930.8 122  4'224'172  385 association of Swiss 
museums 
museums (no.) 27.6 31.3 1 153  385 association of Swiss 
museums 
forest area (ha) 42'289.0  44'248.5 471 159'794 385 federal statistical office 
Health doctors (no.) 601.6 722.9 16 3’669 390 federal statistical office 
patient cases in hospitals 
(no.) 
53’009.6 60’051.6 1’250 259’249 390 federal statistical office 
Social Security unemployed (no.) 6'958.2  7'725.7  36  42'771  389 federal statistical office 
reintegrated people (no.) 550.2  647.2  1  3'169  285 federal statistical office 
people over 65 (no.) 47'018.8  48'982.7  2'298  229'196  389 federal statistical office 
Transpor-
tation 
road length (in km) 694.7  649.6  48  2'155  390 federal statistical office 
vehicles (no.) 199'160.8  199'069.3  9'520  906'010  390 federal statistical office 
accidents due to low road 
quality (index a) 
95.7  10.9  1  100  390 federal roads office 
Environment 
and spatial 
planning 
vacant accommodation (no.) 1'515.7  1'524.2  41  7'761  390 federal statistical office 
population (no. of 
inhabitants) 
294'469.2  305'002.4  14'977  1'446'354  390 federal statistical office 
National 
economy 
farms (no.) 2'377.9  2'600.8  11  14'150  390 federal statistical office 
new founded firms (no.) 530.3  725.3  16  8'212  364 federal statistical office 
beds in hotels (no.) 10'385.2  12'257.5  1'135  48'163  364 federal statistical office 
a Index as described in section 6.2 
Note: N < 390 due to deletion of observations with minimum value of zero (outputs need to be strictly positive) 
While Table 16 yields an overview of the outputs, Table 17 below provides information 
regarding the distance functions combining the inputs and outputs. The production function is 
specified as Cobb-Douglas technology. The regularity conditions of a well-defined distance-
function require positive output coefficients and negative input coefficients (Kumbhakar et al. 
2015). Also, the coefficients should be within zero and one or minus one, respectively, in order to 
respect the concavity condition. A violation of the two conditions means that the production 
function is wrongly specified or that there is a measurement error. Additionally, since the DEA 
efficiency scores systematically increase with a higher number of inputs and outputs ceteris paribus, 
only the relevant factors should enter the analysis.64 In order to identify the appropriate outputs in 
terms of the sign and the magnitude of their coefficients, some simple random- and fixed effect 
models are estimated. The estimations are simple in the sense that they disregard possible 
                                                 
64 Put differently, the convergence rate of the efficiency estimated to its true values decreases with an increasing number 
of inputs and outputs. The literature addresses this topic under the label ‘curse of dimensionality’ (Simar & Wilson 
2011a). 
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inefficiencies. For culture and transportation, the results of this regression, displayed in Table 17, 
will be discussed subsequently together with the practical justification and the descriptive statistics 
of each output listed in Table 16. 
The government function culture covers supportive tasks such as contributions to theaters, 
libraries, or sport events but also the maintenance of parks and forest trails (cf. Table 3). 
Accordingly, the four outputs of ‘participation in courses and camps of Youth and Sport’, museum 
tickets sold, museums, and the forest area approximate the cantonal activities in this field (Benito 
et al. 2010; Bischoff et al. 2017). On average, a canton registers more than 20’000 participations in 
Youth & Sport courses and camps per year with, naturally, huge variations due to cantonal size. 
Because of a change in data recording, the year 2002 is missing, thus reducing the number of 
observations. Regarding the number of museums, the canton of Glarus, Ob- and Nidwalden as 
well as Appenzell Innerrhoden closed their few institutions in some years and the respective 
observations drop out of the sample as DEA and SFA struggle with zero-output observations. 
Excluding them yields an average of 28 museums per canton and year with around 560'000 tickets 
sold. The forest area is averaged at around 420 kilometers squared which resembles the surface of 
the canton of Obwalden. 
The distance function for the culture domain in Table 17 sets the inputs and outputs in relation. 
All of the normalized inputs have the expected sign and two of them are significant. Among the 
outputs, the only insignificant coefficient comes from the forest area, which raises the question of 
its meaningfulness. Nevertheless, the coefficient is positive and within the appropriate range of 
zero and one. As the number of outputs is still rather small, there is no need to drop this variable 
and its control function can still be valuable. A more serious issue is the Sargan-Hansen test statistic, 
which is highly significant. Accordingly, the fixed effects estimator would be appropriate. However, 
in several instances the respective estimates contradict the economic theory with opposite signs 
and coefficients above one. In consequence, the random-effect estimator is applied after all. The 
thus obtained stochastic errors accumulate to the left of the mean as the negative 𝜇𝜇3(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) is 
substantiated; the statistic is not significant though. In general, the left-skewed distribution predicts 
no or little inefficiency (Kumbhakar et al. 2015). Note also that the distance function only explains 
around 60 percent of the personnel expenditures’ variation, which is, compared to the other 
domains, rather low. This aspect influences the interpretation of the results below. 
The emphasis of transportation falls on building and maintaining cantonal roads. The road 
length is therefore the primary output measure (Widmer & Zweifel 2012; Da Cruz & Marques 
2014; Narbón-Perpiñá & De Witte 2017). In order to allow for different necessities of attrition, the 
number of cars reflects the frequency and intensity of use (Widmer & Zweifel 2012). Even if the 
cantons periodically evaluate their road quality, the results do not coalesce in a central register 
(Koch & Forster 2010). Because of the lack of the data, the number of accidents due to bad road 
quality serves as proxy (Kalb 2009). Since accidents are an undesirable variable, it enters here in the 
transformed form as index (see section 6.2). With an average of 95.74 and a variance of 10.87 it is 
strongly left-tailed; that is in 150 observations the road quality did not cause an accident. The two 
remaining variables differ considerably among cantons. Particularly the variation of the cantonal 
street length partly has its roots in the divergent coverage of the national streets. This aspect plays 
a role when it comes to the explanation of the efficiency differences (see section 7.3). 
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Looking at the estimated distance function in the seventh column of Table 17, each normalized 
input holds a significantly negative coefficient. On the output side, the road length and the number 
of vehicles are significant with the expected positive coefficients. The quality index stemming from 
the number of accidents due to low road quality carries a non-significant but positive coefficient. 
The relatively high standard error of the coefficient is unsurprising given the low variation of the 
variable. In consideration of the positive sign, the output still stays in the model. Like the culture 
domain, the significant Hansen test is problematic. The more appropriate FE-model results in 
economically senseless parameter estimates, making the RE-model more appropriate nevertheless. 
The resulting errors are significantly left-skewed as the significantly negative 𝜇𝜇3(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) value 
indicates. Left-skewness puts the presence of inefficiency into question in the first instance. 
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Table 17 – Fixed or random effects regression by government function 
 
General 
administration 
Public order and 
security 
Education Culture Health Social Security Transportation Environment, spatial 
planning 
National economy 
Input: O -0.344*** 
(0.031) 
Input: O -0.073* 
(0.032) 
Input: O -0.042** 
(0.016) 
Input: O -0.274** 
(0.040) 
Input: O -0.010 
(0.037) 
Input: O -0.004 
(0.016) 
Input: O -0.062** 
(0.020) 
Input: O -0.156** 
(0.031) 
Input: O -0.101** 
(0.024) 
Input: F -0.011 
(0.007) 
Input: F -0.008 
(0.009) 
Input: F -0.442** 
(0.014) 
Input: F -0.673** 
(0.033) 
Input: F -0.634** 
(0.014) 
Input: F -0.930** 
(0.020) 
Input: F -0.305** 
(0.022) 
Input: F -0.097** 
(0.017) 
Input: F -0.294** 
(0.029) 
Input: C -0.026*** 
(0.007) 
Input: C -0.004 
(0.006) 
Input: C -0.016** 
(0.004) 
Input: C -0.016 
(0.009) 
Input: C -0.078** 
(0.013) 
Input: C -0.022** 
(0.005) 
Input: C -0.048** 
(0.013) 
Input: C 0.002 
(0.018) 
Input: C -0.006 
(0.009) 
Interest 
rates a 
0.026 
(0.019) 
Convicts 0.282** 
(0.029) 
Students  0.859** 
(0.046) 
Youth and 
sport 
0.125** 
(0.026) 
Doctors 0.899** 
(0.104) 
Unem-
ployed 
0.215** 
(0.035) 
Road 
length 
0.280* 
(0.130) 
Vacant 
accomm’ 
0.004 
(0.034) 
Farms 0.415** 
(0.061) 
Firms 0.156*** 
(0.035) 
Delin-
quencies 
0.226** 
(0.025) 
Univ’ 
diplomas 
0.071** 
(0.027) 
Museum 
tickets 
0.132** 
(0.024) 
Patient 
cases 
0.055 
(0.101) 
Reint’ 
people  
0.022 
(0.011) 
Vehicles 0.581** 
(0.122) 
Popu-
lation   
0.980** 
(0.081) 
Founded 
firms 
0.276** 
(0.059) 
Popu- 
lation 
0.732*** 
(0.063) 
Prisoner 
on rem’ 
0.039** 
(0.012) 
H’school 
graduat’ 
0.092** 
(0.032) 
Forest area  0.010 
(0.021) 
  People 
over 65 
0.786** 
(0.058) 
Acci- 
dentsa 
0.011 
(0.023) 
  Beds in 
hotels 
0.012 
(0.018) 
Time 0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Time 0.016** 
(0.001) 
Time 0.004* 
(0.002) 
Time 0.011** 
(0.004) 
Time -0.007 
(0.005) 
Time 0.012** 
(0.002) 
Time 0.003 
(0.003) 
Time 0.000 
(0.002) 
Time 0.020** 
(0.002) 
Intercept -17.54*** 
(4.003) 
Intercept -20.433** 
(3.003) 
Intercept 4.344 
(3.715) 
Intercept -13.671 
(8.068) 
Intercept 23.920* 
(10.808) 
Intercept -11.721* 
(4.769) 
Intercept -4.826 
(4.721) 
Intercept 9.303* 
(4.461) 
Intercept -29.974** 
(4.702) 
R2 0.902 R2 0.963 R2 0.986 R2 0.625 R2 0.969 R2 0.967 R2 0.860 R2 0.854 R2 0.791 
H 𝜒𝜒(7)2   2.341 SH 𝜒𝜒(7)2  14’615*** H 𝜒𝜒(7)2  24.80*** SH 𝜒𝜒(7)2  567.20*** SH 𝜒𝜒(6)2  17.910*** H 𝜒𝜒(7)2  11.874 H 𝜒𝜒(7)2   31.08*** SH 𝜒𝜒(6)2  14.141** H 𝜒𝜒(7)2  5.91 
𝜇𝜇3(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)  -0.284** 𝜇𝜇3(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) 0.055 𝜇𝜇3(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) -0.009 𝜇𝜇3(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) -0.212 𝜇𝜇3(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) -0.828*** 𝜇𝜇3(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) 0.144 𝜇𝜇3(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) -0.289** 𝜇𝜇3(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) -0.480*** 𝜇𝜇3(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) -0.262** 
Model RE Model RE Model FE Model RE Model RE Model RE Model RE Model FE Model RE 
N 374 N 339 N 389 N 288 N 369 N 223 N 379 N 383 N 332 
a Index as described in section 6.2 
Notes: coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; all variables are in logs due to the Cobb-Douglas specification; * p=90%, ** p=95%, *** p=99%; the inputs are normalized by the dependent 
variable personnel expenditures, which leaves operating (O), financial  (F) and capital (C) expenditures; H 𝜒𝜒(𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓)2  states Hausman’s test statistic; SH 𝜒𝜒(𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓)2  is the Sargan-Hansen statistic; 𝜇𝜇3(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) is the 
skewness of the residuals tested against symmetry (only significance reported). N < 390 result from expenditure values that are equal or smaller than zero (due to the harmonization of the financial data). 
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6.5. Efficiency estimates 
The inputs and outputs assessed in section 6.4 make it possible to approach the efficiency scores 
using the two techniques discussed previously, i.e. DEA in section 6.2 and SFA in section 6.3. In 
case the two efficiency estimates differ, the literature provides little help in deciding which to trust. 
Badunenko et al. (2012) suggest consulting the signal-to-noise ratio 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = σ𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡σ𝑣𝑣  , placing the 
standard error estimates of the inefficiency term (σ𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) and the stochastic noise (σ𝑣𝑣) into relation. 
The lower part of Table 18 reports the respective estimates. The authors make their preference for 
one or the other method dependent on three different ranges of 𝜆𝜆. First, if the ratio is smaller than 
one, both approaches perform poorly, and the efficiency estimates are potentially far from their 
true values. Second, a ratio above one means that estimates from both approaches do well. Last, if 
the ratio is about one, DEA is preferable for highly efficient DMUs, whereas SFA produces better 
estimates for less efficient observations. However, as Andor & Parmeter (2017) detect, the accuracy 
of the efficiency estimates using SFA, and hence the second moments of signal (σ𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) and noise 
(σ𝑣𝑣), depend on the assumed distributions. Thus, if the two parameters are misspecified in the first 
place, the estimate of the signal-to-noise ratio 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is also unreliable and it cannot serve as a basis 
for decision-making. For pragmatic reasons, the focus lies on the usually more distinct efficiency 
estimates of the DEA. 
In any case, the plain efficiency scores must be relativized as they leave aside the different 
contextual conditions under which the cantons operate. Chapter 6.6 explains the efficiency 
differences by means of contextual factors. 
Before turning to the results, it is essential to define the necessary parameters for both 
estimation techniques. In the DEA case, these are the orientation, the returns to scale, and the type 
of bootstrap for the bias correction. For orientation, this analysis follows the argumentation of 
previous studies. In the public sector, the law usually leaves little leeway to alter the output, which 
justifies an input-orientation. The management has fairly fixed levels of public service provision 
and is encouraged to provide the very service with the least possible resources (Seifert & Nieswand 
2014). For returns to scale, Simar & Wilson's (2002) ?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐 statistic tests whether the technology is 
subject to constant or variable returns to scale (see section 6.2). Third, to determine whether the 
combination of inputs is independent of the efficiency measure, Wilson's (2003) 𝑇𝑇�4𝑛𝑛-test 
approaches the question statistically.65 Of course, while the input-orientation is valid for all the 
public domains, the latter two aspects have to be tested for each government function individually. 
In the SFA case, constant returns to scale are a prerequisite to justify the estimation of a distance 
function (see footnote 60). The validity of this assumption becomes apparent by summing the 
output coefficients. If they sum up to one, the returns to scale are constant (Kumbhakar et al. 
2015). Furthermore, it is the functional form that imposes the major concern in SFA. A well-
                                                 
65 The integrated square difference 𝑇𝑇�4𝑛𝑛 = ∑ �𝐹𝐹�𝑛𝑛(𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 ,𝒘𝒘𝑖𝑖) − 𝐹𝐹�𝑛𝑛�?̂?𝛿𝑖𝑖�𝐹𝐹�𝑛𝑛(𝒘𝒘𝑖𝑖)�2𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 , where 𝒘𝒘𝑖𝑖 = (𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖,𝜼𝜼𝑖𝑖) is a vector of 
outputs and the decomposed efficiency score (see section 7.1) does not exceed some critical value if the combination 
of inputs is orthogonal to the efficiency scores (the H0 hypothesis) (Wilson 2003). The distribution of the statistic is 
approximated by the bootstrapping technique. 
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specified production frontier meets at least the economic foundations, in the sense that 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 < 0 ∀ 𝑗𝑗 
and 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 > 0 ∀ 𝑗𝑗. Closely related to this concern is the assumption about the error term  
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 . Unless the underlying error term behaves as assumed, the efficiency estimates are 
biased too. It would therefore be incoherent to assume homoscedasticity up to this point and drop 
this assumption when it comes to the inspection of the environmental variables. Hence, in 
anticipation of the heteroscedasticity of 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 , the efficiency estimates presented in Table 18 rely on 
the estimation equation (58) and stem from the results in Table 32. 
Two different Pearson correlation coefficients provide some additional information. The 
relationship between the estimated cost and technical efficiency 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 roughly identifies any 
misallocation of inputs; remember that the cost efficiency equals the product of the technical and 
the allocative efficiency (see section 6.2).66 The same analysis is done with the efficiencies resulting 
from the SFA as reported in Table 18. The second coefficient 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 assesses a potential link 
between missing values of the environmental variables and the estimated efficiency. This 
correlation cannot be assessed with the SFA results because the environmental variables already 
interfere when estimating the efficiencies. Finally, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴∗  
gives information about the joint rank variation of the DEA and SFA efficiency estimates. 
  
                                                 
66 With bootstrap-corrected efficiency estimates, it can happen that the allocative efficiency exceeds one. Since 
efficiency estimates above one are nonsensical, a respective correlation coefficient proves more useful than simply 
reporting a mean allocative efficiency estimate. 
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Table 18 – Cantonal DEA and SFA technical efficiency by government function 2000 to 2014  
Canton DEA: Culture SFA: Culture DEA: Transportation SFA: Transportation 
AG 0.706 (0.214) 0.999 (0.000) 0.816 (0.033) 0.032 (0.003) 
AI 0.544 (0.229) 0.988 (0.014) 0.678 (0.009) 0.011 (0.000) 
AR n.a.  0.646 (0.069) 0.006 (0.000) 
BE 0.671 (0.196) 0.996 (0.000) 0.707 (0.109) 0.348 (0.071) 
BL 0.397 (0.172) 0.992 (0.001) 0.525 (0.054) 0.539 (0.059) 
BS 0.117 (0.052) 0.995 (0.000) 0.181 (0.055) 0.096 (0.001) 
FR 0.578 (0.222)  0.681 (0.073) 0.005 (0.000) 
GE 0.350 (0.153) 0.998 (0.002) 0.725 (0.148) 0.029 (0.001) 
GL 0.701 (0.095)  0.702 (0.023)  
GR 0.684 (0.072)  0.469 (0.085)  
JU 0.487 (0.187) 0.987 (0.003) 0.726 (0.025) 0.132 (0.017) 
LU 0.719 (0.205)  0.837 (0.036)  
NE 0.604 (0.208) 1.000 (0.000) 0.485 (0.086) 0.361 (0.091) 
NW 0.614 (0.302) 0.999 (0.000) 0.710 (0.062) 0.032 (0.001) 
OW 0.697 (0.062) 1.000 (0.000) 0.694 (0.033) 0.029 (0.001) 
SG 0.725 (0.094) 1.000 (0.000) 0.716 (0.067) 0.103 (0.011) 
SH 0.716 (0.111) 1.000 (0.000) 0.691 (0.073) 0.453 (0.052) 
SO 0.689 (0.078) 0.993 (0.002) 0.710 (0.079) 0.527 (0.059) 
SZ 0.625 (0.207) 1.000 (0.000) 0.665 (0.078) 0.596 (0.076) 
TG 0.689 (0.204)  0.764 (0.014)  
TI 0.654 (0.211) 1.000 (0.000) 0.701 (0.070) 0.006 (0.000) 
UR 0.630 (0.191) 0.694 (0.267) 0.737 (0.010) 0.027 (0.001) 
VD 0.522 (0.196)  0.770 (0.053)  
VS 0.459 (0.156) 1.000 (0.000) 0.761 (0.028) 0.005 (0.000) 
ZG 0.546 (0.206) 0.990 (0.007) 0.469 (0.051) 0.046 (0.003) 
ZH 0.529 (0.179)  0.719 (0.092) 0.901 (0.005) 
CH 0.572 (0.228) 0.977 (0.100) 0.671 (0.140) 0.208 (0.089) 
?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐 (p) 0.855 (0.98)  0.881 (0.97)  
𝑇𝑇�4𝑛𝑛  (p) 0.010 (0.00)  0.023 (0.18)  
𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  0.692 -0.033 0.402 -0.245 
𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  -0.044  -0.060  
𝔼𝔼�[𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡]   0.041***  0.137*** 
𝜎𝜎�𝑣𝑣   0.109***  0.093*** 
𝔼𝔼�[𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡]   0.375  1.475 
N 288 214 382 298 
𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴∗  0.189 0.189 -0.159 -0.159 
Notes: * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1% 
DEA estimates show the mean of the year-by-year bootstrap-corrected cost efficiencies (Simar & Wilson 2011a) with standard 
deviation in parentheses. CH is the mean of all cantons. The ?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐-statistic refers to Simar & Wilson's (2002) returns to scale 
test; the 𝑇𝑇�4𝑛𝑛-statistic refers to Wilson's (2003) independence test; always the year with the smallest p-value is reported; both 
tests globally reject the H0 if any year rejects it. If the p-value of the ?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐-test exceeds (is equal or smaller than) 0.05 then the 
efficiencies are estimated based on constant (variable) returns to scale; if the p-value of the 𝑇𝑇�4𝑛𝑛-test exceeds (is equal or smaller 
than) 0.05 then the heterogenous (subsampling) version of the bootstrap correction is applied. The Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 describes the relationship of the cost and technical efficiency, while 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 shows the correlation between 
the missing dummy and the technical efficiency. The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴∗  describes the 
relationship of the DEA and SFA technical efficiency measures. N < 390 due to outlier exclusion (see footnote 57) or negative 
expenditures.𝔼𝔼�[𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] is tested against H0: 𝔼𝔼�[𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] = 0; 𝜎𝜎�𝑣𝑣 is tested against H0: 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣 = 0; 𝔼𝔼�[𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] is tested against H0: 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1; 
for further regression outputs see Table 20. 
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Like the previous sections, the focus lies on the two domains of culture and transportation (the 
remaining efficiency estimates are reported in Table 29 and Table 30 in the appendix). Before 
reacting to the efficiency estimates of the culture domain, it is worth checking the lambda. With a 
value of 0.375, the efficiency variation relative to the stochastic error is too small to reliably estimate 
the efficiencies with either method. Just as Badunenko et al. (2012) observed, the ensuing efficiency 
estimates from the SFA are all together close to one, whereas the estimates from the DEA show 
some variation. In conclusion, the authors trust neither the one nor the other estimates. As pointed 
out by Andor & Parmeter (2017), the surprising SFA estimates might result from a poorly specified 
efficiency distribution. In order to limit the risk of commenting on meaningless results, the 
following paragraph mainly confines itself to the brief discussion of the efficiency estimates 
obtained through the DEA. 
The mean technical efficiency comes to 57.2 percent. In other words, on average the cantons 
could reduce their personnel, operational, financial, and capital expenditures concurrently by 42.8 
percent if they were operating under the same environmental conditions. Given the insignificant 
?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐 and the significant 𝑇𝑇�4𝑛𝑛 statistics, the estimations are based on a constant return to scale 
assumption and a heterogenous bootstrap to correct the bias; also note that the sum of the beta-  
(i.e. output-) coefficients is far from one (see Table 32), which is again an indicator that some 
outputs remain unobserved. This deficiency enters into the interpretation of the main results below 
(section 7.5). Across all cantons and years, the efficiencies range from 7 percent (Basel Stadt in 
2007) to 89 percent (Fribourg in 2012). Likewise, it is the canton of Basel Stadt that, on average, 
provides the least efficient cultural services, while the most efficient canton is St. Gallen over these 
fifteen years. Estimates for the canton of Appenzell Ausserrhoden are missing as it never had any 
capital expenditures, and thus, with one input always zero, the observations drop out of the sample. 
The fact that the correlation coefficient 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 is comparatively high (0.7) ascribes only a small part 
of the cost inefficiency to a misallocation of inputs. 
Within the transportation domain, the point estimate of lambda is 1.5; however, the H0 that 
lambda significantly exceeds one cannot be rejected. Accordingly, for highly efficient DMUs the 
DEA estimates apply, whereas for the others the SFA estimates are more trustworthy. As to the 
DEA estimates, the returns to scale and the orthogonality of the inputs and the efficiency must be 
determined. For the returns to scale, the ?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐-statistic of 0.88 leaves the null hypothesis of constant 
returns to scale intact. Likewise, the sum of the beta coefficients (see Table 32) equals exactly one, 
which also indicates constant returns to scale (Kumbhakar et al. 2015). Therefore, in the domain 
of transportation, the cantons cannot benefit from scale efficiencies and the constant return to 
scale assumption is valid for the further analysis. The 𝑇𝑇�4𝑛𝑛-statistic rejects the H0 of independence 
between the efficiency scores and the combination of inputs in several years. The bootstrapping 
procedure must accordingly account for dependency when estimating the bias-corrected efficiency 
scores (Wilson 2003).67 
Column 8 of Table 29 reports the year-by-year bias-corrected DEA technical efficiency scores 
under the assumption of constant returns to scale. The mean efficiency is 67 percent, which means 
                                                 
67 Due to the small number of observations, the heterogeneous bootstrap was not always possible to implement. In 
these cases, the subsampling version replaced it where the parameter 𝜅𝜅 =0.5. Monte Carlo simulations in Kneip et al. 
(2008) recommend a kappa close to a half with a sample size of below 50 observations. 
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that the cantons could hypothetically reduce their expenditures by 23 percentage points overall. 
According to Badunenko et al. (2012), DEA provides  more reliable results particularly for highly 
efficient DMUs. In the case of transportation, these are Geneva in 2007 (86.6%), Lucerne in 2008 
(86.5%), and Geneva in 2006 (86.2%). Unfortunately, Lucerne is one of the cantons that did not 
provide data on special financings and therefore drops out of the estimation under the SFA 
approach. Clearly, highly efficient observations form the frontier, whereas their exclusion might 
strongly affect the estimation. The extremely low correlation coefficient 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 of -0.06 relativizes 
this argument, though. The sobering comparison to the SFA efficiencies in column 8 in Table 30 
result in the rank correlation of -0.16. Not only do the SFA results differ strongly from the DEA 
scores, the two efficiency estimates are even contradictory. A possible explanation for this 
inconsistency comes from the right-skewed distribution of the error (see Table 17), which poses 
problems particularly for the SFA due to its assumptions about the distribution of the error term. 
The ambiguity of the efficiency estimates shall be kept in mind when it comes to the explanation 
of efficiency. 
6.6. Interim conclusion 
After an extensive review on the performance measurement methods and the operationalization 
of inputs and outputs, this chapter listed mean DEA and SFA estimates across the Swiss cantons 
from 2000 to 2014. In anticipation of when this analysis will narrow down to focus on the two 
domains of culture and transportation, the comments are confined to their results. As for the 
culture, the DEA reports a mean efficiency of about 57 percent, while the SFA’s mean climbs to 
98 percent. Their rank correlation amounts to only 19 percent. Accordingly, both results should be 
cautiously interpreted. Regarding the transportation domain, the mean efficiencies come to 67 
(DEA) and 21 (SFA) percent with a rank correlation of -16 percent, respectively. Additional tests 
revealed that the DEA results are more trustworthy in the further analysis. 
7. Explaining efficiency 
In order to finally test the hypotheses, this chapter combines the previously obtained efficiency 
estimates with the environmental variables, namely, the earmarked revenues. As mentioned before, 
the combination either happens in two steps, using the DEA approach, or in one step when 
applying the SFA. The methodological procedure of the two approaches is discussed in two distinct 
sections. While the second section briefly summarizes existing SFA models involving 
heterogeneity, the first section revisits established two-stage DEA models and proposes a 
procedure to account for panel data. To this end, the section classifies the different ways which 
have emerged from the empirical literature that apply the two-stage DEA analyzing panel data. In 
order to determine which way is the most appropriate in case fixed effects are present, the section 
then adapts the algorithm proposed by Simar & Wilson (2007) which is designed for cross-sectional 
data. For ease of reference, the resulting adjustment of the Simar-Wilson approach we call here the 
‘quasi fixed effect algorithm’. This means that the quasi fixed effect algorithm is basically an 
application of the original Simar-Wilson approach with a specification for panel data. 
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Often, studies exploiting panel data run a DEA on the entire sample and thereby leave aside a 
potentially changing production frontier. In the second step, these papers usually implement year 
and individual dummies to account for eventual fixed effects (Selim & Bursalıoğlu 2015; Fleishman 
et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2005). Instead, the quasi-fixed effect algorithm first performs the DEA on 
each year individually and only introduces individual dummy variables in the second stage. The 
Monte Carlo simulations provide evidence that the quasi fixed effect algorithm performs a lot 
better in terms of accuracy and efficiency than the conventional approach. 
The third section addresses the concerns related to reverse causality, that is, whether the models 
actually estimate causal effects of the environmental variables on efficiency or whether the results 
are simple correlations. In terms of the earmarked revenues, endogeneity should be less 
problematic since special financings themselves are fairly stable and the variations within existing 
ones are largely driven by external factors that are outside the manipulable scope of the cantonal 
government. Nevertheless, the fourth section introduces additional control variables to make the 
ceteris paribus assumption more consistent. After all, if there is some endogeneity present, the 
applied estimators cannot solve that issue. 
Based on the methodological foundations and the data, the estimations in section five provide 
partly unexpected results. The cultural domain mainly supports the debate prevention theory. In 
particular, well-funded special financings dedicated to cultural public goods enforce the negative 
effect earmarking has on efficiency. At the same time, the empirical evidence suggests that the 
effect of earmarks can also turn positive if a canton has a restrictive debt brake. Including the 
findings of the transportation domain show an even more differentiated picture. While indebted 
special financings also allow some debate prevention (i.e. earmarking indeed negatively affects 
efficiency), well-funded special financings have the opposite effect. The most plausible explanation 
for this phenomenon are the inherent differences between the two domains. First, in the 
transportation domain the tax-payers and beneficiaries largely cohere (mainly road utilizers), but 
these two groups differ significantly in the culture domain. Second, the correlation between the 
taxed and the benefiting good is only strong in the transportation domain and not in culture. Third, 
the transportation domain has the potential to exclude those who do not pay but this is less the 
case for culture. These differences correspond exactly to those identified in the literature review. 
The public choice veterans predicted a positive effect of earmarking on efficiency if these 
conditions are fulfilled. The debate prevention now also explains why earmarking has a particularly 
negative effect on efficiency when those conditions are absent. 
As it happens, the effect of earmarked revenue on efficiency can depend on other factors, which 
is why the sixth section outlines some conditional effects. The robustness checks and an interim 
conclusion round out the chapter. 
7.1. Quasi fixed effects algorithm 
There is a considerable amount of papers in which the authors regressed the efficiency measures 
from the first stage based on some external or environmental variables in the second stage.68 Recent 
                                                 
68 For an overview see Simar & Wilson (2007). 
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studies applying such a two-stage approach specifically in the public sector are Afonso & Fernandes 
(2008), Boetti et al. (2012) or Bönisch et al. (2011); Narbón-Perpiñá & De Witte (2017) provide a 
comprehensive review. Most of these papers account in some way for a certain specificity of the 
DEA measure. Because it is bound between zero and one in the input-oriented case or between 
zero and infinity in the output-oriented case, the measure and thus the corresponding error term 
inherently exclude a normal distribution. When the underlying data-generating process is not 
specifically discussed, there are two basic approaches authors often use to consider the 
boundedness of the error term. First, some authors argue that the underlying efficiency measure as 
a dependent variable is indeed normally distributed, but only values within the bounds exist and 
are observable (e.g. Kalb, 2010). In this case, statistical theory proposes truncated models. Second, 
other researchers believe in the censoring of the true error term in the sense that values above or 
below a certain threshold take the threshold value (e.g. Kirjavainen & Loikkanent, 1998). These 
researchers apply a censored estimator as, for instance, the Tobit model (Honoré 1992).  
As Simar & Wilson (2007) and Simar & Wilson (2011b) point out however, all of these studies 
share two common shortcomings. First, none of these authors describe a coherent data-generating 
process that would explain the non-normal distribution of the error term. Consequently, the use 
of censoring and truncation methods as well as whatever transformations of the efficiency score 
are ad hoc makeshift solutions rather than theoretically grounded ones. Second, neither censored 
nor simple truncation models yield estimates of standard errors that would allow for statistical 
inference. The reason is that these methods, by default, do not take into account the correlation 
between the efficiency scores. Correlation is most likely because in finite samples every efficient 
observation expands the frontier and thereby alters the efficiency estimates of all or most of the 
other observations. Unfortunately, because very little is known about the theoretical distribution 
of efficiency scores obtained through DEA, the correlation cannot be simply integrated out of the 
data-generating process. 
Acknowledging the correlation as well as the non-normally distributed error term, Balaguer-Coll 
et al. (2007) chose to use smoothing techniques. Although such techniques facilitate graphical 
illustrations of the effects observed in the sample, the authors did not report any generalization in 
terms of statistical inference. A second approach to overcome the issues of the error term comes 
from Banker & Natarajan (2008). They impose fairly strict assumptions on the data-generating 
process to enable simple OLS estimation. However, the narrow framework in which these 
assumptions hold, almost prevents the use of the model in reality (Simar & Wilson 2011b).69 Yet 
another idea is to use bootstrap estimation to conduct inference (Simar & Wilson 2007; Xue & 
Harker 1999; Hirschberg & Lloyd 2002).  
The idea of bootstrapping, here in particular the parametric bootstrap with resampling residuals, 
entails the following steps (Greene 2003). The first is to estimate the wanted coefficients out of the 
sample at hand together with an estimate of the variance of the error term. Then, some pseudo 
errors are drawn based on the assumed distribution of the error term and its estimated variance. 
Combining the pseudo errors with the coefficient estimates and the observed values of the 
independent variable leads to a pseudo sample of the dependent variable. Next, the pseudo sample 
                                                 
69 Admittedly, Johnson & Kuosmanen (2012) later found that the OLS estimator is still consistent under less restrictive 
assumptions. 
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of the dependent and the original values of the independent variables yield a bootstrap estimate of 
the wanted coefficients. Repeating that procedure multiple times eventually reveals the sought 
distribution of the coefficients and enables inference. Drawing pseudo samples from the estimated 
coefficients mimics the underlying data-generating process (Simar & Wilson 2000). Accordingly, 
“in order to simulate the disturbances, we need either to know (or assume) the data-generating 
process that produces [the error term]. […] The obvious disadvantage of the parametric bootstrap 
is that one cannot learn of the influence of an unknown DGP for [the error term] by assuming it 
is known. For example, if the bootstrap is being used to accommodate unknown heteroscedasticity 
in the model, a parametric bootstrap that assumes homoscedasticity would defeat the purpose” 
(Greene 2003, p.652). 
The description of the data-generating process given here intends to provide a rough overview, 
whereas Simar & Wilson (2007) and Simar & Wilson (2011b) treat it in more detail. With reference 
to section 6.2, still let 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ+
𝑝𝑝  be the 𝑜𝑜th row of the input matrix 𝑿𝑿 with 𝑝𝑝 inputs, and let 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ+
𝑞𝑞  
denote the 𝑜𝑜th row of the output matrix 𝒀𝒀 with 𝑞𝑞 outputs. Now introduce a matrix 𝒁𝒁 whose 𝑜𝑜th 
row 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ𝑚𝑚contains 𝑚𝑚 environmental variables. Assume that these sample observations (𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖, 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖, 
𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖) are realizations of identically, independently-distributed random variables (𝒙𝒙, 𝒚𝒚, 𝒛𝒛) with 
probability density function 𝑓𝑓(𝒙𝒙,𝒚𝒚, 𝒛𝒛). Under the condition that the production frontier is fixed, 
𝒙𝒙 can be written in terms of polar coordinates by (𝜼𝜼,𝜃𝜃), where 𝜼𝜼 = [𝜂𝜂1, … , 𝜂𝜂𝑞𝑞−1] is a vector of 
angles and 𝜃𝜃 is the input efficiency measure.70 Using polar coordinates, now write the probability 
density function as 𝑓𝑓(𝜼𝜼,𝜃𝜃,𝒚𝒚, 𝒛𝒛) which is a series of conditional densities that describe the data-
generating process in three steps (Simar & Wilson 2007): 
𝑓𝑓(𝒙𝒙,𝒚𝒚, 𝒛𝒛) = 𝑓𝑓(𝜼𝜼,𝜃𝜃,𝒚𝒚, 𝒛𝒛)  = 𝑓𝑓(𝒛𝒛)𝑓𝑓(𝜃𝜃| 𝒛𝒛)𝑓𝑓(𝒚𝒚,𝜼𝜼|𝜃𝜃, 𝒛𝒛)    (54) 
The interpretation is straightforward. Starting from the left of equation (54), a decision-making 
unit operates in the environment 𝒛𝒛 that is distributed as 𝑓𝑓(𝒛𝒛). Concretely 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 could be, for instance, 
the normally distributed topographic conditions of a canton 𝑜𝑜. Second, conditional on this 
environment 𝒛𝒛 the decision-making unit draws an input efficiency level 𝜃𝜃 from the conditional 
probability density 𝑓𝑓(𝜃𝜃| 𝒛𝒛). Again, to be concrete, a canton 𝑜𝑜 might have a higher or lower 
probability to be efficient depending on the topographic conditions. Third, the decision-making 
unit draws 𝒚𝒚,𝜼𝜼 from 𝑓𝑓(𝒚𝒚,𝜼𝜼|𝜃𝜃, 𝒛𝒛). To conclude the example, imagine that the canton can achieve 
a certain input-output combination based on 𝜃𝜃 and 𝒛𝒛. Note however, that the third density is hard 
to interpret due to the partitioned output. The take-home message here is that the unadjusted 
inputs 𝜼𝜼 and the outputs 𝒚𝒚 are simultaneously achieved from the same distribution and both do 
not directly depend on the environment variables 𝒛𝒛. Put differently, the environmental variable 
does not affect the efficient frontier itself, but the probability of a certain decision-making unit to 
be closer or further away from the frontier (i.e. to be more or less efficient).71 This condition is the 
reason why the inputs 𝒙𝒙 were rewritten in its polar coordinates (𝜼𝜼,𝜃𝜃) in the first place. The second 
                                                 
70 The original model bases on output-oriented efficiency measures 𝛿𝛿 that are equal or bigger than one. As 
demonstrated in section 6.2, in the CCR model the input-oriented efficiency measure 𝜃𝜃 is simply the inverse of the 
output oriented one. In the BCC model this simple transformation does not apply. 
71 Daraio et al. (2010) propose how to test this so-called separability condition.  
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conditional density 𝑓𝑓(𝜃𝜃| 𝒛𝒛) is the crucial step because it operates by assumption through a specific 
mechanism: 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 = 𝜓𝜓(𝒛𝒛,𝜷𝜷) + 𝜀𝜀 ≤ 1  where 𝜀𝜀 ∽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2)   which is truncated 
left at  −𝜓𝜓( 𝒛𝒛,𝜷𝜷) 
and right at  1 − 𝜓𝜓( 𝒛𝒛,𝜷𝜷) 
(55) 
𝜓𝜓 is a smooth, continuous function, 𝜷𝜷 is a vector of parameters, and 𝜀𝜀 is the error term. 
Additionally, henceforth 𝜓𝜓(𝒛𝒛,𝜷𝜷) = 𝒛𝒛′𝜷𝜷 by assumption. Remember the previous distinction 
between censored and truncated models. On the first sight, it seemed puzzling to assume that in 
fact only values within certain bounds of efficiency exist as it is the case for truncation models. 
Based on equation (55) it becomes clear why Simar & Wilson (2007) advocate for truncated 
regression in the second stage. They suppose that the environmental variable influences efficiency, 
which then in turn creates values of inputs and outputs. Since the inefficiency itself has a truncated 
distribution by construction, the environmental variables 𝒛𝒛 cannot load into the efficiency measure 
over their entire range. 
Assuming the data-generating process in (54) together with its specification in (55) the 
adequate bootstrap procedure runs through the subsequent steps (Simar & Wilson 2007): 
[1] Compute the estimated bias-corrected efficiency scores 𝜃𝜃��𝑖𝑖 using (43). 
[2] Use the maximum likelihood method to obtain the estimates 𝜷𝜷� and 𝜎𝜎�𝜀𝜀2 from the truncated 
regression of 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖 on 𝜃𝜃��𝑖𝑖. The truncation boundaries are 0 and 1. 
[3] Repeating the following steps [3.1 to 3.3] 𝐿𝐿 times, generates 𝐿𝐿 bootstrap samples (𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖∗) and 
accordingly 𝐿𝐿 bootstrap estimates 𝜷𝜷�∗ and 𝜎𝜎�𝜀𝜀2
∗: 
[3.1] Draw 𝑛𝑛 different 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖∗from a truncated normal distribution with zero mean and the variance 
𝜎𝜎�𝜀𝜀
2 estimated in [2]. The truncation on the left is −𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖′𝜷𝜷� and on the right 1 − 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖′𝜷𝜷�. 
[3.2] Compute the bootstrap estimates of the efficiency scores by 𝜃𝜃��𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖′𝜷𝜷� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖∗ 
[3.3] Use the maximum likelihood method to obtain the estimates 𝜷𝜷�∗ and 𝜎𝜎�𝜀𝜀2
∗ from the truncated 
regression of 𝜃𝜃��𝑖𝑖∗ on 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖. 
[4] The 𝐿𝐿 resulting bootstrap estimates 𝜷𝜷�∗ and 𝜎𝜎�𝜀𝜀2
∗provide the necessary information to 
construct estimates of confidence intervals for every element in 𝜷𝜷. 
Having introduced the Simar-Wilson algorithm, an interim conclusion is appropriate. The 
estimator this section ultimately looks for needs to be ready for three data characteristics: First, the 
DEA score is truncated. Second, the error term is correlated in an unknown way. Third, the data 
comes in a panel format containing most likely unobserved individual- and time-invariant effects. 
The Simar-Wilson algorithm is the current standard used to accomplish the two-step approach 
with cross sectional data as it simultaneously accounts for the truncation and the correlation. 
However, the literature has so far left aside the aspect of potential fixed effects in this regard. 
Therefore, it is worth checking how the empirical literature treats longitudinal data characteristics 
in the spirit of two steps, without necessarily considering the other two data characteristics. 
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The common practice to implement panel data in the two-step approach is to run first a DEA 
over the entire observation set including all individuals and all time periods. In section 6.2 such a 
reference set was called intertemporal. The second step then either simply ignores panel effects 
when explaining the efficiency scores, as in Dimas et al. (2012), or uses some types of fixed and 
random effect models. Examples advocating for the latter estimation strategies are Selim & 
Bursalıoğlu (2015), Fleishman et al. (2009) or Chen et al. (2005). Probably the least sophisticated 
papers in this family come from Kittelsen & Rehnberg (2008) and Poveda (2011) who simply used 
OLS, linear fixed, and random effects models. They thereby leave aside not only the correlation 
between, but also the truncation of the efficiency scores. 
Still based on intertemporal efficiency scores in the first stage, several authors used slightly more 
elaborate models in the second stage. For instance, Staub et al. (2010) and Souza & Gomes (2015) 
used moment conditions to estimate some dynamic panel data models which allowed for dynamic 
responses of the efficiency scores and autoregressive errors. Alternatively, if a policy change as a 
one-time event figures as a subject of main interest, the difference-in-difference as a quasi-
experimental design has lately become very popular in the most diverse fields of social sciences. 
Consequently this design has also found its way into the explanation of efficiency scores (Tiemann 
& Schreyögg 2012).72 Similarly, Puenpatom & Rosenman (2008) include interactions with the 
control and dummy variables for those years when some policy program was implemented. 
Running DEA over the entire time span for all individuals compares production processes of 
different years. The implicit assumption is that there is no technology change or innovation and 
thus the efficient frontier remains equal over time (see section 6.2). Very few papers challenge this 
strict assumption by using contemporaneous efficiency scores (Tiemann & Schreyögg 2012; Wanke 
2012) or the results from a window analysis (Zhang et al. 2008). 
With the seminal paper by Simar & Wilson (2007), the empirical two-stage DEA literature 
increasingly followed them by applying truncated regression and bootstrapping also with 
longitudinal data. However, now that these two characteristics came into focus, some authors leave 
other specificities of longitudinal data aside. Barros et al. (2010) applied the cross sectional 
truncated regression with bootstrapped standard errors and thereby pooled the data. In their 
subsequent studies (Barros & Dieke 2008a; Barros & Dieke 2008b), they introduced a trend variable 
without any further consideration of a possible correlation due to the panel structure. The authors 
did not mention their implicit and rather strict assumption of a constant trend in efficiency. In 
contrast, Kalb (2010), Chortareas et al. (2013), and Agasisti & Wolszczak-Derlacz (2014) insert 
dummies while running the Simar-Wilson algorithm in order to account for fixed effects. Note that 
all three base their regressions on intertemporal efficiency scores. 
The studies referenced above illustrate various possibilities for accounting for panel data in the 
two-step procedure. Up to now very few papers have simultaneously incorporated all three 
characteristics. Among them are those of Kalb (2010), Chortareas et al. (2013), and Agasisti & 
Wolszczak-Derlacz (2014) who all estimate DEA scores using the intertemporal reference set in 
the first step. They thereby implicitly assume that the production frontier is constant (Tulkens & 
Eeckenhaut 2006). As already mentioned, this assumption is stronger the longer the time period 
                                                 
72 Note that Tiemann & Schreyögg (2012) actually use contemporaneous efficiency scores as indicated below. 
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analyzed. Assuming a constant frontier suits the second step, where all three studies run the Simar-
Wilson bootstrap procedure to consider the unknown correlation between the efficiency scores as 
well as the truncated error. Following the previously explained data-generating process in equation 
(54), the second step needs the fix frontier assumption, because of the separability condition. In 
order to write the inputs 𝒙𝒙 by its polar coordinates (𝜼𝜼,𝜃𝜃), the production frontier has to remain 
fixed (Simar & Wilson 2007). By including time dummies among the regressors in the second step, 
one inevitably questions the assumption of a fixed frontier, which actually also prevents writing the 
inputs by its polar coordinates. Hence, even if the idea of combining fixed effects with the Simar-
Wilson algorithm is striking, the implementation suggested so far does not satisfy.73 
A further problem that appears when using a fixed effects model in the second stage lies in the 
truncation. In linear fixed effects models, it is well known that consistent coefficient estimates are 
the result of inserting individual dummies. This least squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimator 
controls for individual fixed effects. Indeed, the number of dummies, and therefore the coefficients 
to be estimated, increases with the number of individuals – an issue known as the incidental 
parameter problem. Consequently, the coefficients are not necessarily consistent (i.e. possibly 
asymptotically biased) if the number of years is kept fixed. When applying the OLS framework, the 
estimates resulting from the LSDV approach equal those of the regression with de-meaned or first 
difference transformed variables. The OLS estimates from this transformed data can be shown to 
be consistent and, thus, so are those of the LSDV estimator (Greene 2003). Now, remember that 
truncation leads to non-normally distributed error terms. Due to the non-linearity, estimating a 
fixed effect model by subtracting individual means or by taking first differences is not possible 
anymore. Put differently, since the efficiency scores underlie a truncation process, deviations of 
group means or first differences are meaningless (Greene 2008). Kalb (2010), Chortareas et al. 
(2013) and Agasisti & Wolszczak-Derlacz (2014) unintentionally avoid this issue by using dummies 
instead while possibly suffering from the incidental parameter problem. 
The challenge therefore is to find the middle course between relaxing the assumption of a fixed 
frontier and accounting for individual and time fixed effects. The trick is to combine the data 
transformation and the dummy variable strategy, where the consideration of the appropriate 
reference set is the quasi-transformation and removes the year fixed effect. The dummies tackle 
the individual fixed effect. For further reference, this is called the quasi fixed effect algorithm. 
Concretely, in order to compare only decision-making units that could possibly operate on the 
same efficient frontier, the DEA incorporates only observations of one year in the first step. In 
terms of section 6.2, a year-per-year DEA uses the contemporaneous reference set, which 
automatically excludes unobservable shocks (i.e. fixed effects) that shift the production frontier in 
one year for all DMUs. 
Implementing the dummy variables strategy in the second step controls for individual fixed 
effects. However, as explained above, the dummy approach provokes the incidental parameter 
issue. Greene (2008, p.117 et seqq.) points out, though, that the bias caused by the incidental 
parameters differs from one model to another: “Until recently, analysis of this sort was limited to 
                                                 
73 Note that Agasisti & Wolszczak-Derlacz (2014) also estimated a model where they allowed varying frontiers between 
but not within individuals, i.e. they run a DEA over one individual and several years. However, as they included year 
dummies, their approach does not make more sense than Kalb's (2010). 
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binary choice models, but it was, by and large, taken as a given […] that similar results apply to 
other models. In fact, this appears not to be the case. […] The end result would seem to be that 
estimating fixed effects models with censoring and truncation presents no practical obstacle. The 
incidental parameters problem is to be reckoned with, but if the Monte Carlo results given here 
have any generality, then the IP problem in this setting is far less severe than in the binary choice 
case.” As a consequence, the dummy variables strategy to control for individual fixed effects can 
be used in the present case without too much doubt. Therefore, the second stage of the truncated 
quasi fixed effects estimator with bootstrap inference is simply the Simar-Wilson algorithm with 
individual dummies. 
Analytically the underlying assumed data-generating process enriched by time and individual 
fixed effects is  
𝑓𝑓(𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓(𝜼𝜼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡)  = 𝑓𝑓(𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑓𝑓(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖| 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑓𝑓(𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡| 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑓𝑓(𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡| 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝑓𝑓(𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝜼𝜼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡)    (56) 
where 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 are individual fixed effects and 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 are time fixed effects. Note that fixed effects 
estimators even allow a correlation between the regressors 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and the fixed effects while still 
providing unbiased coefficients. Again, the interesting conditional density function is 𝑓𝑓(𝜃𝜃| 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) 
because it operates by assumption through a specific mechanism: 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′𝜷𝜷 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ≤ 1    where 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2)  is truncated 
left at  −𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′𝜷𝜷 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
and right at  1 − 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′𝜷𝜷 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
(57) 
Accordingly, the quasi fixed effect algorithm is 
[1] Compute the bias-corrected efficiency scores 𝜃𝜃��𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 applying (43) a contemporaneous reference 
set. 
[2] Using the maximum likelihood method yields the estimates 𝜷𝜷�, 𝜎𝜎�𝜀𝜀2 and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 from the truncated 
regression of 𝜃𝜃��𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 on 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and individual dummies. The truncation boundaries are 0 and 1. 
[3] Repeating the following steps [3.1 to 3.3] 𝐿𝐿 times, generates 𝐿𝐿 bootstrap samples (𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗ ) and 
accordingly 𝐿𝐿 bootstrap estimates 𝜷𝜷�∗ and 𝜎𝜎�𝜀𝜀2
∗: 
[3.1] Draw 𝑛𝑛 different 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗  from a truncated normal distribution with zero mean and the variance 
𝜎𝜎�𝜀𝜀
2 estimated in step [3]. The truncation bound on the left is at −𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′𝜷𝜷� − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and on the right 
at 1 − 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′𝜷𝜷� − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖. 
[3.2] Compute the bootstrap estimates of the efficiency scores by 𝜃𝜃��𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′𝜷𝜷� + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗  
[3.3] Use the maximum likelihood method to obtain the estimates 𝜷𝜷�∗ and 𝜎𝜎�𝜀𝜀2
∗ from the truncated 
regression of 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 on 𝜃𝜃��𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗ . 
[4] The distribution of the 𝐿𝐿 resulting bootstrap estimates 𝜷𝜷�∗ and 𝜎𝜎�𝜀𝜀2
∗ provides the necessary 
information to construct confidence intervals for every coefficient in 𝜷𝜷 (see Simar & Wilson, 
2000). 
The assumption about the data-generating process (57) together with the quasi fixed effects 
algorithm covers all three data characteristics requested in the beginning of this section. 
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7.2. Heteroscedasticity in Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Unlike the Simar-Wilson algorithm, which estimates the coefficients of the environmental 
variable in two steps, the stochastic frontier approach enables a one-step estimation. If done 
directly, the impact of the environmental variables on efficiency integrates more naturally into the 
model. Recall the two estimation equations (53) where the inefficiency 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 follows a half-normal 
distribution with constant variance 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2. Introducing some environmental variables 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 challenges 
the constant variance (i.e. homogeneity) assumption and conditions the variance on contextual 
factors (Kumbhakar et al. 2015). In other words, for most econometric models heteroscedasticity 
leads to issues that must be resolved, but when estimating frontier models it achieves an economic 
meaning. 
Recall Greene's (2005) true fixed effects model in section 6.3, which now incorporates the 
heteroscedastic inefficiency and heteroscedastic error. The thus obtained results compare to the 
ones from the two-step approach of the previous section, which also only accounts for time-variant 
efficiency. Formally, the heteroscedastic true fixed- and random-effect model estimating the actual 
cost functions read as74 
CD:  ln𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷′ ln𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
TL:  ln𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷′ ln𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 12 ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐=1 ln𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕 ln 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞𝜕𝜕=1 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 where 𝔼𝔼[𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] = 0  [random effect] or  𝔼𝔼[𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] ≠ 0 [fixed effect] 
  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∽  𝑁𝑁+�0,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 � and  𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 = 𝑒𝑒𝜹𝜹′𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
  𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∽  𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2) and  𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2 = 𝑒𝑒𝜔𝜔0  
(58) 
Again, CD is the actual cost function with Cobb-Douglas specification, whereas the term TL 
stands for the translog specification. In contrast to the homoscedastic version, the time-variant 
inefficiency 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is not identically distributed anymore by the very definition of the term. Yet, it is 
still independently distributed conditional on 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 meaning that one materialization of 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 given 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
is independent from all other values. The interpretation of the coefficients of the environmental 
variables (𝜹𝜹) is not intuitive. As they appear in a non-linear fashion in the estimation equation, a 
direct interpretation would mislead. Instead, Wang (2002) provides the necessary modifications to 
obtain their marginal effects on the inefficiency. He also shows that the effects are monotonic in 
the model (58). In other words, even if the coefficient per se might not be informative without 
modifications, its sign is. Naturally, the effect of interacted variables is non-monotonic. Finally, it 
is crucial to recognize that the coefficients link the environmental variables with the inefficiency 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. A coefficient above zero therefore means that the respective variable negatively affects 
efficiency. 
7.3. Reverse causality 
Irrespective of the method used to estimate efficiency, endogeneity issues might affect the 
estimates. That is, in order to actually claim that the environmental variables cause changes in 
                                                 
74 The adaptations translate one-to-one into the estimation equation of the distance functions. 
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efficiency – rather than they are simply correlated – it is essential that the revenue characteristics 
are exogenous. Namely, potential endogeneity issues of the revenue characteristics may arise from 
reverse causality and unobserved factors that simultaneously affect efficiency and the revenue 
characteristics. At this point, the estimators accounting for this type of endogeneity are still in a 
rather early stage of development and, particularly in the empirical literature, they are not yet 
broadly established (Amsler et al. 2016; Karakaplan & Kutlu 2017). Because of this, the endogeneity 
issues cannot be solved here. Discussing their possible influence on the results is therefore vital. 
Several mechanisms may manifest under the label of reverse causality. In case of earmarked 
revenues, either the executive or the parliament could endogenously modify the part of earmarked 
revenues. The first case is ruled out by the legal prerequisite of special financings. As both the 
HAM1 and the HAM2 stipulate, the earmarking of revenues requires a statutory basis (Conference 
of cantonal finance directors 1981; Conference of cantonal finance directors 2008). As such, special 
financings need to pass the parliament, be it at their implementation, their modification, or their 
repeal. This means that the executive has scarcely any direct and immediate influence on the part 
of earmarked revenues.75 
The second case where the parliament endogenously manipulates the earmarked share builds 
on the Leviathan argument (Brennan & Buchanan 1978). Imagine that in reality earmarks cause a 
higher efficiency. The parliament, being aware of this causal relationship, introduces new 
earmarked revenues if it detects an inefficient service provision in order to discipline the executive. 
Exploiting data from this world would lead to a negative coefficient. Yet, the negative correlation 
would merely indicate the legislator’s reaction to the executive’s behavior rather than the causal 
relationship between the earmarked revenues and efficiency. As a counterargument, note that from 
the parliament’s point of view, the introduction of a new earmarking restriction only makes sense 
if it essentially increases the part of the thereby assigned expenditures. Accordingly, one would 
observe an active use of earmarking as a disciplining instrument. The data sets this type of 
endogeneity in the naught. The mean variation coefficient of the earmarked revenue share (about 
40%) largely exceeds that of the special financings count (about 14%). Taking the low correlation 
coefficient (about 20%) of the two variables into account indicates that the parliament not only 
seldom adjusts the number of special financings, but also that these alterations hardly find 
expression in higher or lower earmarked revenue shares. As it happens, the variation of the 
earmarked revenue shares seems to come from external (and exogenous) sources such as a higher 
fuel demand (which oftentimes contributes to the street fund) or a hunting boom (whose earnings 
from the licenses usually accumulate in the hunting fund). There is no obvious reason why these 
demand shocks should be correlated with efficiency. 
An endogenous manipulation of earmarks by the parliament might also result in a positive 
estimated coefficient between the earmark share and efficiency. If the parliament introduces a new 
earmark in reaction to sparse financial resources, then one possibly observes a positive correlation 
even if no such causal relationship exists. A domain struggling with too few resources arguably 
operates very productively (i.e. a high input-to-output ratio). Furnishing this domain with a special 
financing would seemingly show a positive causal relationship between earmarks and efficiency, 
                                                 
75 In this regard, also remember the discussion about the externality requirement in section 5.1 to consider an account 
as being earmarked. 
100 
even if it is not there. Here, again, such a misestimation cannot be fully excluded, while the above 
argument also reduces the problem somewhat. Since the parliament seldom introduces or repeals 
a special financing, the major part of the variation of the earmarked revenue share is due to external 
incidents. 
The tax system likewise potentially imposes a misdirection in the form of endogeneity. Oates 
(1985) warns, for instance, that the government might spread its tax sources in order to expand its 
expenditures. That is, in more general terms, the government actively exploits the fiscal illusion in 
order to increase the expenditures while holding the outputs on the same level. By now it is clear 
that this kind of behavior leads to inefficiency. Starting with the tax structure as a factor of fiscal 
illusion, the legal prerequisites from above also apply here. Any alterations of the tax base (referring 
to tax complexity and diversification) as well as of the tax rate (referring to the progressivity) must 
pass the parliament. These checks and balances principally prevent the executive from taking 
advantage of the tax configuration as a form of fiscal illusion. The question remains however, as 
to whether the parliament could instrumentalize the tax law to fight inefficient behavior of the 
executive. If so, one would observe a negative correlation between the number of tax sources, the 
tax complexity, and the progressivity on the one side, and the efficiency on the other side, even if 
the true underlying causal relationship is positive. The empirical literature so far lacks evidence for 
such an instrumentalizing parliamentary strategy. Indeed, the results by Feld & Reulier (2009) 
suggest that the parliament does set the tax structure strategically, namely in reaction to the 
surrounding cantons. Because of the relatively distinct tax competition among the Swiss cantons, 
the parliament has to account for other jurisdictions’ tax rates in order to attract tax payers. 
Admittedly, this competition still leaves some room to bring the tax law into line with other 
strategies, but it severely limits the scope. 
Transfers can likewise trigger the endogeneity problem. The government has a strong incentive 
to seize every centime of grants as a funding source for discretionary slacks (see section 3.3). In 
doing so, higher transfers are automatically associated with an inefficient government even if the 
underlying causal mechanism does not exist (Bischoff et al. 2017). When the federal government 
became aware of the possible misconduct, it reformed the fiscal equalization scheme between the 
central state and the cantons. The new equalization scheme bows out of an output-compensating 
system and builds on the idea of adjusting financial potentials as well as compensating burdens 
(Swiss Federal Council 2001). It is in the very nature of the new equalization scheme to prevent 
the cantonal governments from being able to directly manipulate the incoming grants. At least 
since 2008, the new system ensures a certain externality of the total transfers, to which those of the 
equalization scheme (item 462 HAM2) contributed in 2014 around 13 percent. Another 17 percent 
stemmed from the unswayable shares of the federal tax, of other revenues from the central state 
and of public owned companies (item 460 HAM2). Operating contributions of other entities (item 
463 HAM2) represent the largest part of the transfers  (around 46% in 2014) (Federal Finance 
Administration 2016), which the cantonal governments potentially influence to some part. 
Therefore, the exogeneity of the transfers is mixed and the engendered bias is positive (i.e. an 
overestimation is possible). 
Finally, endogeneity can arise from the debt as a last element of fiscal illusion. The government 
can be tempted to increase the debt in order to increase its discretionary slack (see section 3.4). 
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This behavior would indicate a seemingly negative relationship between the debt and efficiency 
even if there is truly no such causality. However, the debt brake most of the cantons have 
implemented limits the government’s ability to arbitrarily increase the debt. These fiscal rules 
sometimes allow for additional debt in case of economic downturns. At the same time, most of 
them require the amortization of outstanding debt in the medium or long term (Yerly 2013). 
Together, the two principles generate a certain exogeneity of the debt variation. 
The arguments discussed above also somewhat address potential endogeneity stemming from 
unobserved external variables. For instance, if it is convincing that the earmarked revenue share is 
mainly externally driven, then it is immaterial whether the endogeneity would originate from 
reverse causality or unobserved variables. In either case endogeneity is abolished. Surely, it would 
be more convenient to have a persuasive instrument at hand which captures the endogenous part 
of the variables at stake. But to date, no method has been developed that could deal with 
endogeneity of environmental variables by incorporating instruments. 
7.4. Environmental variables 
Although chapter 3 pointed to the importance of certain revenue characteristics to explain the 
efficiency of the public service provision, other variables might be equally important. Holding these 
variables fixed is necessary in order to interpret the coefficients of the revenue characteristics as 
causal effects rather than sheer correlations (for a broader discussion of endogeneity see section 
7.3). This section thus aims to identify the relevant control variables, to review previous findings 
in the literature with respect to the effect of these variables, and to give an overview of their 
manifestation in the Swiss cantons. Table 19 lists variables with the descriptive statistics and the 
source. As the bottom of the table states, the panel is unbalanced, which obviously impacts the 
variables’ moments as well as their minimum and maximum values. 
Table 19 – Descriptive statistics of the environmental variables 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum Data source a 
Nom. GDP per capita (in 1’000 CHF) 62.311 20.615 36.196 163.457 BAK Basel Economics 
Population density (1’000 inh. per km2) 0.326 0.509 0.032 5.107 federal statistical office 
Fragmentation (1’000 inh. per municipality) 4.139 5.440 0.829 63.319 federal statistical office 
Foreigners (in percent of total inhabitants) 18.685 6.920 7.832 40.984 federal statistical office 
Referendum (mark from 1 [hard] to 6 [easy]) 3.870 0.960 1.000 6.000 mainly federal statistical office 
Initiative (mark from 1 [hard] to 6 [easy]) 4.692 1.138 2.333 6.000 mainly federal statistical office 
Voter turnout (in percent) 46.188 7.056 27.431 69.262 federal statistical office 
Bourgeois parties in executive (in percent) 42.572 22.027 0.000 100.000 federal statistical office 
National street length (in meters per km2) 54.500 30.337 0.000 256.272 federal statistical office 
a All data are subject to own calculations based on the data source indicated in the last column 
Notes: Without missing values there should be 390 observations (26 cantons and 15 years); the true N = 301; missing cantons 
(and years) are BS (if year < 2013), VD (all years), TG (all years), LU (all years), GR (all years), GL (all years), GE (2014); the N 
can be slightly smaller in some regressions in section 7.5 due to excluded outliers. 
The theoretical argument connecting the GDP per capita to the explaining variables relates to 
the progressivity of the tax system (Oates 1985). As argued in section 3.4, according to the fiscal 
illusion theory people err in perceiving the true marginal tax bill if the increase stems from a larger 
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income rather than a rise of the tax rate. Accordingly, only an increase in income paired with a 
progressive tax system negatively affects efficiency. To approach the respective effect, the 
estimation equation has to include an interaction term of the progressivity variable and income. 
The parameter of interest is the marginal effect of the income. Presumably due to the deficiency 
of an adequate elasticity measure, the empirical research disregarded the interaction term so far and 
only focused on the income alone (Dollery & Worthington 1996).76 Like other studies, this analysis 
lacks comprehensive panel data on income and has to draw on the GDP instead. When introducing 
the interaction term, the GDP usefully has to be in nominal terms, because the cantons compensate 
the cold progression through an adjustment of the tax rate (Eidgenössische Steuerverwaltung 
2015). Recent studies repeatedly found a positive income or GDP elasticity with respect to 
government expenditures (Mitias & Turnbull 2001; Deller & Maher 2005). Papers on efficiency 
often use the GDP as an output rather than as an explaining variable (e.g. Adam et al., 2008). 
Indeed, by operationalizing the concept with the income variable, De Borger & Kerstens (1996), 
Widmer & Zweifel (2012) and Seifert & Nieswand (2014) report a negative effect on efficiency. 
Across all observations, the nominal GDP averages 62’311 Swiss Francs per capita. The smallest 
value in the sample (35’196 CHF per capita) comes from the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden in 
2000, whereas the canton of Basel Stadt tops the list (163’457 CHF per capita) in 2014. Given that 
the values are in nominal terms, a within comparison has little meaning. Based on the full sample 
(i.e. N=390), the Canton of Geneva has the highest mean value over the years (32’139 CHF per 
capita) followed by Basel Stadt (26’024 CHF per capita) and Vaud (10’641 CHF per capita). On 
the lower end are the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden (1’890 CHF per capita), Schwyz (2’178 
CHF per capita) and Appenzell Ausserrhoden (2’681 CHF per capita). Ergo, the between-variation 
is considerable. 
The population density approximates the extent of the urbanity or rurality of a canton. Cities 
potentially benefit from agglomeration economies such that a higher density leads to higher 
efficiency. At the same time, cities might bear greater burdens with respect to social welfare, culture, 
et cetera which hampers an efficient provision of public services. Accordingly, the theory has no 
clear forecast on the influence of population density on efficiency. Empirical findings support the 
former hypothesis in German municipalities (Geys et al. 2010; Bischoff et al. 2017; Kalb 2010b), 
as well as Portuguese (Afonso & Fernandes 2008), and Belgian municipalities (De Borger & 
Kerstens 1996). There is also a contradictory and more recent study about Portuguese 
municipalities, however(Da Cruz & Marques 2014). Finally, no evidence is found for the OECD 
countries (Adam et al. 2011). 
Statistics describe Switzerland as a sparsely densely populated country. The cantonal population 
densities vary from 32 (canton of Uri in 2007) to 5’107 (canton of Basel Stadt in 2014) with an 
average of 326 inhabitants per kilometer squared. Assorting the variable by its values reveals that 
only about half of the cantons change their rank from one year to another. This comes from a poor 
within-variation compared to the between-variation. The cantons of Nidwalden, Schwyz, Fribourg, 
and Bern are clustered round the median of about 200 inhabitants per kilometer squared. 
                                                 
76 Under careful consideration of the theory, regressing the log-expenditures on the log-income only tests Wagner’s 
Law, that is whether the income elasticity is larger than unity (Rodden 2003). Concluding the existence of a fiscal 
illusion from a high elasticity is premature. 
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The institutional fragmentation divides the cantonal inhabitants by the number of municipalities 
within the canton. It reveals the possible situation that a highly fragmented canton diversifies the 
central burden among different geographical areas, thus granting relief to the canton from costly 
interventions (see Grossman et al. (1999) for a similar argument for U.S. cities). This argument 
associates a higher fragmentation with an efficient canton. On the contrary, including many 
different municipalities also means a rag rug of different rules, systems et cetera, which complicates 
cantonal tasks (Kellermann 2007). The estimates the literature provides are not directly adaptable 
to the present case. Grossman et al. (1999) reports a positive effect of an equally distributed 
population among cities on the efficiency. Note though, that even a highly fragmented canton can 
still be focused on one center. Kirchgässner et al. (2005) find no influence of the fragmentation on 
the cantonal economic growth. Here again, the result does not automatically translate into an effect 
on efficiency. 
A view on cantonal data shows a highly fragmented country with a decreasing trend; decreasing 
means a declining fragmentation and an ascending value of the variable. Unsurprisingly, the top 
cantons are the small ones with big cities; this is most importantly Basel Stadt with a very low 
fragmentation with 63’319 inhabitants per municipality in 2013 (Basel Stadt’s data before 2013 are 
not part of the sample). On the other end the canton of Jura has a pronounced fragmentation with 
only 828 inhabitants per municipality in 2000. The canton of St. Gallen represents about the mean 
with approximately 6000 inhabitants per municipality.  
The proportion of foreigners in a canton might become important if this group of people has a 
different perception of the price of public services (see section 3.4). Predicting the direction of the 
effect is difficult, as the resulting demand for public services can be larger or smaller compared to 
the average population. Some studies mention the possibility of including this factor as a further 
demographic control variable (e.g. Bönisch et al., 2011) without discussing the influence in detail 
and without actually estimating their effect. 
The cantonal differences of the percentage of foreigners are marked and range from 7.8 percent 
in Uri (2001) to 41.0 percent in Geneva (2014). The average value is 18.68 percent with an 
increasing trend. Naturally, the geography of the area has a strong influence, which finds expression 
in higher percentages of foreigners in border cantons; after Geneva, these are notably Basel Stadt 
with 35.02% and Ticino with 27.91%, each in 2014. In general, francophone-dominated and urban 
cantons rank among the more popular destinations and they have accordingly higher proportions. 
If there are low obstacles to participation in the democratic process, citizens face a stronger 
incentive to be better informed and to exercise their control function (Widmer & Zweifel 2012; 
Geys et al. 2010). Borge et al. (2008) argue that citizens who participate frequently in polls monitor 
politicians more intensively which brings about a higher level of efficiency. These obstacles are 
often operationalized using the index for financial initiatives and referenda as proposed by Frey & 
Stutzer (2000). Analyzing the Swiss cantons from 2000 to 2004, Widmer & Zweifel (2012) detect 
a negative effect on efficiency, which contradicts the theory. 
By construction, the two indices can take values between six (low barrier) and one (high barrier) 
whereas only the referendum-index yields observations over its entire range (1: Geneva in 2013; 6: 
Schwyz and Appenzell Ausserrhoden, both over the entire time span). To launch an initiative, the 
index assigns the highest obstacles to the canton of Bern (2000-2007) and the best mark to the 
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canton of Appenzell Ausserrhoden in 2001. The two measures correlate by 55 percent, whereas 
both have a similar standard deviation. 
While the possibility of an initiative or a referendum incentivizes contributing to the political 
process, the voter turnout can also be measured directly, using data from national ballots. The 
expected effect is the same. Indeed, Borge et al. (2008), Geys et al. (2010), as well as Adam et al. 
(2011) find some evidence for a positive effect of voter turnout on efficiency. 
At 41.83 percent, the distance from the lowest (Valais in 2003, 27.43%) to the highest 
(Schaffhausen, 2014, 69.26%) voter turnout reaches almost half of a cantonal electorate. The within 
(standard deviation 3.89) and the between variation (standard deviation 4.54) balance almost, which 
is a rare feature amongst the variables discussed here. The varying nationwide attractiveness of 
federal ballots is one reason why the within variation nearly approaches the between variation. In 
consequence, there is no trend from or towards a higher voter turnout. 
Although the idea is nearly only based on intuition and not on a detailed theory, several studies 
assess the effect of political party affiliation on efficiency. The typical argument is that left-wing 
parties are less sensitive with respect to public expenditures. More precisely, the socialist ideology 
tends towards supporting wage claims of worker unions, which increases the costs (Brunner & 
Squires 2013). Also, their preference for public services tends to impede advocating for hard budget 
constraints (Borge et al. 2008). Kalb (2010b) objects to the latter point by rectifying that higher 
public expenditures do not automatically lead to a lower efficiency. Nevertheless, his results 
support the purported lower efficiency of left-wing parties. Also Borge et al. (2008) and Adam et 
al. (2011) find a – however not very robust – relationship between socialist parties and inefficiency. 
On the contrary, results published by Boetti et al. (2012) tie inefficient governing to bourgeois 
parties. The operationalization used here leans on the share of bourgeois parties in the executive.77 
The statistics show that both extremes exist in the cantons. While two cantons (Appenzell 
Innerrhoden and Jura in multiple years) have no bourgeois representative among their ministers, 
the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden’s executive consisted exclusively of bourgeois party members 
in three consecutive years (2003 – 2005). The standard deviation of 22.03 is mainly driven by 
between-canton variation; the between standard deviation reaches 19.52 in contrast to the within 
standard deviation of only 1.47. The composition of the governing council is thus stable without 
any trend. 
When it comes to specific cantonal tasks, it is useful to account for unique contextual factors. 
The construction and maintenance of roads is a task that is distributed among all state layers. Each 
layer, i.e. the municipal, the cantonal and the federal level, assumes a partial responsibility over the 
road network. While municipal roads cover only a limited area, cantonal and national roads connect 
larger regions. That is, national and cantonal roads substitute each other to some extent (Koch & 
Forster 2010). Therefore, if there is a long national road system within a canton, the cantonal road 
system has to absorb less of the heavy traffic and the cantonal expenditures per road kilometer 
shrink. The length of the national roads is measured in meters per kilometer squared of cantonal 
area. 
                                                 
77 The following parties are considered bourgeois: FDP.Die Liberalen, Liberale Partei Schweiz (until their amalgamation 
with the FDP in 2008), Schweizer Demokraten, Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei Schweiz, Schweizerische Volkspartei, Lega dei 
Ticinesi. 
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A surprising fact, when looking at the statistics of the national road length per canton is the 
minimum (0 meter per km2). The two semi-cantons Appenzell Innerrhoden and Ausserrhoden 
manage their road network only with their municipalities; no federal road crosses through the two 
cantons. It is again the canton of Basel Stadt that figures on the top of the list with 256 road meters 
per square kilometer of cantonal area. Expectedly, the variable hardly varies within cantons 
(standard deviation within is 4.00 vs. 30.18 between). However, there is an increasing trend of 
building up the national road network. 
7.5. Results 
This section contrasts the regression coefficients of the two frameworks. Naturally, the question 
arises as to which results to trust more when they contradict each other. The discussion in section 
6.5 on the efficiency estimates provides a clue. Particularly, if a low lambda value (i.e. a low signal-
to-noise ratio) puts the DEA results into question, the doubt translates automatically into the 
second stage, i.e. the regression. The lambda’s impact is less clear in the case of the SFA approach. 
The primary goal is to estimate the frontier and the estimation of the environmental coefficients 
relies on the stochastic properties of the estimated frontier (i.e. on the estimated variances of 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡). The efficiency itself accrues after the frontier estimation, that is, after the environmental 
variable took effect on the frontier. Consequently, if the coefficients’ standard errors are small 
enough to reject the null hypothesis, the results might still be valid even with a low variation of the 
efficiency. Clearly, if both frameworks, i.e. the one-step and the two-step approach, produce 
coefficients with the same directions, this can be considered strong evidence that the respective 
relationship is indeed present in reality. 
In order to give the regression on the DEA scores a meaning, Simar & Wilson (2007) assume 
that the support of inputs is independent of the environmental variables (see section 7.1). This 
separability condition impacts the interpretation of the coefficients associated with the 
environmental variables. It means that the only channel through which the environment affects the 
production process is the distribution of the efficiency scores (Bădin et al. 2014). Such an 
interpretation is utterly comparable to the environmental factors in the SFA framework, where the 
inefficiency follows by assumption an independent distribution. Thus, SFA also sees the only 
possibility in how the environmental variables cause the production process through the 
distribution of the inefficiency. In this aspect, the coefficients of the two frameworks measure the 
same effect. 
The comparability of the SFA and DEA results becomes trickier when it comes to the very 
coefficients. Coefficients stemming from the quasi fixed effects algorithm can be interpreted as 
such without any more ado; of course, the interaction terms need a special treatment too. On the 
contrary and as briefly mentioned in section 7.2, the environmental variables in the SFA framework 
link to the inefficiency in a highly non-linear fashion. In fact, the way the variables enter the model 
produces a specific marginal effect for every observation depending on the values of all the other 
environmental variables (Wang 2002). In other words, the otherwise familiar ceteris paribus 
interpretation does not hold in the SFA. Even at the sample mean, marginal effects only have a 
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limited validity. Graphical illustrations provide remedy here. A plot of the marginal effects against 
the relevant counter-variable proves much more insightful than simple considering coefficient 
estimates (Kumbhakar et al. 2015). 
The different roles of efficiency and inefficiency is the final nuisance in comparing the 
coefficients of the two methods. As alluded repeatedly before, the coefficients stemming from the 
SFA approach measure the effect that environmental variables have on inefficiency. On the 
contrary, the coefficients of the quasi fixed effect algorithm indicate the environmental variables’ 
effect on efficiency. Qualitatively, the coefficients can be interpreted simply vice versa. 
Quantitatively, a comparison of the coefficients is difficult. To facilitate the graphical 
interpretation, the illustrations provide marginal effects on efficiency for both, the one-step and 
the two-step approach.78 Unfortunately, the formula to compute the marginal effects on efficiency 
can lead to missing values, something which particularly appears with the estimates of the 
transportation domain. Therefore, the respective graphs show marginal effects on inefficiency 
nevertheless. For the sake of coherence, the tables always show marginal effects on inefficiency as 
proposed by Wang (2002). 
  
                                                 
78 Wang (2002) only provides the formula to estimate the marginal effects of the environmental variables on 
inefficiency. To make the results of the SFA approach more comparable to the two-step approach, appendix A. 3 
develops the marginal effect on efficiency. 
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Table 20 – Influence of the revenue characteristics on efficiency 
 Culture Transportation Culture Transportation Transportation 
Delta coefficients of 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 = 𝑒𝑒𝜹𝜹′𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   n.a. n.a.  
[A] Expenditures through special 
financings (in % of total expenditures) 
0.017 (0.068) 0.020 (0.018) 0.002* (0.001) 4.00E-04* 
(0.000) 
 
[B] Volume of special financings (in % of 
balance sheet’s total) 
0.515 (0.890) 0.349* (0.190) 0.034 (0.039) 0.001 (0.003)  
 Interaction [A]x[B] 0.004 (0.032) -0.003 (0.005) -0.002** (0.001) 1.89E-04*** 
(0.000) 
 
[C] Tax progressivity (curvature 
parameter) 
4.392*** (1.058) 0.856 (1.166) 0.004 (0.038) -0.013 (0.021) -1.195 (1.836) 
[D] GDP per capita (in 1’000 CHF) 0.502*** (0.179) 0.029 (0.080) -0.002 (0.004) -0.004** (0.002) -0.047 (0.132) 
 Interaction [C]x[D] -0.057*** (0.02) -0.025 (0.032) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.022 (0.032) 
Tax complexity (normalized HHI) 0.043 (0.055) -0.021 (0.077) -0.002 (0.002) 2.57E-04 (0.001) -0.143** (0.063) 
Tax diversification (no. of tax sources) -2.530** (0.997) 0.815** (0.345) 0.062** (0.022) -0.013 (0.012) -0.102 (1.058) 
Pseudo-earmarked transfers (in % of 
total transfers) 
   -4.71E-04 
(0.000) 
-0.091*** (0.03) 
Transfers (in % of total revenues) -0.031** (0.015) 0.012 (0.027) -0.001 (0.001) 0.008** (0.003) -0.629*** (0.18) 
Gross debt per capita (in 1’000 CHF) 0.502* (0.276) 0.264*** (0.086) 0.002 (0.005) -0.599** (0.294) 0.006*** (0.002) 
Population density (1’000 inh. per km2) 20.401* (12.098) 1.327 (7.142) 0.254 (0.462) -0.013 (0.014) 0.148 (3.185) 
Referendum (1 [hard] to 6 [easy]) 0.022 (1.149) -1.311 (0.927) -0.048* (0.028) 0.033 (0.037) -0.889 (0.732) 
Initiative (1 [hard] to 6 [easy]) 1.300* (0.785) 0.621 (0.565) -0.139** (0.057) 0.001** (0.000) 2.143 (2.889) 
Bourgeois parties in executive (in %) -0.051 (0.054) 0.029 (0.020) -0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.022) 0.022 (0.018) 
Fragmentation (1’000 inh. per 
municipality) 
-1.658* (0.967) -0.005 (0.389) 0.008 (0.039) -0.002** (0.001) -0.141 (0 394) 
Voter turnout (in %) 0.035 (0.023) 0.047 (0.074) 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.005) 0.029 (0.057) 
Foreigners (in % of total inhabitants) -1.194** (0.511) -0.066 (0.098) 0.028*** (0.009) -0.001 (0.001) -0.366 (0 485) 
National street length (in km)  0.009 (0.018)  4.00E-04* 
(0.000) 
0.019 (0.013) 
Intercept (𝛿𝛿0) -15.61*** (5.95) -13.22** (6.106)   7.056 (33.589) 
Marginal effects on (in)efficiency      
Expenditures special financings 0.000 (n.a.) 0.000 (n.a.) -0.000 (0.001) 0.001*** (0.000)  
GDP per capita -0.012 (n.a.) -0.015 (n.a.) 0.000 (0.002) 0.001*** (0.001) 0.010 (n.a.) 
Tax complexity 0.001 (n.a.) -0.002 (n.a.) n.a. n.a. -0.012 (n.a.) 
Tax diversification -0.084 (n.a.) 0.089 (n.a.) n.a. n.a. -0.009 (n.a.) 
Pseudo-earmarked transfer share     0.019 (n.a.) 
Transfers -0.001 (n.a.) 0.001 (n.a.) n.a. n.a. 0.051 (n.a.) 
Gross debt per capita 0.017 (n.a.) 0.029 (n.a.) n.a. n.a. 0.033 (n.a.) 
N 214 298 214 298 298 
Model TRE TRE 
Quasi-FE 
algorithm 
Quasi-FE 
algorithm TRE 
Notes: * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1% 
TRE models: Delta coefficients with robust standard errors clustered at cantonal level; the dependent variable is the logged 
personnel expenditures (full output reported in Table 32 in the appendix); a positive delta coefficient indicates a positive (negative) 
effect on inefficiency (efficiency); marginal effects reported as means without significance tests 
Quasi FE models: Coefficients with bootstrap-based standard errors in parentheses (Simar & Wilson 2007); the dependent 
variable is the DEA technical efficiency score with a contemporaneous reference set (i.e. year-by-year DEA); individual dummies 
included but not reported; marginal effects at mean of interaction variable 
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Figure 16 – Marginal effects of expenditures through special financings 
 Panel: Culture 
 
 Panel: Transportation 
 
 
Notes: Negative values on the abscissa indicate indebted special financings; illustrations only cover range of sample 
Source: Own illustration 
As explained earlier (see section 5.4), the main text focusses the results of the two domains 
culture and transportation.79 The upper part of Table 20 lists the pure coefficients of the 
environmental variables. The lower part shows the marginal effects of the revenue characteristics 
among the environmental variables (see Table 32 in the appendix for coefficients of distance 
                                                 
79 The remaining results follow in Table 31 and Table 32 in the appendix. 
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function). Note that no standard errors and therefore no significance tests are estimated for the 
SFA marginal effects. Thus, the absence of stars is no indicator of an insignificant effect. Column-
wise, the first, second, and fifth estimates rest upon the SFA approach, while column three and 
four show the results of the quasi-FE algorithm. 
Looking at the expenditures through and the volume of special financings, the four models 
appear initially sobering. The two variables as well as their interaction term are always insignificant 
in the SFA case.80 The quasi-FE algorithm only provides significant coefficients for the 
interactions. Focusing on the marginal effect, though, proves that it is worth digging deeper. 
According to the culture panel in Figure 16, the expenditures through special financings affect 
efficiency differently depending on the volume of special financings. The better funded the special 
financing, the more intense the effect. The DEA approach suggests a significant and negative effect 
for special financings that constitute more than 2% of the balance sheet. The illustration of the 
marginal effect stemming from the SFA approach provides further evidence for this finding. It 
seems that debate prevention effectively plays a role in this domain, particularly if the special 
financing is well-funded.81 
On the contrary, the results of the transportation domain point in the opposite direction. In 
fact, the marginal effect even changes its sign over the range of the volumes (in both the one-step 
and the two-step approach). For poorly-funded special financings the marginal effect is negative 
and increases constantly until it becomes significantly positive for special financings that make up 
a material part of the balance sheet. The quasi-FE results work well for a quantitative interpretation: 
When a canton stores 10% of its balance sheet in special financings for the transportation, it 
provides its service with 0.2 percentage points less inputs (personnel costs, etc.) if it increases the 
expenditure share through special financings by one percentage point.82 Again, the SFA support 
these findings (note that the one-step graph of the transportation panel shows the marginal effect 
on the inefficiency).  
The positive effect of the expenditures through special financings on efficiency in the 
transportation domain contradicts the theoretical expectation. Finding possible explanations 
requires some background knowledge about the concrete special financings in these domains. In 
transportation, most cantons uphold special financings to construct and maintain roads. This 
domain attracts considerably high political attention because there is a clear link between the taxed 
good (i.e. the vehicle, for instance) and the benefitting good (i.e. the roads) (Brennan & Buchanan 
1978). Given this link and the relatively precise demarcation of the public service (and therefore 
those who pay and those who do not), the lobbying groups can easily organize themselves and 
monitor the government, whereas the focus lies on the effective assignment of the earmarked 
                                                 
80 When including both—the expenditures through and the volume of special financings—the question of their 
correlation arises. If they are strongly correlated, they impose a multicollinearity problem. Given the correlation 
coefficient in the transportation domain (0.081) and in the cultural domain (0.338) this issue seems negligible. 
81 Likewise, the domain of social security results in a negative effect, which is only significant for poorly-funded 
special financings though (see Figure 33 in the appendix). 
82 In 2010, the canton of Zug provides a suitable example. The canton stored 166 million Swiss francs in special 
financings earmarked for transportation services, amounting to 9.25% of the balance sheet total. The government 
funded 16.87% (19 million Swiss francs) of its expenditures for transportation through special financings. Increasing 
this share by 1% (1 million CHF) would lead to a 0.2 percentage points reduction of personnel (20’000 CHF), operating 
(31’000 CHF), financial (64’000 CHF), and capital expenditures (110’000 CHF) according to the estimates. 
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revenues for the intended purpose (Lee & Tollison 1991).83 The better funded the special financing, 
the higher the risk of widening the intended purpose and increased political attention. Attention in 
turn might force the government to provide the service efficiently (Davis & Hayes 1993; Dhillon 
& Perroni 2001). If the special financing is poorly funded, there is less risk that the earmarked 
revenue is misused, and this reduces the attention. With the reduced attention, the debate 
prevention theory comes into play again. For the domain of culture, sport and leisure, the dominant 
special financing comes from lottery money. Since there is no organized lobbying group that 
monitors the usage of these funds, the debate prevention theory takes effect immediately. The 
better funded the special financing is, the less debate takes place and the more heedlessly the 
government dispenses the money. Naturally, this negligence translates into a lower efficiency. 
A further explanation for the specific pattern of the results are the characteristics of the 
benefiting goods. For culture, the special financings fund several small transient projects while the 
earmarked revenue for transportation purposes finances the roads. In the latter case, special 
financings guarantee a constant maintenance of tangible assets which prevents their complete 
deterioration. According to infra suisse (2017), the accumulated expenditures are higher if the value 
retention of roads is postponed than if the roads are constantly maintained. Constant maintenance 
is less guaranteed for poorly-funded special financings, which possibly explains the different effects 
earmarking has depending on the financial endowment. 
Given these findings, it is interesting to test the effect earmarked transfers have on efficiency. 
The last model of Table 20 replaces the expenditures through special financings by the pseudo-
earmarked transfers’ share of total transfers and thereby also drops the interaction term with the 
volume of special financings. The respective graph in Figure 16 reveals marginal effects that follow 
a mounting trend, suggesting an increasing positive (negative) effect of earmarked transfers on 
inefficiency (efficiency). Note that the model controls for the transfers’ fraction of the total 
revenue. Thus, for earmarked transfers, the refined fiscal illusion theory developed by Wyckoff 
(1990) does not apply to the transportation domain, which, initially, contradicts the findings of 
earmarked revenue in general. However, reconsider the argument of the positive effect of 
earmarked revenue on efficiency: Cantonal interest groups form due to the strong link between the 
tax their members pay (for their vehicles for instance) and the good they consume (roads). These 
interest groups then monitor the government. Now, earmarked transfers come mainly from the 
national government where the payer circle is broader. In turn, the cantonal interest group has less 
incentive to inform themselves about the transfers as they pay only a small part of it and because 
the free-riding problem becomes more severe (Dhillon & Perroni 2001). In other words, they 
cherish the fiscal illusion and they struggle to monitor the cantonal government properly. The lack 
of proper monitoring then allows the latter to branch off some rents.84 
                                                 
83 On June 5, 2016, the voters decided upon an initiative that called for an even narrower usage of the earmarked 
revenues. The initiative failed, but the episode shows that this domain is kept under critical observation. 
84 Anecdotal evidence comes from the heavy vehicle charges (Leistungsabhängige Schwerverkehrsabgabe, LSVA), which 
primarily flows to the central state and is then partly transferred to the cantons. In turn, the cantons ought to use their 
share exclusively for expenses related to road traffic (art. 19(3) SVAG). However, while most cantons established a 
special financing dedicated to roads where they allocate – by law – the revenues of the cantonal vehicle tax, only some 
proceed the same way with the national heavy vehicle charges (Federal Office for Spatial Development 2009). As a 
concrete example take § 35 GSW, in which the canton of Zug lists all revenues for the special financing for roads 
without mentioning the heavy vehicle charges. 
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To summarize the findings of the variable of main interest, the empirical insights partly support 
the debate prevention theory. At the same time, they put the completeness of the theory into 
question, as debate prevention currently does not explicitly predict qualitatively different effects 
depending on the volume of the special financings. To increase the credibility of the results, the 
after next section presents some robustness checks.  
For the effect of the GDP per capita interacted with the tax progressivity, the results are patchy. 
Remember that the theory is directly geared towards to the interaction coefficient, predicting a 
downward sloping curve with an always negative marginal effect. The one-step approach makes it 
difficult to bring the numerical results in line with the theory. The illustrations in Figure 31 and 
Figure 34 show, however, a slightly upward sloping trend with an always positive marginal effect 
of the GDP. For transportation, the effect becomes even significant for highly progressive tax 
systems. The results of the two- and one-step approach are very similar.85 In sum, the data does 
not support the fiscal illusion stemming from progressive taxes. It rather seems that an increasing 
GDP positively affects efficiency under tax regimes with a strong progressivity. One possible 
explanation for this surprising relationship is that expenditures in transportation do not react 
immediately to changes in demand (i.e. through a greater number of vehicles), whereas the latter 
comes hand in hand with a higher GDP. Therefore, a higher GDP is associated with a higher 
efficiency to start with. Why this effect accentuates under a progressive tax system is difficult to 
explain. 
Focusing on tax diversification and complexity, the results provide no evidence for the fiscal 
illusion due to a complex tax system. For both domains, the one-step and the two-step approach 
yield insignificant coefficients. On the contrary and in contradiction to Carroll's (2009) idea, tax 
diversification indeed affects efficiency. While more tax sources lead to more efficient service 
provision for culture, a diversified tax system decreases efficiency in terms of transportation 
services. These results are significant in both approaches. For transportation services, the effect 
is unsurprising given the previous interpretation of the effect the expenditures have on efficiency 
through special financings. The well-organized interest groups who monitor the transportation 
domain struggle to keep an overview if the number of tax sources increases, which allows the 
administration to be less efficient. For culture, where no such organized interest group exists per 
se, the additional tax sources might actually attract the attention of an important entity who could 
then more closely monitor that domain.86 
The variable related to the flypaper effect does not confirm the fiscal illusion. The transfers 
show a significant coefficient only in one case (culture domain estimated with the one-step 
approach); otherwise the estimates are always close to zero. The effects are possibly confounded 
                                                 
85 The remaining state functions provide a rather vague picture. For instance, for the general administration, there also 
seems to be an upward-sloping trend in both approaches. On the contrary but in line with the theory, the domains of 
health, transportation, and national economy show a downward sloping trend, whereas the former two are significant 
in the two-step approach. 
86 Another anecdotal example comes from the entertainment tax of the city of St. Gallen. Until 2008, the city collected 
a tax on event tickets to cover the additional costs of security or waste collection. The organizer acted as an interest 
group pressuring the city to provide its service efficiently. In 2008, the city reformed the tax system and abolished the 
entertainment tax whereby the organized interest group lost its interest in monitoring the public service provision 
(Klingenberg 2007).  
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because of the 2008 regime change regarding transfer payments between the federal state and the 
cantons.  
The fiscal illusion stemming from the debt per capita receives just as little support. Albeit the 
SFA provides significant coefficients with the expected negative effect on efficiency, the two-step 
approach provides the opposite results. 
Turning to the control variables, the effects on efficiency are mostly somewhat more stable and 
intuitive. First and foremost, the population density influences efficiency rather negatively in both 
domains. In the transportation domain, the effect is significant in the two-step approach and has 
the same direction, however without significance, in the one-step case. While the coefficient for 
the culture domain has the same sign and is also significant using the SFA approach, the quasi-FE 
algorithm provides an insignificant positive sign. Intuitively, the negative effect of a dense 
population on efficiency receives clearer support for transportation services than for culture. Here 
it is worth expanding the focus to the remaining government functions (see Table 31 and Table 32 
in the appendix). Taking the regressions where the two models’ coefficients are compliant and with 
partly significant results, the population density’s negative effect repeats. It is particularly striking 
that this is a matter in the domains of health and social security. These government functions can 
be challenging for urban cantons who seem to struggle with an efficient service provision. 
When looking at the institution of Switzerland’s direct democracy, the intuition holds that 
initiatives tend to induce inefficient public service provision in the culture domain. It is imaginable 
that a low threshold for initiatives encourages culture enthusiasts to demand further expenditures 
while the output either simply does not increase enough or is simply difficult to measure; the rather 
low value of the distance function’s R2 speaks in favor of the latter argument (see Table 17). The 
inefficiency effect of the initiatives does not repeat for the remaining government functions. The 
effect of the referendum is ambiguous. In any case it seems reasonable to disentangle the direct 
democracy variable in two separate measures in order to prevent premature conclusions made in 
earlier studies (Widmer & Zweifel 2012). 
The voter turnout has a less clear but similar influence on efficiency as the initiative. The effect 
is significant and negative in case of the transportation domain estimated by the two-step 
approach (with the same sign using the one-step approach). Moreover, the domains of national 
economy and education provide further evidence for a negative effect. Particularly in these three 
domains, people seem to participate more actively in polls favoring more public service even if they 
are provided less efficiently. Counterintuitively, politicians are not urged to manage their domain 
more efficiently because of a higher voter turnout and its stronger monitoring effect (Borge et al. 
2008; Geys et al. 2010). 
The variable measuring the bourgeois party share in the government council provides further 
interesting insights, even if the results for the two main domains are vague. A closer look at the 
remaining functions singles out social security, where the influence is positive and significant in 
both approaches. The fairly high R2 of the distance function in Table 17 refutes the potential 
argument that left-wing governments would approach social security in a broader manner, resulting 
in a lower efficiency measure. If this was the case, the considered inputs would explain the outputs 
insufficiently ending up in a low R2. 
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While fragmentation has a significant and positive effect on efficiency in the transportation 
domain when estimated with the two-step approach, the one-step approach contradicts this 
finding. Social security is the only function with mutually confirming results:  highly significant 
positive effects in both models. Here, the results support the small-is-good hypothesis. 
Finally, the share of foreigners relative to the entire population has a positive influence on 
efficiency in both domains, whereas the results of the culture domain are highly significant in both 
approaches. On the contrary, in the two domains public order and security on one side and social 
security on the other side, the foreign share affects efficiency rather negatively. Intuitively, one 
could argue that, on the one hand, foreigners demand less extravagant cultural goods (e.g. museum 
exhibitions) keeping expenditures on a reasonable level. On the other hand, they induce higher 
costs per output in the domains of public order and security as well as social security. 
7.6. Conditional effects of earmarking on efficiency 
As the previous section revealed, concentrating on the plain coefficient of the expenditures 
through special financings on the efficiency possibly overlooks some potential conditional effects. 
This section therefore interacts the respective variable with different factors that influence the 
marginal effect. To simplify the interpretation, all the estimations are based on the two-step 
approach which yields linear marginal effects by construction. Furthermore, only the estimates with 
significant marginal effects are shown.87 Table 21 lists the estimated coefficients together with the 
marginal effects, while Figure 17 illustrates the latter. Regarding the illustrations, at a first glance 
the always upward-sloping trend stands out. However, this is more by accident as some of the 
unreported models resulted in decreasing (though non-significant) marginal effects. 
The first row of Table 21 indicates the domain followed by the variable with which the 
expenditures through special financings is interacted. The first specification interacts the 
expenditures through special financings with the debt brake. A restrictive debt brake might 
incentivize ministers to generally monitor more accurately and thereby restrain debate prevention. 
If this argumentation were true, the marginal effect of the expenditures through special financings 
on efficiency would, while always remaining negative, approach zero with a more restrictive debt 
brake. Indeed, applied to culture, the marginal effect is (insignificantly) negative for small volumes 
of the special financing and increases along the debt brake axis. However, at a certain point, the 
marginal effect becomes positive and even turns significant for very restrictive debt brakes. In 
combination with the results above, where the effect of expenditures through special financings 
was always negative, this specification provides a further consideration. Even for culture, special 
financings can positively affect efficiency, if the debt brake of a canton is strong enough. 
The remaining models are based on the data of the transportation domain, with the fraction of 
tax revenues as the first interaction variable.88 The idea is that ministers generally monitor their 
                                                 
87 In addition to the reported interaction variables, the debt per capita, the transfers, the initiative index, and the lagged 
budget balance were tested. None of these variables provided a significant marginal effect over their entire scope for 
either domain. 
88 Note that the ceteris paribus interpretation still holds, since the fraction of tax revenue is measured on the cantonal 
level, while the share of expenditures through special financings ties on expenditures at the domain level. 
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colleagues more carefully when the public services are overall funded with taxes that the politicians 
have to sell hard to their voters (compared to transfers, for instance). This means that the 
expectation is that a higher fraction of tax revenues bans debate prevention, i.e. a marginal effect 
that approaches zero from below. As Table 21 reveals, the marginal effect is positive and significant 
at the mean value of the tax revenue fraction. Moreover, the larger the fraction of tax revenues 
becomes, the stronger the marginal effect becomes (see Figure 17). If the tax revenues amount to 
more than 70 percent of the total revenues, an additional percentage point of expenditures through 
special financings decreases the input requirements by more than 0.2 percentage points. Hence, tax 
revenues do indeed restrain debate prevention, but it turns its effect even in the positive scope. 
The next conditioning variable aims for the fractionization within the governing council. If the 
governing council is composed of very few parties, it is likely that there is less monitoring going on 
and thus fractionization stimulates the debate prevention. Again, this idea ought to translate into a 
negative but increasing marginal effect. Indeed, the marginal effect is (insignificantly) negative for 
unity government councils.89 However, the effect turns eventually and becomes significant for 
fractionization values above 60 percent. Note that this does not mean that highly fractionalized 
government councils lead to an efficient public service provision. 
Finally, it is again the political context that motivates the last model. With a similar logic as 
above, the concordance possibly fosters debate prevention, as the governing council feels less 
pressure from the parliament. That is, ministers supposedly monitor less if their party is equally 
represented in the legislative government branch. Given the similarity of the arguments, it comes 
as little surprise that this specification yields comparable results with significant marginal effects 
for concordance values above 40 percent. 
In sum, the three models analyzing the transportation domain provide little further insights. It 
seems that earmarking generally has a positive effect on efficiency for this government function – 
at least as long as the special financing is not in debt. On the contrary, the previously found negative 
effect in the culture domain can be rescued if the canton operates under a restrictive debt brake. 
 
  
                                                 
89 The government council of the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden, composed of seven members of the Christian 
democratic people’s party from 2008 to 2007. 
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Table 21 – Truncated regressions with different interactions 
Domain Culture Transportation Transportation Transportation 
Conditional variable 
Debt brake1 Tax revenue share2 
Fractionization in 
governing council3 Concordance4 
[A] Expenditures through special 
financings (in % of total expenditures) -0.002* (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
[B] Condition variable -0.073*** (0.024) -0.002 (0.002) -0.117 (0.108) -0.175*** (0.061) 
 Interaction [A]x[B] 0.002** (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 
Volume of the special financing (in % of 
balance sheet’s total) -0.041 (0.025) 0.006** (0.003) 0.006** (0.003) 0.007*** (0.002) 
[C] Tax progressivity (curvature 
parameter) -0.020 (0.038) -0.060** (0.026) -0.050* (0.027) -0.043 (0.026) 
[D] GDP per capita (in 1’000 CHF) -0.005 (0.004) -0.004 (0.002) -0.004 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 
 Interaction [C]x[D] 0.001* (0.001) 0.001** (0.000) 0.001** (0.000) 0.001** (0.000) 
Tax complexity (normalized HHI) -0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 
Tax diversification (no. of tax sources) 0.079*** (0.022) -0.002 (0.014) -0.011 (0.014) -0.013 (0.014) 
Transfers (in % of total revenues) -0.001* (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Gross debt per capita (in 1’000 CHF) -0.003 (0.005) 0.006* (0.004) 0.006 (0.004) 0.007* (0.004) 
Population density (1’000 inh. per km2) 0.419 (0.460) -0.594* (0.343) -0.424 (0.340) -0.419 (0.335) 
Referendum (1 [hard] to 6 [easy]) -0.020 (0.026) -0.014 (0.016) -0.017 (0.016) -0.024 (0.016) 
Initiative (1 [hard] to 6 [easy]) -0.144*** (0.057) 0.007 (0.040) 0.006 (0.040) -0.013 (0.041) 
Bourgeois parties in executive (in 
percent) -0.002** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 0.001** (0.001) 0.001** (0.001) 
Fragmentation (1’000 inh. per 
municipality) 0.012 (0.039) 0.014 (0.027) 0.014 (0.028) 0.014 (0.027) 
Voter turnout (in percent) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
Foreigners (in % of total inhabitants) 0.029*** (0.009) -0.006 (0.006) -0.004 (0.006) -0.008 (0.006) 
Marginal effect on inefficiency     
Expenditures special financings 0.000 (0.001) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 
N 214 298 298 298 
Notes: * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%; coefficients with bootstrap-based standard errors in parentheses (Simar & Wilson 2007); 
the dependent variable is the DEA technical efficiency score with a contemporaneous reference set (i.e. year-by-year DEA); 
individual dummies included but not reported; marginal effects at mean of interaction variable 
1 Index proposed by Feld & Kirchgässner (2008): Each of the following elements adds one point to the index: (1) a strong 
connection of budget planning with actual budget execution; (2) strong numerical  constraints; (3) highly effective sanctions in the 
form of automatic tax adjustments. Thus, a high index indicates a restrictive debt brake. 
2 In percent of total revenue 
3 Index proposed by Rae (1967): 𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑧𝑧𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 = 1 − ∑ 𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝=1  where 𝑛𝑛 is the number of parties in the governing council 
and 𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝 the fraction of seats each party occupies in the council. A large number indicates a high fractionization. 
4 Index proposed by Martin (2008): 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 = ∑ 𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝=1  where 𝑝𝑝 includes all parties represented in the governing council 
and 𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝 is their fraction of seats in the parliament. A large number indicates a high congruence between the parties in the 
governing council and in the parliament and hence a high concordance. 
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Figure 17 – Marginal effects of expenditures through special financings with interactions 
 Debt brake Tax revenue share 
 (Domain: Culture)  (Domain: Transportation) 
  
 Fractionization in government council Concordance  
 (Domain: Transportation) (Domain: Transportation) 
  
Source: Own illustration 
7.7. Robustness checks 
The relatively assertive statements above regarding the appropriateness of special financings call 
for some robustness tests. For the sake of limiting the number of reported results, the different 
tests do not recur for both government functions. The focus lies on the transportation domain 
which faces eleven different specifications or estimators to substantiate the earlier claimed effects. 
At the same time, the robustness checks for the culture domain involve two tests. The two 
regressions give an idea of the additional tests, which are not reported. Both, the two-step (models 
(I) through (VII)) and the one-step approach (models (VIII) to (XII)) are taken up again, although, 
with partly different estimators. Since the goal of this section is to test the robustness of the effect 
special financings have on efficiency, the graphs in Figure 18 only illustrate the respective marginal 
effect and leave the other variables aside. 
The first model (I) questions the quasi-fixed effect algorithm and re-estimates the original model 
using the conventional estimator proposed by Simar & Wilson (2007) including individual- and 
time fixed effects in the second step. The DEA efficiency scores of the first step come from an 
intertemporal reference set, which implicitly assumes a fix frontier along the time axis (see 
discussion in section 7.1). The respective graph in Figure 18 basically replicates the marginal effect 
of the base model and supports the earlier estimates. 
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The original estimates withstand the further tests using the two-step approach. Model (II) re-
estimates the base model while dropping the fixed effects in both steps, whereas model (III) drops 
the interaction with the volume of special financings; note that the calculation of marginal effects 
becomes unnecessary without interactions in the two-step approach. In the latter case, the variable 
of interest remains positive with a 90 percent confidence interval above zero. Still without the 
interaction term, model (IV) introduces a first and second lag of the variable of interest in order to 
test for long-term effects. All respective coefficients are positive (on a very low scale though) but 
no longer significant. In order to test the influence of the hilliness, the specification (V) again drops 
the fixed effects and introduces the altitude of the cantonal capital city as a further control variable 
and its interaction with the street length (not reported). Both coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero and the marginal effect of the expenditures through special financings remains 
unchanged. Preventing a misestimation due to an alternating effect with a time lag, model (VI) re-
estimates the baseline model using a five-year moving average of all variables. Still the qualitative 
and quantitative results hardly differ.90 The last two-step model (VII) applies the specification of 
the first robustness test of Model (I) using data from the culture domain. Here also, the marginal 
effect of the variable of interest is the same if the year fixed effects only come into play in the 
second step. However, the estimates of the standard errors are less conservative which yields 
positive marginal effects for poorly-funded (but not indebted) special financings. 
The remaining robustness test is based on the one-step approach, that is, the models follow the 
SFA logic. Model (VIII) re-estimates the base model using the estimator proposed by Battese & 
Coelli (1995), which uses a time trend in the estimation of the frontier instead of fixed effects. In 
addition, the heteroscedasticity draws on the mean of the inefficiency distribution instead of the 
standard error (i.e. 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∽  𝑁𝑁�𝜇𝜇𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝜎𝜎2� and 𝜇𝜇𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑒𝑒𝝋𝝋′𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), and the reported estimates represent 
the 𝜑𝜑-coefficients. As the respective plot in Figure 18 indicates, the marginal effects of the variable 
of interest follow the previously found trend (note that the graph ‘Transportation (VIII)’ shows 
the marginal effect on inefficiency). Applying the same estimator to the culture domain replicates 
the findings of model (VI) where the marginal effect is positive for poorly-funded special 
financings. Using the Battese & Coelli (1995) model, lifts the trend even more, while keeping its 
negative slope. 
Staying within the transportation domain, model (X) expresses the expenditures through special 
financings in per capita terms. Interestingly, this modification renders the other variables highly 
significant, while the implication on the marginal effect turns out to be jejune. While some single 
observations show pronounced marginal effects, most of them are very close to zero. From a 
theoretical point of view, such a fruitless result is satisfying as debate prevention builds on the 
earmarked revenues’ share on the total expenditures rather than on absolute values. Hence, 
earmarking has – in absolute terms – little influence on efficiency. 
To account for the restrictiveness of the Cobb-Douglas specification, model (XI) allows for 
further flexibility of the production function using the translog form. As this specification uses up 
many more estimations, the degrees of freedom shrink while the standard errors typically rise. 
                                                 
90 Even if the results withstand this robustness test, the problem might still be present, since the five-year average 
might be too short. Due to the lack of data, a longer time range becomes increasingly inept. 
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Nevertheless, the marginal effects are by and large unchanged as illustrated in Figure 18. The same 
is true when the base model is re-estimated using the debt brake as an additional variable as in 
model (XII). 
The last model provides little additional insights since the graph illustrating the marginal effects 
is dominated by a few extreme values. The base for these two plots is model (XIII), which replaces 
the expenditures through special financings with their own normalized HHI. The idea behind this 
last estimation is that it might make a difference whether there is one dominant special financing 
or several small ones. As mentioned above, the marginal effect mostly moves around zero. 
In sum, the estimates for the transportation domain are very robust against different 
specifications and methods. As far as the culture is concerned, the base estimate represents the 
upper bound in terms of the negative effect earmarking has on efficiency. Nevertheless, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the larger the special financing, the more pronounced the negative 
effect of earmarking on efficiency. 
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Table 22 – Robustness checks 
Government function Transportation Transportation Transportation Transportation Transportation Transportation Culture Transportation 
Estimation (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)1 (VI) 2 (VII) (VIII) 
[A] Expenditures through special 
financings (in % of total expenditures) -2.61E-04 (0.000) 1.99E-04 (0.000) 3.83E-04* (0.000) 3.83E-04 (0.000) 2.18E-04 (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.001) 3.30E-04 (0.002) 
 Lag (1 year)    1.29E-04 (0.000) -0.009** (0.004)    
 Lag (2 years)    9.08E-05 (0.000)     
[B] Volume of special financings (in % of 
balance sheet’s total) -0.001 (0.003) -0.014*** (0.004) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002)  -0.001 (0.003) 0.153*** (0.038) 0.091*** (0.031) 
 Interaction [A]x[B] 2.01E-04*** (0.00) 3.18E-04*** (0.00)   2.74E-04*** (0.00) 2.31E-04*** (0.00) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.001* (0.001) 
[C] Tax progressivity (curvature parameter) 0.089*** (0.026) 0.048*** (0.015) 0.022 (0.014) 0.015 (0.019) 0.010 (0.018) -0.036* (0.021) -0.001 (0.049) 0.019 (0.115) 
[D] GDP per capita (in 1’000 CHF) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002** (0.001) 3.36E-04 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.007*** (0.002) -0.004 (0.004) -0.009 (0.007) 
 Interaction [C]x[D] -0.001* (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000)   -0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 
Tax complexity (normalized HHI) 0.030 (0.299) 0.002 (0.001) -4.52E-04 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.005** (0.002) -0.008 (0.008) 
Tax diversification (no. of tax sources) -0.030** (0.011) 0.007 (0.005) -0.013 (0.012) -0.020 (0.014) 0.014*** (0.005) 0.025* (0.013) 0.107*** (0.023) -0.037 (0.048) 
Transfers (in % of total revenues) 0.001** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -1.33E-04 (0.000) -3.65E-04 (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.003) 
Gross debt per capita (in 1’000 CHF) -0.013*** (0.003) -0.003* (0.002) 0.008*** (0.003) 0.008** (0.004) 0.003 (0.002) -0.012** (0.005) 0.013** (0.006) 0.059*** (0.022) 
Marginal effects on (in)efficiency         
Expenditures special financings -0.000 0.001*** n.a. n.a. 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001 -0.001 
GDP per capita -0.002 -0.004*** n.a. n.a. -0.005*** 0.000 -0.001 0.002 
Tax complexity n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.005 
Tax diversification n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.022 
Transfers n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.001 
Gross debt per capita n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.035 
𝔼𝔼�[𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡]  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.202*** 
𝜎𝜎�𝑣𝑣  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.051*** 
𝔼𝔼�[𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡]  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.953*** 
Control variables yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Year trend no no no no no no no yes 
Year fixed effects yes (2nd step) no yes (1st step) yes (1st step) no yes (1st step) yes (2nd step) no 
Individual fixed effects yes (2nd step) no yes (2nd step) yes (2nd step) no yes (2nd step) yes (2nd step) no 
N 298 298 298 253 298 195 214 298 
Model 
Simar & Wilson 
(2007) 
Simar & Wilson 
(2007) 
Quasi FE 
algorithm 
Quasi FE 
algorithm 
Simar & Wilson 
(2007) 
Simar & Wilson 
(2007) 
Simar & Wilson 
(2007) 
Battese & Coelli 
(1995) 
Notes: * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%; coefficients with robust standard errors clustered at cantonal level; the dependent variable is the logged personnel expenditures (in the SFA case) or the input oriented 
efficiency score (in the DEA case); a positive coefficient indicates a positive (negative) effect on inefficiency (efficiency) in case of the SFA approach – vice versa signs with the DEA approach; mean marginal 
effects without significance tests in the SFA case; 𝔼𝔼�[𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] is tested against H0: 𝔼𝔼�[𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] = 0; 𝜎𝜎�𝑣𝑣 is tested against H0: 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣 = 0; 𝔼𝔼�[𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] is tested against H0: 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1 
1 Includes altitude and its interaction with national street length as control variables; 2 All variables converted to five year moving averages 
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Table 22 continued – Robustness checks 
Government function Culture Transportation Transportation Transportation Transportation 
Estimation (IX) (X) 3 (XI) (XII) (XIII) 
[A] Expenditures through special 
financings (in % of total expenditures) 0.003 (0.005) -6.405* (3.397) 0.012 (0.009) -0.006 (0.025)  
[B] Volume of special financings (in % of 
balance sheet’s total)  -27.037*** (4.76) 0.080 (0.196) 0.152 (0.514)  
 Interaction [A]x[B]  40.12*** (11.14) -0.001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.006)  
[C] Tax progressivity (curvature 
parameter) -0.016 (0.284) 5.121*** (1.677) 0.450 (0.676) -2.101 (2.004) 2.991 (4.566) 
[D] GDP per capita (in 1’000 CHF) -0.006 (0.004) 1.004*** (0.218) 0.004 (0.048) -0.158 (0.219) 0.378 (0.591) 
 Interaction [C]x[D] 0.359*** (0.126) -0.199*** (0.039) -0.012 (0.011) 0.035 (0.035) -0.100 (0.101) 
Tax complexity (normalized HHI) 0.027*** (0.009) 0.127*** (0.046) -0.148*** (0.051) -0.238** (0.102) -0.297 (0.348) 
Tax diversification (no. of tax sources) -0.005* (0.003) -2.102*** (0.268) -0.813** (0.374) 0.290 (0.536) -1.315* (0.716) 
Transfers (in % of total revenues) -0.002 (0.008) -0.173*** (0.031) -0.026** (0.012) 0.015 (0.019) -0.009 (0.065) 
Gross debt per capita (in 1’000 CHF) -0.046 (0.068) -0.235 (0.239) 0.366*** (0.105) 0.642 (0.537) 0.684 (0.590) 
Debt brake ([0] weak, [3] restrictive) 0.003** (0.001)   0.298 (0.666)  
Normalized HHI of expenditures 
through special financings -0.007 (0.016)    0.086*** (0.022) 
Marginal effects on (in)efficiency      
Expenditures special financings -0.003 0.036 0.000 0.000  
Normalized HHI of expenditures 
through special financings     0.005 
GDP per capita 0.000 -0.024 -0.004 0.011 -0.033 
Tax complexity -0.002 0.003 -0.009 -0.013 -0.016 
Tax diversification -0.041 -0.047 -0.050 0.016 -0.072 
Transfers 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
Gross debt per capita -0.006 -0.005 0.023 0.036 0.037 
𝔼𝔼�[𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡]  0.256*** 0.028*** 0.078*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 
𝜎𝜎�𝑣𝑣  0.010 0.066*** 0.039*** 0.064*** 0.059*** 
𝔼𝔼�[𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡]  2.573 0.429 1.980*** 1.083 1.150*** 
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes 
Year trend yes no no no no 
Year fixed effects no no no no no 
Individual fixed effects no yes yes yes yes 
N 214 298 298 298 170 
Model 
Battese & Coelli 
(1995) TRE TRE TRE TRE 
Specification of distance function Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas translog Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas 
Notes: 3 Expenditures through special financings and volume of special financing measured in per-capita-units 
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Figure 18 – Robustness checks of marginal effects of expenditures through special financings 
 Transportation (I) Transportation (II) 
 
 Transportation (V) Transportation (VI) 
 
 Culture (VII) Transportation (VII) 
 
 Culture (VIII) Transportation (IX) 
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 Transportation (X) Transportation (XI) 
 
 Transportation (XII) 
   
Notes: Negative values on the abscissa indicate indebted special financings; illustrations only cover range of sample 
Source: Own illustration 
7.8. Interim conclusion 
This chapter started with the proposition of an enhanced estimator when explaining DEA 
efficiency scores in a panel data environment. Often, studies with such a data structure run the 
DEA on the entire sample and in this way leave aside a potentially changing production frontier. 
In the second step, these papers usually implement year and individual dummies to account for 
eventual fixed effects (Selim & Bursalıoğlu 2015; Fleishman et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2005). Instead, 
the quasi-fixed effect algorithm first performs the DEA on each year individually and only 
introduces individual dummy variables in the second stage. The Monte Carlo simulations provide 
evidence, that the quasi fixed effect algorithm performs a lot better in terms of accuracy and 
efficiency than the conventional approach. 
Still concerned with methodological issues, the second section introduced heteroscedasticity in 
SFA in order to make the inefficiency dependent on some environmental variables. The third 
section rounded up the methodological part by discussing endogeneity problems. In terms of the 
earmarked revenues, endogeneity should be less problematic since special financings themselves 
are fairly stable and the variations within existing ones are largely driven by external factors that are 
outside the manipulable scope of the cantonal government. Nevertheless, the fourth section 
introduced additional control variables to make the ceteris paribus assumption more consistent. 
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Based on the methodological foundations and the data, the estimations provide partly 
unexpected results. The cultural domain mainly supports the debate prevention theory. In 
particular, well-funded special financings dedicated to cultural public goods enforce the negative 
effect earmarking has on efficiency. At the same time, the results show that the effect of earmarks 
can also turn positive if a canton has a restrictive debt brake. Including the findings of the 
transportation domain suggests an even more differentiated picture. While indebted special 
financings also allow some debate prevention (i.e. earmarking indeed negatively affects efficiency), 
well-funded special financings have the opposite effect. The most plausible explanation for this 
phenomenon are the inherent differences between the two domains. First, in the transportation 
domain the tax-payers and beneficiaries largely cohere (mainly road utilizers), but these two groups 
differ significantly in the culture domain. Second, the correlation between the taxed and the 
benefiting good is only strong in the transportation domain and not in culture. Third, the 
transportation domain has the potential to exclude those who do not pay but this is less the case 
for culture. These differences correspond exactly to those identified in the literature review. The 
public choice veterans predicted a positive effect of earmarking on efficiency if these conditions 
are fulfilled. The debate prevention now also explains why earmarking has a particularly negative 
effect on efficiency when those conditions are absent. 
8. Qualitative Analysis 
After the previous chapters quantitatively tested the debate prevention theory, a deepening 
qualitative approach proves useful to directly examine the hypothesized causal chains. For this 
purpose, this chapter assesses the budgeting process of the canton of Solothurn in 2016 for the 
domains of culture and transportation. Besides adding some empirical evidence, this kind of case 
analysis also identifies further aspects which the theory so far ignores. In order to equip the case 
study with an appropriate methodological foundation, the process-tracing method provides the 
structural frame. Note that applying process-tracing as a main method would be enough for a 
separate thesis. This means that this chapter cannot actually present enough evidence to claim the 
validity of the debate prevention theory. However, looking deeply into a specific case helps set 
aside the quantitative lenses and make better founded claims. 
Probably one of the most theory-challenging insights concerns the point where the actual 
individual budget cuts (and consequently the budget allocation) take place. While the debate 
prevention theory regards the governing council as the dominant allocation authority, the case 
study proposes a different venue. In fact, the governing council actually sets the overall budgetary 
objective, but it does not debate the effective budget allocation. This happens instead in the bilateral 
meetings with the finance department (i.e. the minister and the head of the finance office) and the 
individual spending departments (i.e. the minister and the department secretary), whereas the 
former usually demands specific budget cuts while the latter justifies his financial needs. Still, the 
debate prevention theory holds as far as the finance department asks for less budgetary cuts from 
services funded through special financings, as they have no influence on the budget balance. From 
a theoretical point of view, this means that the spending ministers still have an incentive to increase 
the quality of their dossier in order to protect their budget share. However, it is the finance minister 
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who puts some effort into monitoring the spending ministers in order to achieve the parliamentary 
and the governing council’s objective to balance the budget. 
Apart from that, the process-tracing provides some evidence that the parliament aims to cut the 
transportation budget instead of the cultural budget. Even if both domains are funded with special 
financings, the transportation domain is monitored by an organized interest group that promotes 
an efficient use of resources. At the same time, the culture domain was hardly debated during the 
budgeting procedure. 
8.1. Process-tracing method 
The fundamental difference between the previously applied quantitative approaches and the 
process-tracing method as a member of the qualitative family is the ontological understanding of 
causal relationships. That is, while the quantitative large-n approaches is usually based on the 
regularity assumption (i.e. a regular association between X and Y whose underlying link is 
unobservable), the qualitative small-n process-tracing believes in mechanisms that are open to 
scrutiny (Chalmers 2013). Such a mechanism is not necessarily regular because it can be infrequent. 
At the same time, even if the link is found empirically, “[n]o claims can be made […] about whether 
the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome” (Beach & Pedersen 2013, p.3). Yet, there must 
necessarily exist an X that follows a path linked with Y. As to the second big methodological 
characterization, the process-tracing method resembles the DEA in the sense that both are 
deterministic. As opposed to this, the SFA has a probabilistic ontology and allows a certain causal 
fuzziness by including a stochastic error. 
Process-tracing goes further in imagining a mechanism than simply assuming its existence. In 
fact, the aim is to open the black box as much as possible and to go beyond the mere stringing 
together of variables (Beach & Pedersen 2013). Instead, a mechanism involves entities that engage 
in activities and thereby they actually transmit the causal force from a cause to an outcome. The 
logic behind the mechanism derives from the theory. If the hypothesized mechanism truly exists, 
it should leave observable fingerprints that can be studied empirically. Detecting these fingerprints 
therefore produces some evidence for the causal force between X and Y and consequently for the 
theory. 
Inevitably, the design of the mechanism automatically brings up the question of the level of 
analysis. Some authors see the micro-foundation as the only place where the true mechanisms 
actually take place (George & Bennett 2005). In their view, the analysis should focus on individuals 
in order to truly understand the causal forces. In terms of the debate prevention theory, this claim 
is hardly rejectable since the idea ties on individual utility functions of the ministers. Accordingly, 
the best understanding of the true mechanism surely would result from a micro-level analysis. From 
a more pragmatic viewpoint though, it makes more sense to choose the level of analysis at which, 
at the same time, the mechanism is still observable and the necessary information is available (Beach 
& Pedersen 2013). In the present case this is the actor level in the institutional sense, i.e. the 
government council and the parliament with its commissions. 
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8.2. Empirical fingerprints 
After the previous section briefly introduced process-tracing as a method, the debate prevention 
theory and its conditions identified through the quantitative analysis now translate into an expected 
mechanism with entities (actors) and activities (events) as illustrated in Figure 19. The mechanism 
closely follows the budgeting process introduced earlier (section 4.1). The soft-edge rectangles 
signify actors with their activities in the diamond boxes. The contextual factors appear in hexagons 
and the pentagons denote the outcome of the process. 
Figure 19 – Expected mechanism how earmarking leads to inefficiency 
 
Source: Own illustration 
Before going through the mechanism demonstrating the empirical fingerprints, the question of 
the case selection remains. In light of the fact that the method is information-demanding, there 
must be enough documentation about the selected case. The canton of Solothurn appears to be an 
optimal choice because of its unique public nature of the governing council meetings. To see 
behind the curtain of the executive branch of the government is essential since the hypothesized 
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debate prevention largely takes place there.91 Besides the sessions of the government council, the 
events before and after have their impact on the outcome too and need to be taken into account. 
Accordingly, the entire documentation stems from several meetings, sessions, and interviews as 
listed in Table 23. Besides the event itself, where the statements of the actors are part of the 
information, the related documents also serve as a source. 
Table 23 – Sources for process tracing 
Date Event Actors Documents 
2016/04/27 FICO meeting 
(budgetary target) 
FICO members, finance minister, head of financial 
office, head of internal audit 
financial plan, minutes, 
letter to government 
council 
2016/05/09 government council 
meeting (response to 
budgetary target) 
ministers, state secretary, head of financial office letter to parliament, 
internal budget 
directive 
2016/08/29 interview (budgeting 
process) 
head of financial office, controller of finance 
department 
minutes 
2016/09/06 government council 
meeting (budget 
passage) 
ministers, state secretary, head of financial office financial plan, draft 
budget 
2016/09/14 meeting of FICO 
committee for education 
and culture (budget) 
committee members, finance minister, state 
secretary, head of financial office, controller of 
finance department 
minutes, draft budget 
2016/09/18 meeting of FICO 
committee for building 
and justice (budget) 
committee members, finance minister, state 
secretary, head of financial office, controller of 
finance department 
minutes, draft budget 
2016/10/25 
2016/10/26 
2016/11/23 
FICO meeting (budget) FICO members, ministers, office heads, state 
secretary, department controllers, head of internal 
audit 
draft budget, budget 
supplement, minutes 
of committees, 
financial semester 
report 
2016/11/22 government council 
meeting (comments on 
amendments) 
ministers, state secretary, head of financial office amended draft budget 
2016/12/06 
2016/12/07 
2016/12/14 
parliament (budget) parliament members, ministers, office heads, state 
secretary, department controllers, head of internal 
audit 
enacted budget 
Notes: FICO is the Cantonal Finance Commission; the named actors involve the most relevant ones excluding further 
subordinates 
The first part of the mechanism in Figure 19 refers to step [1.2] of the budgeting process (Table 
1), where the finance commission decides upon the budgetary target based on the financial plan. 92 
Strictly speaking, this first step happens before the hypothesized causal chain starts. The earmarked 
revenue (special financings) only comes into play in the second part (step [1.6]) where the process 
separates into two distinct paths. Remember though, that debate prevention assumes a balanced 
                                                 
91 The choice of the budget year 2017 (planned in 2016) is for solely practical reasons. It was at that time when enough 
data of the quantitative part was available to reasonably classify the information and to ask the right questions when 
meeting with the relevant actors. 
92 In the budgeting process in Table 1, the financial plan corresponds to the 4-year financial blueprint (IAFP, 
Integrierter Aufgaben- und Finanzplan). 
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budget, which the financial plan rarely satisfies. With the balance requirement, the parliamentary 
commission underlines the practical importance of that assumption. In case of the budget 2017, 
the financial plan 2017-2020 foresees for 2017 a loss (deficit) of the financial performance of 47.1 
million Swiss Francs.93 Proceeding from this base, the finance commission decided during their 
meeting on April 27th, 2016 to impose a balance requirement and hence to improve the financial 
result. In their subsequent meeting on May 9th, 2016, the government council started the 
administrative budgeting procedure and at the same time it responded to the parliaments’ budgetary 
target. In their letter, the government council expressed their concern about the strict budget 
requirement and held out for the prospect of a slightly broader budget. 
The administrative budgeting procedure is worth looking at in more detail. According to the 
theoretical mechanism, the government council’s reaction of increased financial pressure differs by 
domain (corresponds to step [1.6] of Table 1). A government function (here the department) which 
benefits mostly from earmarked revenues presumably prevents the debate by hiding behind their 
special financings. In contrast, the other departments depend on the now reduced general fund 
and allocate the remaining resources according to their dossier quality and the monitoring effort of 
the ministers. In line with the descriptive statistics of all its counterparts, the canton of Solothurn’s 
domains with the highest expenditures through special financings in terms of total expenditures 
are culture (52% on average between 2000 and 2014) followed by transportation (51%). It is 
therefore in these two domains where the theory predicts no budget cuts (i.e. path b1). At the same 
time, the other domains supposedly face stronger budgetary restrictions. The result of the 
budgetary debate in the government council is manifested in Figure 20.94  
                                                 
93 The financial performance (Saldo der Erfolgsrechnung) comprises all revenues and expenses of the income statement 
(Erfolgsrechnung) but it excludes the transactions of the statement of capital expenditures (Investitionsrechnung). 
94 Figure 37 in the appendix shows the same graph including the capital expenditures. 
128 
Figure 20 – Budgetary amendments (expenditures) of the Solothurn cantonal budget 2017 
 
Source: Own illustration 
The different lines show the planned expenditures of each department according to the stage 
of the budgetary process. The focus lies on the expenditures instead of the balance because the 
theory stipulates the ministers’ objective to maximize the former. In order to account for the 
different sizes of the departments, the planned expenditures of the financial plan serve as 
reference. 95  
The draft budget column shows the government council’s reaction to the financial pressure (i.e. 
reducing the deficit by 47.1 million Swiss Francs) imposed by the finance commission. Apparently, 
the council decided not to apply the broad-brush approach and reduce anyone’s expenditures by a 
certain percentage point. The Department of Economics was the least powerful in the budget 
debate and lost 1.6 percent of its initial budget. Surprisingly, the Department of the Interior was 
the most successful and increased its budget share by 4.6 percent.96 As expected, both, the 
Department of Building and Justice (+1.7%) – managing the transportation domain – and the 
Department of Education and Culture (+0.3%) slightly increased their share.97 In sum, the 
                                                 
95 The expenditure shares after the financial plan divide as follows: Authorities and State Chancellery (0.9%), 
Department of Building and Justice (12.0%), Department of Education and Culture (21.8%), Department of Finance 
(7.5%), Department of the Interior (45.4%), Department of Economics (11.3%). The courts account for the rest, but 
they follow a different logic and are therefore not part of this analysis. These shares can be interpreted as 𝜆𝜆̅ of the 
theory section. 
96 During the interview, the head of the finance office names the Department of the Interior as an example with a lot 
of cantonal autonomy, which is a precondition to reduce the budget in a fiscally stressful situation (Bühlmann 2016). 
97 For the transportation domain, the head of the finance office sees a relationship between the existence of a special 
financing and higher expenditures. In his view, this effect was much stronger under the previous accounting system 
(HAM1), when the special financing for roads actually had no influence on the fiscal balance. For the cultural domain, 
 94.0
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governing council managed to reduce the loss (deficit) of the financial performance to 8.2 million 
Swiss francs and thereby failed to balance it entirely. 
A deeper empirical assessment of the actual process shows where the numbers come from. The 
official (but non-public) decision of the government council as a result of its meeting on May 9, 
2016 is particularly insightful. The decision takes the form of budgetary directives which state that 
“the departments must develop measures to reduce the budget on the expense side […] within 
their scope” (Government Council of the Canton of Solothurn 2016).98 In other words, the 
government council only decides formally on the budget allocation, whereas the budget cuts 
effectively evolve during dialogues between the finance department and the spending departments. 
Concretely, the finance minister, backed up by the head of the finance office and one of his 
controllers, meet the spending minister who in turn brings his department secretary along. The 
finance delegation then asks the spending minister to reduce the expenditures by a certain amount 
derived from the financial plan, previous budgets, and the most recent financial statement. The 
spending delegation then either complies or it needs to explain why the expected cuts are not 
possible (Bühlmann 2016); according to the head of the finance office, the focus lies on expenditure 
cuts that improve the fiscal balance, which implicitly excludes special financings. These activities 
are found in the debate prevention theory. While the questioning of the financial delegation comes 
rather close to the idea of the monitoring effort (i.e. 𝑒𝑒), the rationalization of the spending 
delegation corresponds to the dossier quality (i.e. 𝑞𝑞). Since these talks are poorly documented and 
not public, it turns out to be challenging to find even more explicit empirical fingerprints to show 
the influence of earmarking. Therefore, Figure 19 does not depict these activities in detail. 
Once the government council submits the draft budget to the parliament, the theory does not 
predict specific amendments to domains without large special financings. These domains are 
supposed to provide their services efficiently since they were already subject to monitoring by the 
other ministers. For the domains of culture and transportation, the further procedure depends on 
the intensity of the link between the taxed and the benefitting good. When the link is strong, the 
parliament supposedly advocates for a well-organized interest group that asks for less inputs (path 
c1 in Figure 19). Since it is the same group that pays and benefits, their aim is to make the specific 
service more efficient. When the link is weak, no such pressure exists as the payers differ from the 
beneficiaries (path c2). In this case, it might even appeal to some parliamentary groups to serve 
their clientele to increase the inputs and thus reduce efficiency. 
In reality, the draft budget first passes by the parliamentary commissions before it arrives at the 
assembly (steps [3.1] – [3.4] of Table 1). Particularly, the finance commission organizes in 
committees following the departmental division to debate the various domains. Accordingly, the 
committee for building and justice treats the transportation domain, while the committee for 
education and culture obviously covers the cultural domain. In the latter, the committee accepted 
the government council’s budgetary proposal for the cultural domain without any discussion in 
their meeting on October 18, 2016. Likewise, in their meeting on September 14, 2016 the 
                                                 
he refuses to give his opinion regarding the efficiency of the Museum Altes Zeughaus (a recent and concrete cultural 
project partly funded with a special financing) which he classifies as a subjective question. Applying the efficiency 
concept there is difficult according to him. 
98 Translated from German by the author. 
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committee for building and justice waved through the budgetary proposals for the transportation 
domain without discussion; upon request, several commission members confirmed their limited 
interest in discussing domains where most of the revenues stem from either earmarked revenues, 
transfers, or charges. This means that the first stage of the parliamentary phase does not entirely 
echo the predictions of the theory. Indeed, they muddled through without encountering critical 
questions, but likewise they did not benefit from additional allowances.   
Subsequently, the different committees carried their pre-discussed parts of the budget in the 
meeting of the plenary finance commission on October 25 and 26, 2016. Suddenly, a previously 
ignored domain now moved into more focus. Several attendees, typically related to the road lobby, 
accused the chief of the road office of gilding the roads. Consequently, they demanded a budget 
reduction (for capital expenditures) of 10 percent, but this did not gain a necessary majority in the 
vote. Still, the culture domain did not spark a debate. This incident shows the increasing pressure 
on the transportation budget in comparison to the funds for the cultural domain. At the end of the 
commission’s debate, the budget foresaw a financial performance surplus of 1.9 million Swiss 
Francs that was mainly caused by higher expected tax revenues. 
Having passed the commissions, the budget reached the assembly (step [3.7] of Table 1), which 
debated the budget in three sessions (December 6, 7 and 14, 2016). Unsurprisingly, the initiated 
discussion about the transportation domain continued heatedly. The transportation minister 
identified the reason for such high emotions during the debate: “There are discussions because we 
have many interest groups as cyclists, the motorized individual transport, the public transport, the 
pedestrian, and people with disabilities.” Likewise, he brought up an objection to the accusation 
that his service is excessive: “The expansions are often based on norms, on discussions with the 
municipalities, and on concessions to the different interest groups” (Parliament’s secretariat of the 
canton of Solothurn 2016, p.920).99 Despite the dedicated debate, the renewed proposal to reduce 
the budget by 10 percent failed. The significantly lower expenditures in the enacted budget of the 
Department of Building and Justice were the result of lower appropriations due to delayed capital 
expenditures for building constructions. The budget reductions were simply an accounting artefact 
and had nothing to do with the predicted cuts in the transportation domain. Apparently, the 
organized interest group acts as a disciplinary factor only if it can achieve its power in the 
parliament. Indeed, Figure 38 (in the appendix) supports this hypothesis as the positive effect of 
the expenditures through special financings on efficiency increases with the share of civic parties 
in the parliament.100 
Note that in the entire process, neither the governing council, nor the parliament or its 
commissions decided on output reductions. In consequence, all reductions of the budget 
automatically translate into efficiency gains. Surely, it is another question as to whether these gains 
are achievable in the execution of the budget. In any case, it puts the administration under pressure 
to reduce the bureaucratic slack if there is any. In addition, the maintenance of the output level 
supports the earlier claim, that the input-oriented efficiency measures are adequate. 
In sum, this search for empirical fingerprints confirming the theorized mechanism does support 
some of the predictions. First of all, the parliament did exert some financial pressure on the 
                                                 
99 Both quotations are translated from German by the author. 
100 The respective estimates are not reported in any table but available upon request. 
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governing council which then triggered the latter to cut the budget. Yet, the mutual appearance of 
these two elements does not mean that the governing council would not have cut the budget to 
the same extent even if the parliament had given the governing council a long leash financially. 
Second, the budget in the domains of transportation and culture increases in a first stage while 
most of the other departments have to accept cuts. There is some evidence, based on a statement 
made by the head of the financial office, that the special financing has an influence on the demands 
for budget cuts. However, ministers with large special financings do not seem to prevent the debate 
because their colleagues are aware of the funds’ fixed allocation, but more because an expenditure 
reduction within special financings is irrelevant for the budget balance.101 Third, the strong 
congruence of the two groups paying in and benefitting from special financings does seem to have 
a disciplining effect on the expenditures. The respective effect only has an influence, however, if 
the group has enough power to prevail in the parliament. 
8.3. Interim conclusion 
Process-tracing as part of the qualitative method family has a completely different ontological 
understanding of the world than the previously applied quantitative approaches. Because of its 
rigorous demand for a mechanism linking X and Y instead of a simple correlation, process-tracing 
can identify necessary clarifications and even gaps in the theory. As an analytical grid, the debate 
prevention theory is translated into a mechanism that should leave empirical fingerprints if it really 
exists. This grid then tests the validity of the theory using the budgeting procedure of the canton 
of Solothurn in 2016. 
Probably one of the most theory-challenging insights concerns the point where the actual 
individual budget cuts (and hence the budget allocation) take place. While the debate prevention 
theory regards the governing council as the dominant allocation authority, the case study proposes 
a different venue. In fact, the governing council actually sets the overall budgetary objective, but it 
does not debate the effective budget allocation. This happens instead in the bilateral meetings with 
the finance department (i.e. the minister and the head of the finance office) and the individual 
spending departments (i.e. the minister and the department secretary), whereas the former usually 
demands specific budget cuts while the latter justifies his financial needs. Still, the debate 
prevention theory holds as far as the finance department asks for less budgetary cuts from services 
funded through special financings, as they have no influence on the budget balance. From a 
theoretical point of view, this means that the spending ministers still have an incentive to increase 
the quality of their dossier in order to protect their budget share. However, it is the finance minister 
who puts some effort into monitoring the spending ministers in order to achieve the parliamentary 
and the governing council’s objective to balance the budget. 
                                                 
101 Nevertheless, in the previous year’s budgetary debate (i.e. 2015), the finance minister requests “not to appropriate 
the entire revenue of the heavy vehicle fee to the special financing for roads but only half of it. The special financing 
has the effect that it ties available equity as soon as the fund becomes positive. In the worst case, we need to trigger 
the deficit brake even if the canton closes with a positive financial result because the special financing ties so many 
resources”  (Parliament’s secretariat of the canton of Solothurn 2015, p.861) (Translated from German by the author). 
This statement shows his discontent about the reduced scope of domains that cannot benefit from that special 
financing. 
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Apart from that, process-tracing provides some evidence that the parliament aims to cut the 
transportation budget instead of the cultural budget. Even if both domains are funded with special 
financings, the transportation domain is monitored by an organized interest group that promotes 
an efficient use of resources. At the same time, the culture domain was hardly debated during the 
budgeting procedure. 
9. General conclusion 
Public finance scholars and practitioners might already have had the feeling that earmarking 
revenues is a widespread practice in the Swiss cantons. But because earmarked funds as a subject 
have successfully snuck past any thorough scientific study, that there is not enough temporal and 
spatial comparable data to make substantiated statements possible. To fill this gap in the 
knowledge, the first step was to set about creating a database that to work with. Establishing a 
database of the Swiss cantons from 2000 to 2014 initially involved a careful definition of the term 
‘earmarked fund’. A fleeting glimpse over the cantonal financial statements is enough to observe 
the heterogeneity among cantons in terms of the interpretation and the utilization of special 
financings and comparable instruments (such as special funds, prefinancings etc.). Accordingly, a 
simple definition based on plain accounts would have missed the target and an identification of the 
relevant characteristics more appropriate. An earmarked fund is considered as such, if the financial 
statement reports it as a stock account that is exclusively funded by externally set earmarked 
revenues and that must be exclusively used for a specific and narrowly predefined purpose.  
The database resulting from this definition revealed that the shares of earmarked revenues 
differed vastly across government functions. On average over all cantons from 2000 to 2015, the 
traffic (24 percent) and culture (35 percent) domain reported the highest shares of expenditures 
through special financings. These two government functions amounted to seven (traffic) and two 
(culture) percent of the total cantonal expenditures. For the accumulated earmarked revenues (i.e. 
special financings), they represented about one percent of the balance sheet on average, but they 
also increased to nearly four percent in some cantons. In a temporal comparison, the expenditures 
funded with special financings remained roughly stable over time. This stagnation is surprising 
given the reform of the fiscal equalization between the central state and the cantons in 2008 which 
was meant to  drastically cut the earmarked part of transfers (Swiss Federal Council 2001). 
Conversely, the volume of special financings related to transportation expanded significantly in 
some cantons after 2008; there was no comparable pattern for special financings containing 
earmarked revenues for cultural expenditures. It seems that the earmarked revenues in some 
cantons exceeded the expenditures in the traffic domain such that the respective special financings 
accumulate more and more appropriated funds. This phenomenon leaves open the question as to 
whether earmarking enhances efficiency – and thus spares financial resources that accumulate in 
special financings – or if earmarking fosters inefficiency. 
A literature review provides little help in predicting whether earmarking has a positive or 
negative effect in terms of efficiency. The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the literature 
is mainly based on the presumed motive of politicians. On the one side, public administration 
scholars  disapprove of earmarking as it prevents the benevolent minister from optimally allocating 
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the budget (Schönenberger 2013). On the other side, public choice proponents focus on the 
controlling function that earmarking can have to restrain selfish politicians (Buchanan 1963). At 
the least, public choice literature works out some conditions under which their arguments in favor 
of earmarking should hold. First, a strong link between the taxed good and the benefiting public 
service or good; second, a significant differentiation from other public goods or services; third, a 
strong homogeneity among payers of the taxed good and the beneficiaries of the good financed by 
the earmarked revenue along with an excludability of those who do not pay (Brazer 1984; Lee & 
Wagner 1991; McCleary 1991). Nonetheless, supporters of earmarking have so far failed to explain 
why it might actually have an opposite effect if these conditions are not fulfilled. This is where the 
debate prevention theory can fill in some of the gap. 
Within the public choice framework, the debate prevention theory is grounded on established 
median voter models with uncertainty and ideological preferences (Persson & Tabellini 2002). 
These models show that even under competition, politicians can extract rents depending on 
transaction cost. Now, debate prevention – referring to the Swiss cantonal government system with 
several equally empowered ministers – claims that the transaction cost is a function of the 
monitoring activities of the other ministers. The ministers in turn have less incentive to monitor 
their colleagues if the latter benefit from earmarked revenues. Since these funds are appropriated 
for a specific domain, the ministers cannot shift the earmarked part of the budget to their 
department even when engaging in extensive monitoring. This means, then, that higher shares of 
earmarked revenues are predicted to diminish efficiency. This mechanism might particularly 
intervene in the Swiss cantonal budgeting process with its rather specific organization of the 
executive branch of government. Yet, also ministers working for a president fight for their part of 
the total budget and the debate prevention potentially also has its effects in such a governing 
system. 
 To test the prediction, two approaches proved successful in the literature. Albeit both use a 
production frontier as a reference to estimate the efficiency of each canton, their underlying 
assumptions are fundamentally different. The Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) specifies a 
functional form which makes it possible to separate efficiency from stochastic noise. Also, the 
method already developed in the spheres of panel data and exploits them accordingly. In contrast, 
the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) forms the production frontier using the observed data 
points and thereby follows a deterministic logic. Even if today’s DEA estimators acknowledge a 
certain noise in the data, their application on panel data leaves room for improvement. The study 
remedies this shortcoming by proposing an algorithm to estimate the effect of environmental 
variables on efficiency with fixed effects. The respective Monte Carlo simulations reveal the 
dominance of the proposed algorithm in terms of accuracy in comparison to conventional 
estimators. 
The empirical test of the debate prevention theory indeed yields significant results – both in a 
statistical and a practical sense. Apparently, the effect that earmarking has on efficiency depends 
not only on the domain under investigation but also on how well the special financings are funded, 
on the restrictiveness of the debt brake, on the share of tax revenues, on the fractionization within 
the government council, and on the concordance between the executive and the legislative branch 
of government. In general, earmarking negatively affects efficiency in the cultural domain whereas 
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the opposite is true for the transportation domain. A possible explanation can be found by 
returning to the public choice literature. With reference to the three criteria for a successful 
implementation of earmarking, the transportation domain meets all of them considerably well. 
When looking at the cultural domain however, the correlation between the lottery (the taxed good) 
and the benefitting service (culture) appears rather weak. Furthermore, many different goods and 
services can be gathered into the category of culture, which makes it difficult to clearly differentiate 
from other goods. Finally, the non-paying beneficiaries of culture are difficult to clearly exclude. 
Based on the estimations and on the results from the qualitative analysis, the following policy 
recommendations impose themselves. Even when politically alluring, the government should 
carefully contemplate before installing a new special financing funded with earmarked revenues. It 
might well be that linking specific taxes to a policy program can enhance their acceptance among 
voters (Baranzini & Carattini 2017). Also, it is undoubtedly tempting to bind future governments 
through earmarked funds (Brett & Keen 2000; Jackson 2013). However, if the designated 
government function fails to meet the above-mentioned criteria, it is very likely that the special 
financing will lead to a waste of taxpayers’ money. It is therefore welcome, that the Swiss 
harmonized accounting standards ask for a legal foundation for every special financing (Conference 
of cantonal finance directors 2008). Since there is considerable autonomy in terms of how cantons 
may implement the HAM2 standards, some cantons consider executive ordinances or 
parliamentary decrees as a sufficient legal foundation. This juridical dodge circumvents the 
necessity of a popular vote, which would set a rather high hurdle for any new special financing. 
In case the three above-mentioned criteria are met, a special financing can initiate a positive 
effect on efficiency. In order to make the mechanism work, the payers must correspond to the 
beneficiaries of the tax and they need a powerful representation in the parliament. Optimally, there 
is a high degree of concordance. That is, the party representation in the parliament resembles the 
one in the executive. Likewise, when the budget is generally more dependent on taxes (instead of 
other revenue sources like third-party contributions or transfers), then earmarking has a more 
positive effect on efficiency. When, however, the criteria do not apply, a strong debt brake can 
potentially offset the mechanism. Hence, besides other positive consequences (Luechinger & 
Schaltegger 2013; Feld et al. 2017), the debt brake favorably affects the debate prevention 
mechanism. 
In addition, these insights on earmarked transfers shed new light on the fiscal equalization 
reform from 2008. Admittedly, the non-earmarked transfers decreased conspicuously in the year 
of the reform, but their share has since gradually increased. Taking into account their significant 
negative influence on efficiency in the transportation domain justifies a reconsideration of the 
system, in which, currently, the federal state collects the taxes (notably the petroleum tax on fuel 
and the heavy vehicle charges) and redistributes them to the cantons. During the recurring debate 
about road pricing, the Swiss Federal Council already considered in 2004 the possibility of repealing 
these taxes and replacing them with differentiated user charges (Swiss Federal Council 2004). Based 
on the results of the previous analysis, a direct cantonal collection of these charges appears 
reasonable. 
Besides the policy implications, this study also provides material for future research based on 
gaps revealed within the existing literature or inherent unsolved shortcomings of this study. 
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Theory-wise, the study limited its scope relatively narrowly to the assessment of technical 
efficiency, while earmarking undoubtedly also affects the budget allocation. Accordingly, the results 
make no statement whatsoever regarding the contingent increase or loss in social welfare due to 
earmarked funds. Moreover, the study proposes one possible mechanism through which 
earmarking might affect efficiency. At the same time, it cannot exclude other channels that could 
potentially lead to the same outcome; one being, for instance, the efficiency gained by focusing on 
the actual provision of public services instead of putting lots of effort into political discussions. 
Future research projects could therefore try to disentangle the hypothesized mechanism and 
integrate a measure that approximates the monitoring activities within the executive government 
branch. Equally, the explanation for the opposing effects in the two government domains could 
be substantiated further. While the three conditions derived from the previous literature are 
reasonable, other reasons seem plausible too. Namely, the two government functions vary widely 
in terms of the dominant type of expenditures. While the cultural domain spends its budget share 
for current expenditures, the transportation function typically invests in roads. Constant 
maintenance of roads is typically cheaper than repairing them once they are in bad shape (Koch & 
Forster 2010). Earmarked funds make the resources available immediately which helps to smooth 
expenses. This might also explain the positive effect found in the transportation domain. Given 
the almost identical effect of earmarks on efficiency in the short-run (Model I) and the long-run 
(Model VI) model, this latter argument appears less pertinent. The same robustness check refutes 
a further skepticism referring to the delay in the production process. When the transportation office 
spends an earmarked Swiss franc in one year, increasing thereby the earmarked share, one can 
hardly measure a longer road in the very same year. Ignoring the other outputs, one might expect 
a lower efficiency together with a higher share of expenditures through special financings. This is 
not the case though and, again, there is apparently no different long- and short-run effect. 
One criticism almost every efficiency study faces concerns the lack of sufficient output 
measures. Particularly in the transportation domain, the unobserved variables might trigger a 
serious bias. Imagine most of the cantons fund their roads mainly through earmarked revenues, 
while the public transportation provision – which is also part of this government function – relies 
on the general fund. Note furthermore that all estimations entirely exclude any measure 
approximating the amount of public transport. If a canton puts more resources into public 
transport, it decreases its share of earmarked funding, while the observed output remains stable. 
Consequently, the efficiency decreases. On the contrary, if a canton spends more for roads funded 
by earmarked revenues, the share of expenditures through special financings rises together with 
the output. If the output increases more than the input, then efficiency improves. Altogether, in 
such a world, earmarking would be positively correlated with efficiency only due to the unobserved 
outputs related to public transportation. The crucial question is, whether cantons fund private and 
public transport differently. In principle, a comparison of the road fund laws with the expenses 
covered by the transportation function indicates that this should not systematically be the case. In 
addition, one would observe exactly the opposite in the cultural domain, which does not seem 
reasonable either. Indeed, there are also certainly unobserved outputs in the cultural domain. But 
no obvious argument suggests that the unobserved rather than the observed outputs are funded 
with earmarked revenues. 
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Digging deeper into the effective mechanisms in the government councils might also involve 
investigating the drivers of special financings, i.e. explaining the varying popularity of earmarks 
among cantons. The newly designed database on special financings could be moved from the left- 
to the right-hand side of the estimation equation providing insights regarding the motivation to 
introduce, adjust, and remove earmarks. A relatively broad theoretical literature already holds 
available a number of hypotheses waiting to be tested. 
While the further revenue features associated with the fiscal illusion theory were not particularly 
responsive in the estimated models, their operationalizations might still prove useful for further 
research. The progressivity of the tax system is worth mentioning explicitly. By fitting a logarithmic 
function into the income-tax-rate-plot the herein used approach copes without micro data and still 
covers a very broad income range. With the discernible variation between cantons and years, the 
variable might likewise be used as dependent variable in a future research project. 
In terms of the interest of the research community, the methodological strand also seems 
promising. In their review of papers related to efficiency analysis, Lampe & Hilgers (2015) highlight 
the phenomenal increase of papers applying DEA and SFA. Given this impressive development, 
the research on how to implement panel data in the two-stage DEA approach definitely needs to 
be pushed forward in order to receive more accurate results. The herein proposed quasi fixed 
effects algorithm presents one possibility. 
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Appendix 
A. 1 Derivations of the mathematical statements related to the debate prevention 
From equation (25), recall minister A’s optimized objective with respect to 𝑒𝑒: (1 − ?̅?𝜂)?̅?𝑔?̅?𝜗𝐴𝐴 �𝜕𝜕Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 Φ(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) + 𝜕𝜕Φ(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞)� = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒   (59) 
The first step is to show that equation (59) has only one solution 𝑒𝑒∗ if ?̅?𝜂 is fixed. For that to be 
the case, the curve on the left-hand side must intersect the curve on the right-hand side once. 
Equation (59)’s left-hand side term in the large brackets is the unweighted marginal benefit of the 
monitoring effort. For simplicity define this term as 
𝑧𝑧 ≡ �
𝜕𝜕Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
Φ(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) + 𝜕𝜕Φ(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞)�  (60) 
Remember the assumption from the text regarding the marginal cost, i.e. 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑒𝑒=0,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
= 0. 
Furthermore, note that, based on equation (60), 𝑧𝑧 > 0 if 𝑒𝑒 = 0. In other words, the left-hand side 
of (59) is positive for 𝑒𝑒 = 0 while the right-hand side is zero. Ergo, to obtain an intersection curve, 
the left-hand side’s derivative must be smaller than the one of the right hand’s side. If this is the 
case, the two curves necessarily intersect at one point as 𝑒𝑒 becomes larger than zero. Unfortunately, 
the imposed assumptions made so far are not sufficient to guarantee a single intersection. 
Mathematically, the necessary condition for one single intersection curve is: (1 − ?̅?𝜂)?̅?𝑔 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
< 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
 ⇔ 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
> 0 > 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒(𝜂𝜂�−1)𝑔𝑔� ∀ 𝑒𝑒 ∈ [0,∞) and ∀ ?̅?𝜂 ∈ [0,1] (61) 
For simplicity assume that 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
> 0. It can be shown that a necessary condition for this 
assumption to hold is a sufficiently large second order derivative of the offensive bargaining power 
𝜕𝜕2Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
. As stated in the text, the positive second order derivative means that marginal effect of 
the monitoring activity on the other minister’s bargaining power decreases. The additional 
assumption simply requires the second derivative of the bargaining power to be sufficiently high, 
which translates into a rapidly shrinking bargaining power of the other ministers rapidly when 
minister A increases his monitoring activities. 
Knowing that equation (59) has only one solution 𝑒𝑒∗ if ?̅?𝜂 is fixed, the next step is to determine 
the dependency of the 𝑒𝑒∗ if 𝜂𝜂 is variable. Put differently, what is the minister’s optimal effort level 
depending on the earmarked share? To answer this question, solve (59) for ?̅?𝜂 and take the first 
derivative with respect to 𝑒𝑒: 
𝜕𝜕𝜂𝜂
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
= − 𝜕𝜕2𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
𝑔𝑔��
𝜕𝜕Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
Φ(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)+𝜕𝜕Φ(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)� −
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
�𝑔𝑔��
𝜕𝜕Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
Φ(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)+𝜕𝜕Φ(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)��2 ∗ 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 < 0  (62) 
The inequality in (62) justifies as follows. The first derivative of 𝑧𝑧 with respect to 𝑒𝑒 is: 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
= 𝜕𝜕2Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
Φ(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) + 2 𝜕𝜕Φ(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
𝜕𝜕Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
+ 𝜕𝜕2Φ(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞)  (63) 
The necessary derivatives of the relative bargaining power Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) and the residual share Φ(𝑒𝑒, 𝑞𝑞) 
are: 
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• 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
= −∑ 𝜕𝜕Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷
1+𝑛𝑛�
> 0 
• 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
= 𝜕𝜕1+𝑛𝑛�−∑ 𝛺𝛺𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)−𝛺𝛺𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞)𝐷𝐷 1+𝑛𝑛�
𝜕𝜕2𝑒𝑒
= −∑ 𝜕𝜕2Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2𝐷𝐷
1+𝑛𝑛�
< 0  
• 𝜕𝜕Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
= 𝜕𝜕 Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞)∑ Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)+Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞)𝐷𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
= − Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞)[∑ Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)+Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞)𝐷𝐷 ]2 ∑ 𝜕𝜕Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷 > 0  
• 𝜕𝜕
2Ψ𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
= 𝜕𝜕 Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞)∑ Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)+Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞)𝐷𝐷
𝜕𝜕2𝑒𝑒
= Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞) �∑ 𝜕𝜕Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷 �2[∑ Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)+Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞)𝐷𝐷 ]3 − Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞) ∑ 𝜕𝜕2Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2𝐷𝐷[∑ Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)+Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞)𝐷𝐷 ]2 ≤≥ 0 
The uncertainty about the fourth derivative necessitates the additional assumption above, i.e.  
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
> 0. To reproduce the signs of the other derivatives, remember the following assumptions: 
• Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞) ∈ [0,1] [absolute defensive bargaining power] 
• Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒) ∈ [0,1] [absolute offensive bargaining power] 
• 𝜕𝜕Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
< 0 [by assumption; see text] 
• 𝜕𝜕
2Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
< 0 [by assumption; see text] 
• 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕(𝑒𝑒,𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
> 0 [by assumption; see text] 
Equation (62) states that a higher monitoring effort comes with a higher earmarked share. Or 
put differently, the higher the earmarked share, the lower the monitoring effort will be.  
For illustrative purposes consider the following calibration: The total budget ?̅?𝑔 = 1 ; the 
offensive bargaining power function Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒) = 11+𝑥𝑥 ; the defensive bargaining power Ω𝐴𝐴(𝑞𝑞) = 0.5; 
there are 𝑛𝑛 = 4 ministers besides minister A in the council; the ministers’ cost function  
𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒) = 1
3
𝑥𝑥3.  
Figure 21 traces the marginal cost, i.e. the left-hand side of equation (59), in the lightly shaded 
transparent surface. Since the marginal cost is independent of the earmarked share 𝜂𝜂, the respective 
function is simply a convex curve in the 𝑒𝑒-𝑧𝑧-plane. The darker shaded opaque surface spans the 
marginal benefit of the monitoring effort, which has a negative slope in the 𝑒𝑒-𝑧𝑧-plane. Thus, the 
two functions chosen for Ω𝐷𝐷(𝑒𝑒) and 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒) meet the requirement imposed in equation (61) and the 
two surfaces intersect only once. As deduced analytically, the marginal benefit of the monitoring 
effort has a negative slope in the 𝜂𝜂-𝑧𝑧-plane. Finally, the interesting perspective is the 𝑒𝑒-𝜂𝜂-plane, 
where the intersection of the two surfaces produce a negatively sloped curve. A decreasing 
intersection curve means that the higher the earmarked share 𝜂𝜂, the lower minister A must set his 
monitoring effort 𝑒𝑒 in order to maximize his objective. 
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Figure 21 – Minister A’s reaction on an increased earmarked share  
 
 
 
  
Source: Own illustration 
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A. 2 Monte Carlo simulation with the quasi fixed effect algorithm 
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed estimation algorithm, some Monte Carlo 
simulations were conducted. They reveal whether the resulting confidence intervals cover the true 
value. In addition, they contrast the quasi fixed effect algorithm with the usually applied 
simultaneous regression. Likewise, because most of the parameters are equal to those set by Simar 
and Wilson (2007), a comparison to their study is straightforward. Nevertheless, since the 
estimator’s behavior depending on the number of individuals and time periods is the focus, the 
simulation does not include different numbers of inputs, outputs, and environmental variables. 
Concretely, the controlled data-generating process produces two inputs, two outputs, and one 
environmental variable. Table 24 presents the formula or distribution imposed to generate the 
respective variable. The last column entails the parameters to be estimated.  
Table 24 – Distributions and parameters used for the data-generating process 
Symbol Meaning Distribution / Formula Parameters 
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 environmental variable 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∽  𝑈𝑈(0,2)  
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 individual fixed effect 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 =  𝑧𝑧1̅,𝑖𝑖 − 1 𝑧𝑧1̅,𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑇𝑇 ∑ 𝑧𝑧1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1   
𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 time fixed effect 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 =   3 ∗ 𝑧𝑧1̅,𝑡𝑡 − 2 𝑧𝑧1̅,𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑁𝑁 ∑ 𝑧𝑧1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1   
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 error term of efficiency 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∽  𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2)  truncated 
 left at  1 − 𝛽𝛽0 − 𝑧𝑧1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽1 − 𝑧𝑧2,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  
 right at 0 − 𝛽𝛽0 − 𝑧𝑧1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽1 − 𝑧𝑧2,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 = 0.2; 𝛽𝛽0 = 0.2; 𝛽𝛽1 = 0.2  
𝛽𝛽2 = 0.2 
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 input efficiency 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝑧𝑧1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽1 + 𝑧𝑧2,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 outputs 𝑥𝑥(1,2)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∽  𝑈𝑈(6,16)  
𝑢𝑢 weight of first input 𝑢𝑢 ∽  𝑈𝑈(0,1)  
𝑥𝑥(1)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 first input 𝑦𝑦(1)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑢𝑢𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡�𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡3 4⁄ + 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡3 4⁄ �  
𝑥𝑥(2)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 second input 𝑦𝑦(2)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝑢𝑢)𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡�𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡3 4⁄ + 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡3 4⁄ �  
Notes: Simulations were conducted using Stata with 1000 replications each time 
Source: Own composition inspired by Simar and Wilson (2007) 
The environmental variable 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 follows a uniform distribution with the boundaries zero and 
two. It thereupon affects the value of the fixed effects. Remember that in terms of an OLS 
regression, independently distributed individual effects make it possible to use the more efficient 
random-effects estimator whereas the fixed effect estimator is still consistent. Since the main 
concern is consistency here, a non-orthogonality between the two fixed effects and the 
environmental variable as a regressor is imposed, which takes advantage of the fixed effect 
estimator. Concretely, both, the time- and the-individual fixed effects depend upon either the 
individual mean per year or the annual mean per individual, respectively. The rationale behind the 
particular specification, i.e. 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 =  𝑧𝑧1̅,𝑖𝑖 − 1 and 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 =   3 ∗ 𝑧𝑧1̅,𝑡𝑡 − 2, is to ensure a sensible output 
efficiency whose error term lies within the truncation boundaries. That is, on the one hand, if 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
becomes too small, it does not affect the output efficiency. On the other hand, a too high 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
dominates the output efficiency and annihilates the influence of the environmental variable 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. At 
the same time, a too negative 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 provokes a very high left truncation boundary which in turn leads 
to a problem in finding a randomly distributed error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. The same arguments hold for the 
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time fixed effect 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡. The chosen distribution parameters proved to take into account accurately 
these concerns. 
The next step entails setting the parameter value 𝛽𝛽1 = 0.2, which is the effect the environmental 
variable has on efficiency, and the error term’s variance 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 = 0.2. Note that 𝛽𝛽0 = 0.2 is simply 
the constant which is irrelevant for this analysis. Having 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡, 𝛽𝛽0, 𝛽𝛽1, and 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 at hand enables 
generating values for the efficiency’s error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. Because the input efficiency 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 must stay 
within zero and one by definition, the error term’s truncation boundary on the left is  1 − 𝛽𝛽0 − 𝛽𝛽1𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 and on the right 0 − 𝛽𝛽0 − 𝛽𝛽1𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡. As Cooper et al. (2007) 
outline, the input efficiency is simply the inverse of the output efficiency. The outputs are drawn 
twice from an independent uniform distribution between 6 and 16. Based on these values, the total 
inputs are the result of 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡�𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
3 4⁄ + 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡3 4⁄ �. The term in parentheses indicates the combination 
of the two outputs in the production process and efficiency multiplier in the front increases the 
input by a certain percentage if it exceeds one. In order to appropriate the two input proportions 
on the total, the first input’s weight 𝑢𝑢 is determined by a uniform distribution between zero and 
one. 
Applying the quasi fixed effect algorithm presented in section 7.1 produces the parameter 
estimates listed in the left part of Table 25. As a comparison, the right part presents the estimates 
running the DEA in the first step with an intertemporal reference set (i.e. with pooled data). The 
second step is always a truncated regression with Simar & Wilson (2007) type bootstrapped 
confidence intervals. In the simultaneous case, year dummies control for fixed effects in addition 
to the individual dummies to account for individual fixed effects. As in usual Monte Carlo 
simulations, the algorithms were run with different numbers of individual observations (n) and 
years (t) in order to reveal the small sample biases. 
Table 25 – Estimated coverage rates of confidence intervals 
  Para-
meter 
Quasi fixed effect algorithm  Simultaneous regression 
n t 0.80 0.90 0.95 0.99  0.80 0.90 0.95 0.99 
100 9 𝛽𝛽1 0.661 0.791 0.865 0.953  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.008 
100 9 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 0.187 0.29 0.399 0.608  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
30 9 𝛽𝛽1 0.765 0.875 0.926 0.982  0.019 0.026 0.048 0.104 
30 9 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 0.737 0.831 0.913 0.974  0.001 0.002 0.005 0.010 
100 5 𝛽𝛽1 0.454 0.588 0.692 0.844  0.016 0.031 0.038 0.081 
100 5 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.024  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
30 5 𝛽𝛽1 0.690 0.801 0.873 0.952  0.099 0.171 0.227 0.342 
30 5 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 0.212 0.312 0.414 0.629  0.001 0.003 0.004 0.010 
Notes: Simulations were conducted using Stata with 1000 replications each time 
Source: Own calculations 
Before reflecting the coverage rates of the confidence intervals, consider the graphical 
representation of the coefficient estimates in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22 – Densities of sample estimates 
 Panel A: n=100; t=9; beta Panel B: n=30; t=9; beta 
 
 Panel C: n=100; t=5; beta Panel D: n=30; t=5; beta 
 
 Panel E: n=100; t=9; sigma Panel F: n=30; t=9; sigma 
 
 Panel G: n=100; t=5; sigma Panel H: n=30; t=5; sigma 
 
Note: solid curve: quasi fixed effects algorithm; dotted curve: two-way fixed effects estimates using the full panel simultaneously 
Source: Own illustration 
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The most important insight the results provide is the dominance of the quasi fixed effect 
algorithm over the simultaneous regression. Irrespective of the number of individual observations 
or the number of years, the coverage rate of the quasi fixed effect algorithm always outperforms 
the simultaneous regression. Admittedly, the coverage rates are not stunningly high compared to 
the results that Simar & Wilson (2007) find in the cross-sectional case. However, if time and 
individual fixed effects as implemented in the data-generating process are present, the quasi fixed 
effect algorithm is apparently the better way estimate the parameters. 
The graphical illustration in Figure 22 supports the dominance of the quasi fixed effect 
algorithm. It becomes particularly visible that the simultaneous regression estimates the coefficients 
more optimistically (i.e. with a narrower distribution of the point estimates) than the quasi fixed 
effect algorithm. Consequently, the confidence interval also becomes too narrow so that the 
coverage rate of the simultaneous regression is poor (c.f. Table 25). Also, the point estimates itself 
of the quasi fixed effect algorithm accumulate closer to the true value. This becomes more evident 
the higher the number of individual observations. While the difference between the two estimators 
is less evident for only 30 individual observations (panels B and D), the estimated betas of the quasi 
fixed effect algorithm come much closer to its true values if the number of observations increases 
(panels A and C). 
In the case where the Swiss cantons represent the individual observations, the econometrician 
finds himself clearly in the panels B and D. Even if the illustrations in panel B and D suggest that 
the number of years is almost irrelevant if the number of individuals is so small, the coverage results 
in Table 25 object. Consider the 80% confidence interval of the quasi fixed effect algorithm. While 
the coverage rate of 𝛽𝛽1 only reaches 38% with n=30 and t=5, it increases to 51% when the 
researcher includes 4 additional years. In the present case, where 15 years are observed, the 
coverage rate can undoubtedly be expected to lie even higher.   
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A. 3 Marginal effects on efficiency in the Stochastic Frontier framework 
Once the estimates of equation (58) are disposable, the technical efficiency computes as 
(Battese & Coelli 1988) 
𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =  𝔼𝔼[exp(−𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) |𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] = exp(−𝜇𝜇∗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 0.5𝜎𝜎∗2) ∗ Φ�𝜇𝜇∗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎∗ −𝜎𝜎∗�Φ�𝜇𝜇∗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝜎𝜎∗
�
  
 where 𝜇𝜇∗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = −𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2+𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2 − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2+𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2 
  𝜎𝜎∗2 = 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2+𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2 
  𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 = exp(𝜹𝜹′𝒛𝒛) 
  𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2 = exp(𝝎𝝎′𝒛𝒛) 
  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝝋𝝋′𝒛𝒛 
(64) 
As usual, Φ(∙) indicates the cumulative distribution function and 𝜙𝜙(∙) is the probability 
density function. The marginal effect of each environmental variable 𝑧𝑧1 on efficiency is the result 
of the first partial derivative: 
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕1
= 𝑓𝑓′(∙) 𝑔𝑔(∙)
ℎ(∙) + 𝑓𝑓(∙) 𝑔𝑔′(∙)ℎ(∙)−𝑔𝑔(∙)ℎ′(∙)ℎ(∙)2   where 
𝑓𝑓(∙) = exp(−𝜇𝜇∗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 0.5𝜎𝜎∗2)  and 𝑓𝑓′(∙) = 𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓(∙)𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕1  
𝑔𝑔(∙) = Φ�𝜇𝜇∗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝜎𝜎∗
− 𝜎𝜎∗�  and 𝑔𝑔′(∙) = 𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔(∙)𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕1  
ℎ(∙) = Φ�𝜇𝜇∗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝜎𝜎∗
�   and ℎ′(∙) = 𝜕𝜕ℎ(∙)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕1
 
𝑓𝑓′ = exp(−𝜇𝜇∗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 0.5𝜎𝜎∗2) 𝜎𝜎∗2𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2+𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2 [0.5(𝜔𝜔1𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 − 𝛿𝛿1𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2) − (𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 − 𝛿𝛿1)(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑1𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2)]  
𝑔𝑔′ = 𝜙𝜙 �𝜇𝜇∗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝜎𝜎∗
− 𝜎𝜎∗�
1
𝜎𝜎∗
�𝜎𝜎∗
2 𝜔𝜔1−𝛿𝛿1
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢
2+𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣
2 (𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑1𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2) − 𝜔𝜔1𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2+𝛿𝛿1𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣22�𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2+𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2� (𝜇𝜇∗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎∗2)�   
ℎ′ = 𝜙𝜙 �𝜇𝜇∗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝜎𝜎∗
� �𝜎𝜎∗
𝜔𝜔1−𝛿𝛿1
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢
2+𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣
2 (𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑1𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2) − 𝜇𝜇∗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2𝜎𝜎∗�𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2+𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2� (𝛾𝛾1𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 + 𝛿𝛿1𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2)�  
(65) 
This expression simplifies when the estimations stem from the true random- or true fixed 
effect model, since in this case 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 0. Further, the utilized models assume homogeneity of the 
stochastic error term which means 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2 = exp(𝜔𝜔0).  
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A. 4 Figures 
Figure 23 – Accounting scheme for the special financing (SF) with non-immediate depreciation 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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Figure 24 – Accounting scheme for the special financing (SF) with immediate depreciation 
 
Source: Own illustration 
Figure 25 – Tax complexity and diversification by year 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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Figure 26 – Progressivity of the tax system by year 
 
Notes: The ordinate shows the estimated 𝑎𝑎-value of the logarithmic function 𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) = 𝑎𝑎 ∗ ln(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + 𝑏𝑏 fitted into data on the tax 
rate (𝑡𝑡) and income (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) of a household consisting of a married couple and two children. 
Source: Own illustration 
Figure 27 – Gross debt (in 1’000 CHF per capita) by year 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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Figure 28 – Marginal effects within the domain of general administration 
 Expenditures through special financings Expenditures through special financings 
 
 
 GDP per capita GDP per capita  
  
 
 Transfers Tax complexity  
 
 
 Tax diversification Debt per capita 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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Figure 29 – Marginal effects within the domain of public order and security 
 Expenditures through special financings Expenditures through special financings 
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 Transfers Tax complexity  
 
 
 Tax diversification Debt per capita 
  
Source: Own illustration 
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Figure 30 – Marginal effects within the domain of education 
 Expenditures through special financings Expenditures through special financings 
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Source: Own illustration 
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Figure 31 – Marginal effects within the domain of culture 
 Expenditures through special financings Expenditures through special financings 
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Source: Own illustration 
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Figure 32 – Marginal effects within the domain of health 
 Expenditures through special financings Expenditures through special financings 
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 Tax diversification Debt per capita 
  
Source: Own illustration 
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Figure 33 – Marginal effects within the domain of social security 
 Expenditures through special financings Expenditures through special financings 
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 Tax diversification Debt per capita 
  
Source: Own illustration 
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Figure 34 – Marginal effects within the domain of transportation 
 Expenditures through special financings Expenditures through special financings 
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 Tax diversification Debt per capita 
  
Source: Own illustration 
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Figure 35 – Marginal effects within the domain of environment and spatial planning 
 Expenditures through special financings Expenditures through special financings 
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 Tax diversification Debt per capita 
  
Source: Own illustration 
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Figure 36 – Marginal effects within the domain of national economy 
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Source: Own illustration 
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Figure 37 – Budgetary amendments of the Solothurn cantonal budget 2017 (operating and 
capital expenditures) 
 
Source: Own illustration 
Figure 38 – Marginal effects of expenditures through special financings conditional to the 
party dominance in parliament 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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A. 5 Tables 
Table 26 – Mean and standard deviation of cantonal expenditures by expenditure type and government function 2000 to 2014 
Government function 
G
en
er
al 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
-
tio
n 
Pu
bl
ic 
or
de
r 
an
d 
se
cu
rit
y 
E
du
ca
tio
n 
Cu
ltu
re
 
H
ea
lth
 
So
cia
l 
Se
cu
rit
y 
Tr
an
sp
or
-
ta
tio
n 
E
nv
iro
n-
m
en
t a
nd
 
sp
at
ial
 
pl
an
ni
ng
 
N
at
io
na
l 
ec
on
om
y 
Fi
na
nc
in
g 
an
d 
ta
xe
s 
Personnel expenditure [P] 
70'550 
(63'848)  
166'342 
(185'797)  
485'076 
(680'727)  
10'480 
(12'973)  
128'050 
(238'313)  
43'043 
(63'279)  
23'773 
(18'554)  
12'973 
(12'078)  
13'554 
(12'218)  
1'659 
(1'992)  
General, administrative and 
operating expenditure [O] 
50'020 
(47'334)  
57'357 
(72'989)  
79'604 
(111'832)  
6'292 
(11'182)  
50'961 
(95'621)  
14'639 
(17'583)  
31'184 
(39'944)  
9'628 
(13'673)  
8'030 
(9'210)  
20'572 
(34'819)  
Defense expenditure 
0 
(n.a.)  
0 
(n.a.)  
0 
(n.a.)  
0 
(n.a.)  
0 
(n.a.)  
0 
(n.a.)  
0 
(n.a.)  
0 
(n.a.)  
0 
(n.a.)  
0 
(n.a.)  
Financial expenditure [F] 
473 
(2'008)  
108 
(285)  
4 
(8)  
9 
(21)  
0 
(n.a.)  
60 
(88)  
736 
(1'115)  
1 
(1)  
6 
(9)  
60'543 
(88'984)  
Transfer expenditure [F] 
7'575 
(14'627)  
8'861 
(12'309)  
189'751 
(142'629)  
34'334 
(47'375)  
235'754 
(320'690)  
481'139 
(520'032)  
62'993 
(72'093)  
9'050 
(11'741)  
121'948 
(121'382)  
106'681 
(170'113)  
Extraordinary expenditure [F] 
294'856 
(508'374)  
44'513 
(62'811)  
252'820 
(516'365)  
0 
(n.a.)  
2'990 
(n.a.)  
18'846 
(23'354)  
0 
(n.a.)  
33'933 
(n.a.)  
76'253 
(n.a.)  
0 
(n.a.)  
Tangible fixed assets [C] 
14'510 
(24'510)  
10'194 
(13'277)  
29'983 
(43'376)  
3'708 
(9'044)  
16'057 
(22'397)  
1'981 
(4'455)  
107'106 
(103'331)  
7'033 
(8'714)  
1'258 
(3'062)  
0 
(n.a.)  
Capital expenditures on behalf 
of third parties [C] 
33 
(15)  
50 
(706)  
0 
(n.a.)  
0 
(n.a.)  
0 
(n.a.)  
819 
(500)  
2'997  
(5'343)  
285 
(363)  
0 
(n.a.)  
0 
(n.a.)  
Capital expenditures, intangible 
fixed assets [C] 
7'631 
(12'493)  
2'367 
(3'421)  
1'936 
(2'370)  
79 
(69)  
406 
(392)  
2'269 
(3'007)  
700 
(1'698)  
2'026 
(3'527)  
588 
(1'314)  
0 
(n.a.)  
Loans and financial interests 
[C] 
2'427 
(6'346)  
927 
(675)  
1'714 
(2'888)  
1'243 
(3'230)  
6'286 
(18'874)  
7'194 
(10'092)  
20'906 
(59'342)  
5'758 
(7'515)  
13'571 
(37'435)  
0 
(n.a.)  
Loans [C] a 
4'961 
(n.a.)  
716 
(315)  
1'292 
(2'177)  
1'824 
(2'444)  
1'412 
(2'826)  
2'497 
(2'555)  
25'273 
(34'944)  
1'644 
(1'706)  
3'539 
(4'053)  
0 
(n.a.)  
Financial interests and share 
capital [C] 
2'962 
(6'880)  
197 
(266)  
925 
(1'248)  
290 
(474)  
48'289 
(106'524)  
25'747 
(15'509)  
1'809 
(1'720)  
0 
(n.a.)  
11'537 
(22'569)  
0 
(n.a.)  
Notes: N = 390; the letters in brackets indicate to which category each expenditure type belongs (see section 6.3) 
a The separation of the loans into two positions stems from the harmonization process of the federal finance administration and is not relevant to the present context (Financial Statistics Section 2011). 
Source: Own calculation based on data from the Federal Finance Administration (2016) 
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Table 27 – Mean and standard deviation of variables related to revenue characteristics by government function 
Government function 
G
en
er
al 
ad
m
in
i- 
st
ra
tio
n 
Pu
bl
ic 
or
de
r 
an
d 
se
cu
rit
y 
E
du
ca
tio
n 
Cu
ltu
re
 
H
ea
lth
 
So
cia
l 
Se
cu
rit
y 
Tr
an
sp
or
-
ta
tio
n 
E
nv
iro
n-
m
en
t a
nd
 
sp
at
ial
 
pl
an
ni
ng
 
N
at
io
na
l 
ec
on
om
y 
Expenditures through special financings a 0.832 (2.540) 1.841 (4.253) 0.512 (1.694) 35.431 (20.296) 1.020 (2.787) 2.509 (6.700) 23.628 (33.456) 12.076 (33.019) 3.320 (5.538) 
Volume of the special financings b 0.125 (0.422) 0.273 (0.440) 0.512 (1.427) 1.104 (0.776) 0.710 (2.344) 0.348 (0.486) 1.131 (3.253) 0.359 (1.121) 1.014 (1.516) 
Transfers c 9.668 (11.558) 14.410 (9.027) 70.021 (13.656) 26.783 (21.609) 21.930 (27.894) 88.605 (11.917) 3.580 (12.892) 26.888 (21.671) 48.660 (17.320) 
Pseudo-earmarked transfers d 88.203 (30.411) 98.009 (7.500) 99.137 (1.813) 96.324 (11.946) 87.526 (30.790) 99.787 (0.647) 97.284 (11.622) 98.740 (5.836) 99.861 (0.394) 
a In percent of total expenditures within function 
b In percent of the balance sheet’s total 
c In percent of total revenues within function 
d In percent of total transfers within function 
Note: N = 301 
Source: Own calculation based on data from the federal finance administration and the annual financial statements of the cantons 
Table 28 – Cantonal expenditure shares by state function and expenditure type 2000 to 2014 
Government function 
G
en
er
al 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
-
tio
n 
Pu
bl
ic 
or
de
r 
an
d 
se
cu
rit
y 
E
du
ca
tio
n 
Cu
ltu
re
 
H
ea
lth
 
So
cia
l 
Se
cu
rit
y 
Tr
an
sp
or
-
ta
tio
n 
E
nv
iro
n-
m
en
t a
nd
 
sp
at
ial
 
pl
an
ni
ng
 
N
at
io
na
l 
ec
on
om
y 
Fi
na
nc
in
g 
an
d 
ta
xe
s 
Personnel expenditure [P] 15.37% 56.59% 46.25% 17.06% 25.03% 7.14% 8.09% 13.37% 5.11% 0.88% 
General, administrative and 
operating expenditure [O] 10.90% 19.51% 7.59% 10.25% 9.96% 2.43% 10.62% 9.92% 3.03% 10.86% 
Defense expenditure 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Financial expenditure [F] 0.10% 0.04% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.25% 0.00% 0.00% 31.96% 
Transfer expenditure [F] 1.65% 3.01% 18.09% 55.90% 46.08% 79.84% 21.45% 9.32% 45.94% 56.31% 
Extraordinary expenditure [F] 64.25% 15.14% 24.11% 0.00% 0.58% 3.13% 0.00% 34.96% 28.73% 0.00% 
Tangible fixed assets [C] 3.16% 3.47% 2.86% 6.04% 3.14% 0.33% 36.47% 7.25% 0.47% 0.00% 
Capital expenditures on behalf 
of third parties [C] 0.01% 0.17% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.14% 1.02% 0.29% 0.00% 0.00% 
Capital expenditures, intangible 
fixed assets [C] 1.66% 0.81% 0.18% 0.13% 0.08% 0.38% 0.24% 2.09% 0.22% 0.00% 
Loans and financial interests 
[C] 0.53% 0.32% 0.16% 2.02% 1.23% 1.19% 7.12% 5.93% 5.11% 0.00% 
Loans [C] a 1.08% 0.24% 0.12% 2.97% 0.28% 0.41% 8.60% 1.69% 1.33% 0.00% 
Financial interests and share 
capital [C] 0.65% 0.07% 0.09% 0.47% 9.44% 4.27% 0.62% 0.00% 4.35% 0.00% 
Notes: The letters in brackets indicate to which category each expenditure type belongs (see section 6.3) 
a The separation of the loans into two positions stems from the harmonization process of the federal finance administration and is not relevant in the present context (Financial Statistics Section 2011). 
Source: Own calculation based on data from the Federal Finance Administration (2016) 
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Table 29 – Mean cantonal DEA technical efficiency by government function 2000 to 2014  
Canton General 
administration 
Public order and 
security 
Education Culture Health Social Security Transportation Environment, 
spatial planning 
National economy 
AG 0.732 (0.031) 0.772 (0.040) 0.778 (0.231) 0.706 (0.214) 0.760 (0.084) 0.793 (0.027) 0.816 (0.033) 0.775 (0.093) 0.746 (0.046) 
AI 0.579 (0.086) 0.620 (0.176) 0.776 (0.074) 0.544 (0.229) 0.762 (0.062) 0.823 (0.031) 0.678 (0.009) 0.639 (0.130) 0.626 (0.037) 
AR 0.582 (0.071) 0.479 (0.114) 0.744 (0.133) n.a. 0.734 (0.083) 0.807 (0.036) 0.646 (0.069) 0.567 (0.159) 0.773 (0.059) 
BE 0.743 (0.056) 0.677 (0.069) 0.771 (0.102) 0.671 (0.196) 0.750 (0.061) 0.648 (0.040) 0.707 (0.109) 0.779 (0.089) 0.749 (0.075) 
BL 0.517 (0.085) 0.635 (0.088) 0.699 (0.213) 0.397 (0.172) 0.826 (0.078) 0.667 (0.004) 0.525 (0.054) 0.410 (0.142) 0.628 (0.102) 
BS 0.312 (0.070) 0.716 (0.095) 0.600 (0.125) 0.117 (0.052) 0.505 (0.067) 0.547 (0.118) 0.181 (0.055) 0.286 (0.091) 0.550 (0.063) 
FR 0.677 (0.076) 0.658 (0.053) 0.757 (0.072) 0.578 (0.222) 0.601 (0.201) 0.678 (0.041) 0.681 (0.073) 0.765 (0.076) 0.561 (0.031) 
GE 0.447 (0.114) 0.732 (0.032) 0.852 (0.065) 0.350 (0.153) 0.713 (0.142) 0.590 (0.098) 0.725 (0.148) 0.606 (0.173) 0.604 (0.066) 
GL 0.585 (0.075) 0.578 (0.133) 0.814 (0.080) 0.701 (0.095) 0.620 (0.162) 0.806 (0.076) 0.702 (0.023) 0.698 (0.065) 0.627 (0.105) 
GR 0.700 (0.068) 0.737 (0.100) 0.815 (0.068) 0.684 (0.072) 0.797 (0.071) 0.880 (0.032) 0.469 (0.085) 0.412 (0.040) 0.770 (0.019) 
JU 0.540 (0.076) 0.737 (0.068) 0.809 (0.050) 0.487 (0.187) 0.553 (0.119) 0.789 (0.040) 0.726 (0.025) 0.539 (0.130) 0.430 (0.064) 
LU 0.729 (0.084) 0.831 (0.058) 0.646 (0.077) 0.719 (0.205) 0.660 (0.078) 0.678 (0.011) 0.837 (0.036) 0.833 (0.058) 0.765 (0.029) 
NE 0.527 (0.069) 0.789 (0.055) 0.695 (0.076) 0.604 (0.208) 0.628 (0.084) 0.661 (0.085) 0.485 (0.086) 0.681 (0.147) 0.358 (0.039) 
NW 0.676 (0.069) 0.628 (0.166) 0.761 (0.186) 0.614 (0.302) 0.581 (0.110) 0.846 (0.067) 0.710 (0.062) 0.580 (0.094) 0.772 (0.079) 
OW 0.647 (0.108) 0.619 (0.064) 0.749 (0.076) 0.697 (0.062) 0.525 (0.092) 0.797 (0.101) 0.694 (0.033) 0.566 (0.103) 0.774 (0.065) 
SG 0.739 (0.104) 0.746 (0.038) 0.669 (0.081) 0.725 (0.094) 0.663 (0.051) 0.799 (0.092) 0.716 (0.067) 0.687 (0.081) 0.753 (0.050) 
SH 0.602 (0.092) 0.554 (0.125) 0.802 (0.126) 0.716 (0.111) 0.686 (0.076) 0.772 (0.041) 0.691 (0.073) 0.681 (0.050) 0.616 (0.045) 
SO 0.622 (0.052) 0.746 (0.085) 0.730 (0.126) 0.689 (0.078) 0.770 (0.078) 0.776 (0.000) 0.710 (0.079) 0.692 (0.119) 0.659 (0.044) 
SZ 0.654 (0.120) 0.600 (0.135) 0.826 (0.067) 0.625 (0.207) 0.609 (0.064) 0.714 (0.010) 0.665 (0.078) 0.846 (0.064) 0.755 (0.069) 
TG 0.774 (0.038) 0.654 (0.120) 0.764 (0.067) 0.689 (0.204) 0.701 (0.096) 0.721 (0.021) 0.764 (0.014) 0.715 (0.053) 0.681 (0.061) 
TI 0.537 (0.059) 0.835 (0.032) 0.788 (0.073) 0.654 (0.211) 0.743 (0.060) 0.714 (0.100) 0.701 (0.070) 0.807 (0.053) 0.616 (0.040) 
UR 0.564 (0.135) 0.000 (0.000) 0.743 (0.125) 0.630 (0.191) 0.543 (0.083) 0.833 (0.053) 0.737 (0.010) 0.291 (0.161) 0.762 (0.074) 
VD 0.567 (0.094) 0.733 (0.040) 0.797 (0.082) 0.522 (0.196) 0.722 (0.116) 0.723 (0.046) 0.770 (0.053) 0.838 (0.068) 0.535 (0.081) 
VS 0.798 (0.065) 0.776 (0.019) 0.830 (0.055) 0.459 (0.156) 0.729 (0.106) 0.865 (0.027) 0.761 (0.028) 0.691 (0.107) 0.673 (0.054) 
ZG 0.745 (0.031) 0.602 (0.111) 0.549 (0.092) 0.546 (0.206) 0.767 (0.073) 0.749 (0.047) 0.469 (0.051) 0.708 (0.116) 0.608 (0.072) 
ZH 0.837 (0.052) 0.766 (0.066) 0.830 (0.075) 0.529 (0.179) 0.810 (0.035) 0.877 (0.016) 0.719 (0.092) 0.761 (0.091) 0.681 (0.038) 
CH 0.637 (0.137) 0.697 (0.121) 0.754 (0.128) 0.572 (0.228) 0.684 (0.131) 0.746 (0.107) 0.671 (0.140) 0.652 (0.182) 0.658 (0.123) 
?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐 (p) 0.965 (0.93) 0.888 (1.00) n.a. 0.855 (0.98) 0.849 (1.00) n.a. 0.881 (0.97) 0.889 (1.00) 0.960 (0.98) 
𝑇𝑇�4𝑛𝑛  (p) 0.001 (0.00) 0131 (0.00) 0.009 (0.00) 0.010 (0.00) 0.019 (0.00) 0.012 (0.00) 0.023 (0.18) 0.010 (0.00) 0.019 (0.00) 
𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  0.606 0.640 0.115 0.692 0.452 0.674 0.402 0.594 0.602 
𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  -0.063 0.101 -0.028 -0.044 -0.055 -0.070 -0.060 -0.032 0.019 
N 372 339 389 288 369 223 382 378 332 
Notes: * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%. Mean of year-by-year bootstrap-corrected cost efficiencies (Simar & Wilson 2011a) with standard deviation in parentheses. CH is the mean of all cantons. The ?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐-
statistic refers to Simar & Wilson's (2002) returns to scale test; the 𝑇𝑇�4𝑛𝑛-statistic refers to Wilson's (2003) independence test; always the year with the smallest p-value is reported; both tests globally reject the 
H0 if any year rejects it. If the p-value of the ?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐-test exceeds (is equal or smaller than) 0.05 then the efficiencies are estimated based on constant returns (variable) to scale; if the p-value of the 𝑇𝑇�4𝑛𝑛-test 
exceeds (is equal or smaller than) 0.05 then the heterogenous (subsampling) version of the bootstrap correction is applied. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient 𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 describes the relationship of the cost 
and technical efficiency, while 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 shows the correlation between the missing dummy and the technical efficiency. N < 390 due to outlier exclusion (see footnote 57) or negative expenditures. 
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Table 30 – Mean cantonal SFA technical efficiency by government function 2000 to 2014 
Canton General 
administration 
Public order and 
security 
Education Culture Health Social Security Transportation Environment, 
spatial planning 
National economy 
AG 0.998 (0.001) 0.993 (0.004) 0.918 (0.052) 0.999 (0.000) 0.956 (0.024) 0.851 (0.134) 0.032 (0.003) 0.938 (0.002) 0.993 (0.002) 
AI 0.999 (0.001) 1.000 (0.000) 0.947 (0.032) 0.988 (0.014) 0.898 (0.033) 0.858 (0.073) 0.011 (0.000) 0.600 (0.093) 0.611 (0.018) 
AR 0.999 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.963 (0.019)  0.805 (0.189) 1.000 (0.000) 0.006 (0.000) 0.668 (0.026) 0.784 (0.030) 
BE 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.938 (0.057) 0.996 (0.000) 0.942 (0.015) 1.000 (0.000) 0.348 (0.071) 1.000 (0.000) 0.998 (0.000) 
BL 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.849 (0.094) 0.992 (0.001) 0.890 (0.068) 1.000 (0.000) 0.539 (0.059) 0.805 (0.021) 0.989 (0.005) 
BS 0.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.994 (0.001) 0.995 (0.000) 0.957 (0.001) 1.000 (0.000) 0.096 (0.001) 0.989 (0.000) 0.993 (0.002) 
FR 0.999 (0.000) 0.998 (0.004) 0.889 (0.071)  0.972 (0.008) 1.000 (0.000) 0.005 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.998 (0.000) 
GE 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.972 (0.027) 0.998 (0.002) 0.957 (0.024) 1.000 (0.000) 0.029 (0.001) 1.000 (0.000) 0.416 (0.514) 
GL          
GR          
JU 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.942 (0.036) 0.987 (0.003) 0.984 (0.004) 1.000 (0.000) 0.132 (0.017) 0.991 (0.000) 0.998 (0.000) 
LU          
NE 0.999 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.958 (0.031) 1.000 (0.000) 0.990 (0.006) 1.000 (0.000) 0.361 (0.091) 1.000 (0.000) 0.998 (0.000) 
NW 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.989 (0.005) 0.999 (0.000) 0.942 (0.017) 1.000 (0.000) 0.032 (0.001) 0.969 (0.000) 0.667 (0.034) 
OW 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.994 (0.004) 1.000 (0.000) 0.970 (0.006) 1.000 (0.000) 0.029 (0.001) 0.526 (0.028) 0.744 (0.062) 
SG 0.997 (0.000) 0.990 (0.006) 0.926 (0.064) 1.000 (0.000) 0.896 (0.048) 1.000 (0.000) 0.103 (0.011) 1.000 (0.000) 0.997 (0.000) 
SH 0.998 (0.000) 0.861 (0.127) 0.989 (0.006) 1.000 (0.000) 0.944 (0.033) 0.971 (0.050) 0.453 (0.052) 0.959 (0.000) 0.943 (0.013) 
SO 0.999 (0.001) 0.990 (0.009) 0.872 (0.088) 0.993 (0.002) 0.941 (0.023) 1.000 (0.000) 0.527 (0.059) 0.997 (0.000) 0.991 (0.004) 
SZ 0.998 (0.000) 0.841 (0.105) 0.952 (0.042) 1.000 (0.000) 0.884 (0.047) 0.859 (0.128) 0.596 (0.076) 0.907 (0.008) 0.962 (0.017) 
TG          
TI 0.998 (0.000) 0.996 (0.002) 0.979 (0.011) 1.000 (0.000) 0.947 (0.014) 0.986 (0.016) 0.006 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 0.790 (0.040) 
UR 0.999 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.929 (0.066) 0.694 (0.267) 0.968 (0.006) 0.981 (0.041) 0.027 (0.001) 0.890 (0.012) 0.729 (0.038) 
VD          
VS 0.999 (0.001) 0.995 (0.005) 0.924 (0.062) 1.000 (0.000) 0.981 (0.011) 1.000 (0.000) 0.005 (0.000) 0.985 (0.000) 0.900 (0.067) 
ZG 0.999 (0.000) 0.991 (0.012) 0.992 (0.003) 0.990 (0.007) 0.968 (0.014) 0.927 (0.079) 0.046 (0.003) 0.987 (0.000) 0.941 (0.032) 
ZH 1.000 (0.000) 0.999 (0.001) 0.973 (0.017)  0.795 (0.078) 0.860 (0.098) 0.901 (0.005) 0.999 (0.000) 0.996 (0.001) 
CH 0.999 (0.001) 0.981 (0.060) 0.945 (0.061) 0.977 (0.100) 0.934 (0.075) 0.958 (0.083) 0.208 (0.089) 0.910 (0.030) 0.876 (0.193) 
𝔼𝔼�[𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡]  0.025** 0.021** 0.076*** 0.041*** 0.141*** 0.026** 0.137*** 0.152*** 0.227** 
𝜎𝜎�𝑣𝑣  0.066*** 0.055*** 0.029*** 0.109*** 0.147*** 0.058*** 0.093*** 0.085*** 0.031*** 
𝔼𝔼�[𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡]  0.381 0.377 2.611*** 0.375 0.960 0.453 1.475 1.797*** 7.256*** 
𝜌𝜌𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷,𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷  -0.016 0.183 0.140 -0.033 -0.0006 0.0274 -0.245 0.529 -0.113 
𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴∗   -0.103 -0.013 0.023 0.189 -0.365 -0.123 -0.159 0.303 -0.312 
N 285 258 300 214 282 161 298 294 260 
Notes: * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%. The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients 𝜌𝜌𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴∗  describes the relationship of the DEA and SFA technical efficiency measures, while the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient 𝜌𝜌𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷,𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 indicates how the cost and technical efficiency estimates interrelate; 𝔼𝔼�[𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] is tested against H0: 𝔼𝔼�[𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] = 0; 𝜎𝜎�𝑣𝑣 is tested against H0: 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣 = 0; 𝔼𝔼�[𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] is tested against H0: 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1; for 
further regression outputs see Table 20. 
  
174 
Table 31 – Truncated regression of the DEA efficiency score on environmental variables by government function (two-step approach) 
 
General 
administration 
Public order and 
security Education Health Social Security 
Environment, spatial 
planning Economy 
[A] Expenditures through special 
financings (in % of total expenditures) 0.004** (0.002) -0.004 (0.004) -0.012 (0.015) 0.000 (0.003) -0.015*** (0.005) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
[B] Volume of special financings (in % 
of balance sheet’s total) -0.012 (0.023) -0.123** (0.058) -0.016 (0.016) 0.001 (0.005) -0.022 (0.037) -0.016 (0.015) 0.000 (0.004) 
 Interaction [A]x[B] 0.001 (0.002) 0.007 (0.007) 0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 0.021** (0.008) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
[C] Tax progressivity (curvature 
parameter) 0.010 (0.027) 0.091*** (0.032) 0.016 (0.041) 0.048 (0.030) -0.006 (0.027) 0.002 (0.041) 0.011 (0.021) 
[D] GDP per capita (in 1’000 CHF) -0.002 (0.002) 0.006** (0.003) -0.002 (0.004) 0.008*** (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) -0.004 (0.004) 0.006*** (0.002) 
 Interaction [C]x[D] 0.001* (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) -0.001** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001** (0.000) 
Tax complexity (normalized HHI) -0.001 (0.001) -0.003* (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.002* (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) 
Tax diversification (number of tax 
sources) -0.003 (0.014) 0.026 (0.018) -0.028 (0.023) -0.010 (0.019) -0.009 (0.016) 0.009 (0.022) -0.002 (0.011) 
Transfers (in % of total revenues) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.002** (0.001) 0.001** (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Gross debt per capita (in 1’000 CHF) 0.000 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.008 (0.006) 0.011*** (0.004) 0.005 (0.003) -0.001 (0.006) 0.003 (0.003) 
Population density (1’000 inh. per km2) -0.889*** (0.327) -0.841** (0.358) -0.439 (0.539) -1.981*** (0.392) -0.232 (0.311) 0.368 (0.514) -0.015 (0.243) 
Referendum (1 [hard] to 6 [easy]) 0.054* (0.029) -0.012 (0.016) -0.008 (0.025) -0.078*** (0.028) 0.017** (0.009) 0.013 (0.024) -0.010 (0.010) 
Initiative (1 [hard] to 6 [easy]) -0.122*** (0.041) 0.090** (0.042) -0.078 (0.061) 0.050 (0.044) -0.049* (0.026) 0.050 (0.062) 0.048* (0.026) 
Bourgeois parties in executive (in %) -0.001* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001*** (0.000) 
Fragmentation (1’000 inh. per 
municipality) 0.085*** (0.027) 0.012 (0.030) 0.006 (0.043) 0.020 (0.035) 0.087*** (0.021) 0.022 (0.050) -0.046** (0.019) 
Voter turnout (in %) 0.002* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001* (0.001) 
Foreigners (in % of total inhabitants) -0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.007) 0.016 (0.010) -0.014* (0.008) -0.005 (0.005) 0.017* (0.010) 0.012*** (0.005) 
National street length (in km)        
Marginal effect: Expenditures through 
special financings 
0.004* -0.002 -0.011 -0.001 -0.009*** -0.000 -0.000 
Marginal effect: GDP per capita 0.002* -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.000 0.002** 
N 285 258 300 282 161 294 260 
Notes: * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%. Coefficients with bootstrap-based standard errors in parentheses (Simar & Wilson 2007); the dependent variable is the DEA technical efficiency score with a 
contemporaneous reference set (i.e. year-by-year DEA); individual dummies included but not reported; marginal effects at mean of interaction variable. 
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Table 32 – True fixed- and true random-effect model estimates  
 
General 
administration (RE) 
Public order and 
security (RE) Education (FE) Culture (RE) Health (RE) Social Security (RE) 
Transportation 
(RE) 
Environment, spa-
tial planning (FE) 
National Economy 
(RE) 
Frontier Input: O -0.109*** 
(0.029) 
Input: O 0.049*** 
(0.019) 
Input: O -0.035 
(0.052) 
Input: O -0.316*** 
(0.019) 
Input: O -0.028 
(0.046) 
Input: O -0.043 
(0.027) 
Input: O 0.048 
(0.047) 
Input: O -0.093** 
(0.043) 
Input: O -0.032** 
(0.013) 
  Input: F -0.011 
(0.009) 
Input: F 0.000 
(0.012) 
Input: F -0.401*** 
(0.114) 
Input: F -0.662*** 
(0.019) 
Input: F -0.708*** 
(0.022) 
Input: F -0.926*** 
(0.021) 
Input: F -0.255*** 
(0.062) 
Input: F -0.071** 
(0.033) 
Input: F -0.899*** 
(0.020) 
  Input: I -0.008 
(0.010) 
Input: I -0.007 
(0.006) 
Input: I 0.000 
(0.005) 
Input: I -0.004 
(0.010) 
Input: I -0.033*** 
(0.011) 
Input: I -0.014 
(0.011) 
Input: I -0.007 
(0.040) 
Input: I 0.006 
(0.018) 
Input: I -0.007 
(0.005) 
  Interest 
rate a 
0.045** 
(0.017) 
Convicts 0.213*** 
(0.039) 
Students  0.148 
(0.106) 
Youth 
and sport 
0.099*** 
(0.028) 
Doctors 1.098*** 
(0.084) 
Unem-
ployed 
0.169*** 
(0.028) 
Road 
length 
0.539*** 
(0.086) 
Vacant 
accomm’ 
-0.026 
(0.037) 
Farms 0.631*** 
(0.022) 
  Firms 0.137*** 
(0.019) 
Delin-
quencies a 
0.188*** 
(0.032) 
Univers’ 
diplomas 
0.033 
(0.041) 
Museum 
tickets 
0.075*** 
(0.021) 
Patient 
cases 
-0.094 
(0.082) 
Reintegr’ 
people  
-0.005 
(0.014) 
Vehicles 0.458*** 
(0.134) 
Popu-
lation   
0.619 
(0.748) 
Founded 
firms 
0.076*** 
(0.019) 
  Popu- 
lation 
0.831*** 
(0.017) 
Prisoner 
on remand  
-0.008 
(0.007) 
H’ school 
grad’  
0.034 
(0.028) 
Forest 
area  
-0.011 
(0.008) 
 
 
People 
over 65 
0.856*** 
(0.019) 
Acci-
dents a 
0.002 
(0.005) 
  Beds in 
hotels 
-0.026*** 
(0.003) 
  Year 0.007** 
(0.003) 
Time 0.017*** 
(0.002) 
Time 0.024*** 
(0.005) 
Time 0.017*** 
(0.004) 
Time 0.008 
(0.006) 
Time 0.006** 
(0.003) 
Time 0.897 
(10.343) 
Time 0.003 
(0.008) 
Time 0.023*** 
(0.001) 
  Intercept -0.109*** 
(0.029) 
Intercept -22.87*** 
(3.722) 
 
 
Intercept -26.44*** 
(8.080) 
Intercept -0.028 
(0.046) 
Intercept -0.043 
(0.027) 
Intercept 0.048 
(0.047) 
  Intercept -36.26*** 
(1.228) 
Sigma uit         
Expenditures 
special financings 0.096 (0.327) 0.248 (0.188) 0.578 (0.465) 0.017 (0.068) 0.243 (0.156) -12.977** (5.312) 0.020 (0.018) -0.034** (0.016) -0.026 (0.068) 
Volume special 
financings 4.059 (2.749) 0.829 (2.237) 0.354 (0.277) 0.515 (0.890) 0.015 (0.157) -2.097 (8.420) 0.349* (0.190) -1.074* (0.610) 0.105 (0.152) 
 Interaction -0.200 (0.274) -0.346 (0.266) -0.084 (0.068) 0.004 (0.032) -0.008 (0.016) 2.943 (14.165) -0.003 (0.005) 0.016** (0.008) 0.013 (0.013) 
Tax progressivity 3.492 (4.463) 1.089 (1.517) 3.522*** (1.222) 4.392*** (1.058) 0.380 (1.238) -11.258*** (3.452) 0.856 (1.166) -3.616* (2.057) 1.265** (0.620) 
GDP per capita 0.335 (0.343) 0.030 (0.055) 0.107** (0.044) 0.502*** (0.179) -0.002 (0.104) 0.124 (0.141) 0.029 (0.080) -0.222** (0.106) 0.073* (0.037) 
 Interaction -0.081 (0.061) -0.028 (0.022) -0.047*** (0.013) -0.057*** (0.021) -0.020 (0.033) 0.048** (0.019) -0.025 (0.032) 0.038** (0.017) -0.030** (0.012) 
Tax complexity -0.240 (0.296) -0.059 (0.083) 0.041 (0.050) 0.043 (0.055) -0.162* (0.098) -0.027 (0.075) -0.021 (0.077) -0.012 (0.053) -0.045 (0.056) 
Tax 
diversification -1.396 (1.653) -1.916*** (0.585) -0.338 (0.207) -2.530** (0.997) -0.480 (0.351) -1.520 (1.162) 0.815** (0.345) 0.131 (0.519) 0.173 (0.178) 
Transfers 0.042 (0.246) -0.229** (0.092) 0.043* (0.025) -0.031** (0.015) -0.028 (0.027) 0.206 (0.130) 0.012 (0.027) 0.038 (0.027) 0.013 (0.015) 
Gross debt p. cap. -0.793 (0.602) -1.792*** (0.258) -0.077 (0.177) 0.502* (0.276) -0.140 (0.489) -1.784*** (0.530) 0.264*** (0.086) 0.246 (0.415) 0.436*** (0.110) 
Population density -12.959 (62.591) -5.664 (3.967) 2.985 (7.223) 20.401* (12.098) 11.934 (14.591) 28.404** (11.420) 1.327 (7.142) -0.517 (4.056) 0.892 (2.424) 
Referendum 0.558 (1.827) 0.384 (0.318) 1.193** (0.605) 0.022 (1.149) -0.722 (0.866) -0.271 (0.477) -1.311 (0.927) -1.513 (0.955) -0.250 (0.494) 
Initiative 0.018 (2.644) 1.847*** (0.622) -0.698 (0.576) 1.300* (0.785) -0.672 (1.431) -3.600** (1.696) 0.621 (0.565) 6.954** (3.402) 0.433 (0.277) 
Bourgeois parties 0.000 (0.101) -0.064** (0.026) -0.037 (0.027) -0.051 (0.054) 0.055*** (0.019) -0.141** (0.071) 0.029 (0.020) 0.034 (0.021) -0.008 (0.016) 
Fragmentation -1.419 (1.537) -0.935*** (0.344) -0.020 (0.461) -1.658* (0.967) -0.606 (0.752) -6.212*** (2.331) -0.005 (0.389) 0.013 (0.268) -0.129 (0.152) 
Voter turnout -0.065 (0.088) 0.012 (0.036) -0.024 (0.026) 0.035 (0.023) -0.005 (0.047) 0.063 (0.055) 0.047 (0.074) -0.004 (0.025) 0.036** (0.017) 
Foreigners 1.137 (1.397) 2.069*** (0.278) 0.215 (0.176) -1.194** (0.511) -0.208 (0.209) 0.989** (0.474) -0.066 (0.098) -0.315* (0.165) 0.051 (0.076) 
National streets      0.009 (0.018)   
Intercept (𝛿𝛿0) -11.253 (43.124) -25.965*** (8.507) -21.355 (14.028) -15.608*** (5.946) 18.365 (13.239) 45.338 (40.745) -13.223** (6.106) -14.772 (22.041) -13.344*** (5.075) 
Sigma v          
Intercept (𝜔𝜔0) -5.426*** (0.194) -5.809*** (0.169) -7.073*** (0.202) -4.435*** (0.154) -3.832*** (0.207) -5.707*** (0.194) -4.746*** (0.623) -4.938*** (0.230) -6.930*** (0.216) 
a Index as described in section 6.2 
Notes: * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%. Beta, delta and omega coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by canton in parentheses; the upper part (frontier) describes the frontier function and hence 
all variables are in logs due to the Cobb-Douglas specification; the middle (Sigma ui) part shows the coefficients of the 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 parametrization, where the environmental variables coincide with those in  
Table 20; the lower part (Sigma v) shows the estimate of 𝜔𝜔0 = 2 ln(𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣); (RE) and (TE) indicate the true random or true fixed effect model. 
